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          SUMMARY 
    7KH$GPLUDOW\¶VJUHDWHVWFKDOOHQJHGXUing the interwar period was how 
to defend %ULWDLQ¶VYDVWHPSLUHDQGWUDGHURXWHVZLWKWKe limited resources that 
it had been given. Within such a context, tough decisions had to be made 
about threat assessment and evaluating the relative importance of British 
holdings worldwide in order to create a list of defence priorities. This became 
increasingly more important towards the end of the 1930s, as the prospect that 
the British Empire would face a hostile correlation of enemy forces that was 
well beyond its means became increasingly likely. This thesis shall study how 
WKH$GPLUDOW\¶VSODQV IRUGHIHQGLQJ%ULWLVK LQWHUHVWV LQ WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ6HD
evolved over the course of an eight-year period from 1932 to 1939, seeking in 
the process to understand how naval planning in the Mediterranean connected 
with larger schemes of imperial defence. 
 
    British defence planners had, prior to the 1930s, not given much 
thought to formulating comprehensive plans for defending British interests in 
the Mediterranean sea. This, however, did not mean that the region was 
considered strategically unimportant in the eyes of the British government or its 
defence planners. Rather, it was a reflection of the fact that the Royal Navy 
faced no challenger in the Mediterranean strong enough to warrant attention. 
When this comfortable scenario changed during the mid 1930s, the Admiralty 
embarked on a belated but innovative search for solutions. Some naval 
planners sought to exploit British naval superiority to deliver a decisive blow to 
%ULWDLQ¶VPDLQ0HGLWHUUDQHDQDGYHUVDU\,WDO\Yet, for such an offensive to be 
possible, the Admiralty would have been forced to reduce, at least temporarily, 
British naval assets in other theatres. In addition, the attendant risk of losses in 
capital ships that would inevitably arise in a war against Italy could seriously 
deplete overall British naval strength. These risks were, in light of the triple 
threat faced by the British Empire in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and the Far 
East, considered too much for the Admiralty to stomach. 
 
 Records of discussions held within the Admiralty and the British 
Cabinet, as well as private correspondence between British defence planners 
 iv 
indicate that they were always deeply concerned about the impact that a war 
with Italy in the Mediterranean would have upon %ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ Europe 
and in the Far East. The rapidly deteriorating strategic situation by the late 
1930s forced British leaders to consider the possibility of an accommodation 
with DWOHDVWRQHRI%ULWDLQ¶VSRWHQWLDOHQHPLHV7KLVKDGDQHIIHFWRQGHIHQFH
planning in the Mediterranean. While it might be unfair to accuse the Admiralty 
RIEHLQJ OHGXS WKHJDUGHQSDWKZLWK UHJDUG WR ,WDO\¶VXOWLPDWH LQWHQWLRQV, the 
fact remains that British defence planners clung onto the possibility of peace in 
the Mediterranean right until the very last moment.   
 
     7KHPXFKWRXWHG³NQRFNRXWEORZ´WKDWZDVaimed at eliminating ,WDO\¶V
capacity to wage war within the shortest possible time proved ultimately 
unworkable. Yet, the fact that such a plan was seriously considered in the first 
place suggests the Admiralty considered the Mediterranean to be a region of 
great strategic significance from the very beginning. British naval planning in 
the Mediterranean holds an important place in any serious study of interwar 


























      The British Admiralty played an integral role in formulating 
British defence policy in the Mediterranean during the 1930s. As the 
PHQLQFKDUJHRIWKHPRVWSRZHUIXODUPRI%ULWDLQ¶VPLOLWDU\WKH5R\DO
1DY\ WKH$GPLUDOW\¶V YRLFHZDVRIWHQPRVW LQIOXHQWLDO GXULQJ&KLHI RI
Staff(COS) debates over issues of imperial defence. In 1932, the 
Admiralty considered the Mediterranean to be a completely secure 
region for which few, if any, defence preparations would be necessary. 
By 1939, the Admiralty expected a general European war to begin with 
an all-out Italian attack against British interests in the Mediterranean, 
and was seriously considering the option of a pre-emptive strike led by 
WKH 5R\DO 1DY\ VKRXOG ,WDO\ GHFODUH ZDU %ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH
Mediterranean was a crucial piece of the jigsaw of imperial defence, 
becoming even more important towards the end of the decade. 
Undoubtedly, British naval policy in the Mediterranean was to some 
extent a reactive exercise, shaped by the flow of events as they 
GHYHORSHG 1HYHUWKHOHVV XQGHUO\LQJ WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V WKLQNLQJ ZDV
always a strong sense that this was a strategically important region 
inextricably connected with grand schemes of imperial defence. 
 
      British naval strategy in the Mediterranean has traditionally 
been under-represented in studies of interwar defence policy given the 
trDGLWLRQDO HPSKDVLV RQ WKH)DU(DVW DV WKH FHQWUH RI WKH$GPLUDOW\¶V
naval plans. This does come across as rather surprising given the 
traditional importance of the Mediterranean to the British Empire. Since 
$GPLUDO1HOVRQ¶VGHIHDWRI1DSROHRQ¶VIOHHWDWWKe Battle of Trafalgar in 
1805, British policymakers had considered the Mediterranean Sea to 
be a region of great strategic interest to the Empire. Following the 
construction of the Suez Canal in 1869, which provided British ships 
with the shortest route to India and the Far East, the Mediterranean 
6HD¶V LPSRUWDQFH LQFUHDVHG HYHQ IXUWKHU LQ %ULWLVK H\HV :KLOH WKH
Admiralty can indeed be credited with a Far Eastern bias, it does not 
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follow that it considered the Mediterranean to be strategically 
insignificant within the broader context of grand strategy.  
 
      %ULWDLQ¶V GHIHQFH SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ ZDV DOZD\V
seen as an important link in the global chain of imperial defence both 
metaphorically and geographically, not least in maintaining the 
connection between Europe and the Far East through Suez.  During 
the Crimean War from 1853 to 1856, Britain had gone to war on the 
side of the Ottoman Empire against Russia partly due to concerns that 
the defeat of the Ottomans would have led to Russia enjoying 
unrestricted naval access to the Mediterranean sea.1 The presence of 
a Russian fleet was expected to undermine British naval supremacy in 
the Mediterranean, concomitantly weakening British influence in the 
Middle East. The ill-fated Gallipoli Campaign during the First World 
War, which lasted for eight months and cost the British Empire 205,000 
casualties, had been conducted with the aim of knocking the Ottoman 
Empire out of the war.2  This was expected to permanently remove the 
Ottoman threat to the Suez Canal. The lure of a Mediterranean 
³NQRFNRXW EORZ´ ZRXOG EH XSSHUPRVW LQ WKH PLQGV RI $GPLUDOW\
planners once again on the eve of the Second World War.   
 
      This thesis shall argue that naval planning from 1932 to 1939 
reflected a nervous search for solutions that would guarantee British 
dominance of the Mediterranean under any circumstances. This search 
became more urgent towards the end of the decade as a result of 
)DVFLVW ,WDO\¶VH[SDQVLRQLVWDPELWLRQV7KLVWKHVLVDOVRDUJXHVWKDWWKH
Admiralty was persistently reluctant to sanction a war with Italy due to 
its fear that possible losses from such a war would compromise the 
defence of British interests in other theatres. It will explore the 
relationship between naval planning in the Mediterranean and overall                                                         
1
 John Aldred, British Imperial and Foreign Policy, 1846-1980 (London: 
Heinemann, 2004), p. 97. 
2
 Edward J. Erickson. Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in 
the First World War (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2001), p. 94.  
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grand strategy, and how this relationship changed over the course of 
the decade in response to the course of events. 
 
      Chapter One will study British naval planning in the 
Mediterranean from 1932 to 1935. It will begin by setting out the 
geographLFDO SDUDPHWHUV RI %ULWDLQ¶V LPSHULDO LQWHUHVWV LQ WKH
0HGLWHUUDQHDQ DQGKRZ WKHVH SDUDPHWHUV LQIOXHQFHG WKH$GPLUDOW\¶V
mindset in deciding important strategic issues such as defence 
resource allocation both within and without the Mediterranean Sea. 
Planners recognized the importance of the Suez Canal in facilitating 
the success of the Singapore Strategy, yet realized that this had to be 
balanced against the fact that Britain faced no forseeable threat to its 
position in the Mediterranean. Local defence issues at this point were 
mainly concerns about the vulnerability of Malta, the island that served 
as the headquarters and main base of the Mediterranean Fleet, and 
fears about the vulnerability of the Suez Canal to sabotage. Requests 
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet to fortify Malta 
constantly fell on deaf years. In contrast, the Admiralty devoted plenty 
of attention to formulating a detailed plan to ensure British control over 
Suez in a variety of scenarios. These local defence plans can tell us 
much about how the Admiralty viewed the Mediterranean and its place 
in grand strategy, and which strategic concerns it considered as vital.    
 
      &KDSWHU 7ZR DQDO\]HV WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V UHDFWLRQV WR WKH
Abyssinian crisis, a watershed event that changed the mindset of 
British defence planners towards the vulnerability of British interests in 
WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ,WZLOOVFUXWLQL]HWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VSODQVIRr responding 
to a hostile Italian reaction to sanctions imposed by the League of 
Nations, as well as records of naval movements prior to and during the 
KHLJKW RI WKH FULVLV 7KH $GPLUDOW\¶V GHFLVLRQ WR VHQG RXW WKH0RELOH
Naval Base Defence Organization(MNDBO) suggests that it was fully 
ready for the outbreak of war during the most dangerous period of the 
crisis, and made serious preparations to attack Italy if necessary. Yet, 
WKH$GPLUDOW\¶VUHDGLQHVVIRUZDUZDVQRWUHIOHFWHGLQWKHDGYLFHWKDWLW
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gave the British government, which was characterized by a great deal 
RI FDXWLRQ 7KLV FKDSWHU ZLOO DUJXH WKDW FRQFHUQV DERXW %ULWDLQ¶V
continued ability to guarantee the security of its interests in the Far 
East led the Admiralty to ultimately decide not to risk war against Italy.  
 
      Chapter Three will look at the running debate between the 
British Foreign Office and the Admiralty over whether Britain should 
pursue a policy of conciliation or confrontation towards Italy in the 
Mediterranean. This debate was held amidst the background of the 
Spanish Civil War and a rapidly expanding Italian military presence in 
WKHUHJLRQ ,WZLOODQDO\]H WKHIDFWRUVEHKLQG WKH$GPLUDOW\¶VFRQWLQXHG
support of Italian appeasement despite being clearly aware of the 
increasingly KRVWLOHQDWXUHRI,WDO\¶VDFWLRQV. It will probe the reasoning 
EHKLQG WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V SULRULWL]DWLRQ RI WKH )DU (DVW RYHU WKH
Mediterranean ± why was the Far East, almost by default, considered 
by British defence planners as the most important British defence 
interest outside the Home Islands?  Exchanges between local British 
commanders in the Mediterranean and the COS clearly indicate a 
heightened sense of danger. This chapter also considers how the 
outbreak of the Panay crisis in the Far East triggered a reassessment 
of the security of the Suez passage in light of the increased Italian 
threat against British-held Egypt, which planners belatedly recognized 
could seriously jeopardize the Singapore Strategy. A study of CID and 
Cabinet discussions during this period reveal much about the 
connection between Far Eastern and Mediterranean plans, especially 
when the spectre of a simultaneous triple threat to the British Empire in 
the form of Germany, Italy and Japan gradually emerged. 
 
      The final chapter encompasses the period from the signing of 
the Anglo-,WDOLDQ (DVWHU $FFRUGV WR %ULWDLQ¶V GHFODUDWLRQ RI ZDU RQ
Germany following the German invasion of Poland in August 1939.  It 
will focus primarily on the process of introspection in grand strategy 
that was engineered partly as a result of leadership change in the 
British naval high command. While this study has addressed the 
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traditional information gap that existed about British plans regarding the 
Mediterranean, it will reaffirm the traditional principle of Far Eastern 
SULPDF\ZLWKUHJDUGVWRWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VRYHUDOOJUDQGVWUDWHJLFRXWORRN
/DZUHQFH3UDWW¶VZRUNRQ%ULWLVKVWUDWHJ\ LQ WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQGXULQJ
the late interwar period considers the British government and defence 
HVWDEOLVKPHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR DGRSt, late in the day, Admiral Roger 
%DFNKRXVH¶V ³0HGLWHUUDQHDQ )LUVW´ DSSURDFK +H DUJXHV WKDW WKH
catalyst for the COS to adopt this strategy was the rapidly deteriorating 
European situation in early 1939 which made it impossible for a strong 
fleet to be sent eastwards.3 7KLV WKHVLV DJUHHVZLWK 3UDWW¶V DUJXPHQW
that the worsening situation in Europe in early 1939 was an important 
LQIOXHQFHWRZDUGVWKH&26¶V tentative decision in May 1939 to accept 
%DFNKRXVH¶V proposals. It argues, however, that the Admiralty was 
initially motivated to change its plans primarily because it believed that 
concentrating British naval forces in the Mediterranean during the 
opening stages of war offered an excellent opportunity to defeat Italy. 
This was expected to greatly ease the $GPLUDOW\¶V VWUDWHJLF
SUHGLFDPHQW E\ UHPRYLQJ DW D VWURNH RQH RXW RI WKUHH RI %ULWDLQ¶V
enemies. Chapter Four VKDOOFRQGXFWDGHWDLOHGVWXG\RIWKH$GPLUDOW\¶V
plans for an opening attack against Italy in an attempt to assess the 
key issues behind the strategy debates that took place during the final 
year of peace before World War Two. Did the Admiralty and the COS 
EHOLHYH WKDW D ³NQRFNRXW EORZ´ DJDLQVW ,WDO\ZDV really feasible? Why 
was the plan for a Mediterranean offensive then cancelled by the late 
summer of 1939?  
 
       With conventional narratives about British grand strategy 
during the interwar period tending to focus mainly upon the 
&KDPEHUODLQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V ³SROLF\ RI DSSHDVHPHQW´ LW LV SHUKDSV
appropriate that the part played by the Admiralty in shaping defence 
policy be given more attention. The British government pursued a                                                         
3
 Lawrence. R. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez (Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), p. 179. 
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policy of appeasement in the Mediterranean and persisted with it 
despite increasing evidence of its failure by mid 1938 simply because 
British naval weakness dictated that an accommodation be reached 
ZLWKDW OHDVWRQHRI%ULWDLQ¶VSRWHQWLDOHQHPLHV ,WZDVQRW WKH IDXOWRI
British defence planners that such a situation came to pass, after all it 
was the decision of prior British governments to cut back on defence 
spending in the 1920s that compelled the COS to plan under the 
restriction of drastically reduced resources.  
 
      Nonetheless, it was the COS prerogative and responsibility to 
decide how best these resources should be deployed in the face of the 
demands of defending a worldwide empire. With the Royal Navy 
carrying by far the largest burden in terms of imperial defence by virtue 






















Literature Review   
 
      The state of the field on British interwar grand strategy is 
admittedly very well researched. This is unsurprising when one 
considers that the Second World War is still regarded by many as the 
defining event of the twentieth century. Most works, however, are of a 
mainly macroscopic character, giving us a big picture view of how 
grand strategy was formulated through innumerable numbered debates 
by the various committees and ministries, without paying much 
attention to local concerns. While there are works that consider grand 
strategy by looking at a specific region, such as the Far East, these 
studies constitute the minority.  
 
      1RUPDQ *LEEV¶ DXWKRULWDWLYH volume, Grand Strategy, was 
the first to provide a thoroughly comprehensive account of the systems 
and decisions that guided the process of British rearmament during the 
1930s. Gibbs examines the uniquely British machinery of committee-
based decision making for defence and rearmament policy, charting 
how the system reacted to various crises during the mid to late 1930s. 
He filled an important gap in the scholarship of how defence resources 
were allocated amongst the various services and how the dynamics of 
rearmament, particularly relating to the interaction of views between 
the British Army, Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, played out in the 
years before the outbreak of war. The role of the COS, who sat on the 
various committees that decided the shape, form, and pace of 
rearmament is also given significant scrutiny in GLEEV¶ ZRUN 0RVW
critically, Gibbs charts how rearmament programs were meshed with 
broader grand strategy by the myriad of committees, most notably in 
the form of the Committee of Imperial Defence(CID) and Defence 
Policy Requirements Committee(DRC) during the early to mid 1930s 
and the Strategic Appreciation Committee(SAC) during the late 1930s. 
Written more than forty years after the war, Grand Strategy, Vol: 1, 
argues that the policies pursued by British political leaders were simply 
D SURGXFW RI ³WKHPRRd and spirit of the inter-war age, nothing more 
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DQG QRWKLQJ OHVV´4 In this conception of British policy, appeasement 
was simply a distasteful but necessary evil for the British government 
to buy time for rearmament and psychologically prepare the British 
public for war. This was a direct criticism of the popular perception of 
Neville Chamberlain and other interwar British politicians such as 
Stanley Baldwin for having failed morally simply by deciding to 
³DSSHDVH´+LWOHUDQG0XVVROLQLGXULQJWKHV 
 
      &DSWDLQ6WHSKHQ:HQWZRUWK5RVNLOO¶VNaval Policy Between 
the Wars: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament analyses the impact of 
post-war disarmament and the subsequent naval rearmament 
programmes from 1929 to 1939. Having served as an officer in the 
Royal Navy since 1921, Roskill was appointed as Official Naval 
Historian for the Royal Navy when he retired from service in 1949. 
Roskill is able to bring to the table a uniquely detailed perspective of 
the scope and direction of naval rearmament during the 1930s and 
their impact on Admiralty planning and strategy. In his chapter about 
the British reaction to the Abyssinian crisis, Roskill also manages to 
skillfully blend the views of the Admiralty with those of local 
commanders. This results in a highly nuanced account of the tactical 
as well as broader strategic issues that VKDSHG WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V
UHVSRQVH +HDUJXHVWKDW LWZDVXOWLPDWHO\ WKH$GPLUDOW\¶VUHOXFWDQFH
to risk war with Italy, combined with the doubtful nature of French 
support, that proved decisive in leading to the failure of League 
sanctions against Italy. 5 Arthur Marder echoes this argument in his 
journal article The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis(1976). 6 
Through the utilization of extensive archival sources in the form of 
intelligence reports in addition to other official Admiralty and CID 
records, Marder is able to provide telling details of closed door                                                         
4
 See Norman. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, Vol. I: Rearmament Policy 
(London: HMSO, 1956), p. 333. 
5
 Stephen Wentworth Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, The 
Period of Reluctant Rearmament (London: Walker, 1976), p. 255. 
6
 Arthur Marder³7KH5R\DO1DY\DQGWKH(WKLRSLDQ&ULVLVRI-´
The American Historical Review 75, 5 (1970), p. 1356. 
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discussions over possible responses as the crisis gradually escalated 
throughout late 1935. His access to the private letters of Admiral 
Chatfield makes him privy to the thoughts of the man ultimately 
responsible for the advice that the Admiralty gave the British 
government. While both Roskill and Marder seem justified by primary 
evidence in suggesting that the Admiralty exaggerated the dangers of 
war against Italy, they appear to be on somewhat less firm ground 
when it comes to the role of the French in influencing final decisions. 
Marder in particular appears eager to pin the blame for apparent British 
pusillanimity during the crisis on the lack of French assistance despite 
admitting that the French proved willing to provide some degree of 
support, albeit one that failed to meet British expectations.7  
 
           Ian Hamill and Christopher Bell provide differing accounts 
that provide an interesting contrast of views with regard to the criticism 
leveled at British defence planners for the unpreparedness of British 
military forces on the eve of World War Two. Ian HaPLOO¶VThe Strategic 
Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defence of Australia, 1919-
1942 charts the development of the Singapore Strategy, which was the 
much derided plan to send the British main fleet to the Far East upon a 
Japanese declaration of war against Britain, from its inception in 1921 
until its denouement in the form of the sending of the ill-IDWHG ³)O\LQJ
6TXDGURQ´ FRQVLVWLQJ RI WKe battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the 
battlecruiser HMS Repulse to Singapore in late 1941. Hamill criticizes 
the Admiralty for believing that the Singapore Strategy could act as an 
effective deterrent against Japanese aggression in the Far East despite 
increasing evidence by the mid 1930s that such a plan would be 
unworkable should the worst-case scenario of simultaneous war 
against Germany, Italy and Japan come to pass. He argued that the 
$GPLUDOW\¶VGHFLVLRQWo persist with the Singapore Strategy reflected a 
naïve belief LQDVWUDWHJLFLOOXVLRQWKDW³D7ZR-Hemisphere Empire can 
                                                        
7
 Marder, p. 1355. 
 10 
be defended by a One-Hemisphere Navy.´ 8  %HOO¶V SXEOLFDWLRQ The 
Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy between the Wars(2000), 
FRQGXFWVDQH[WHQVLYHVWXG\RI WKH$GPLUDOW\¶V LQWerwar plans against 
various enemies including Germany, Japan, Italy and even the United 
States. He argues that the Admiralty was already beginning to shift 
from traditional notions of a Mahanian-style clash of fleets towards 
using the navy as an instrument of economic blockade. Seen in this 
respect, the Singapore Strategy was not a singularly rigid plan for a 
naval cavalry charge of British battleships into the waters of Southeast 
Asia as it was traditionally perceived by students of interwar British 
imperial defence strategy. Instead, Bell perceived the Singapore 
Strategy as comprising of a menu of differing options that provided the 
Admiralty with a degree of flexibility in dealing with numerous scenarios 
that might arise prior to or during the event of conflict with Japan in the 
Far East. These plans, according to Bell, evolved in response to 
changes in the global political situation in the 1930s, maintaining the 
6LQJDSRUH6WUDWHJ\¶VUHOHYDQFH9 
 
           The first major study of British interwar defence policy in the 
Mediterranean focused on the last four years before the outbreak of 
war in 1939. This was the period from the beginning of the Spanish 
Civil War onwards, when Italy first began to feature as a possible 
enemy in the eyes of British defence plDQQHUV  /DZUHQFH5 3UDWW¶V
account in (DVWRI0DOWD:HVWRI6XH]%ULWDLQ¶V0HGLWHUUDQHDQ&ULVLV
1936-1939(First published in 1975, 2nd edition 2008) argues that 
%ULWDLQ¶VIDLOXUHWRVHFXUHLWVSRVLWLRQLQWKH(DVWHUQ0HGLWHUUDQHDQZDV
the decisive factor that made its imperial defence dilemma 
unresolvable. 10  Pratt also makes the case for the existence of a                                                         
8
 Ian Hamill, The Strategic illusion, The Singapore Strategy and the 
Defence of Australia and New Zealand (Singapore University Press, 
1981), p. 314.  
9
 Christopher Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between 
the Wars (Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 59. 
10
 Pratt makes the case that the conflict between Mussolini and the 
/HDJXHRI1DWLRQV³UDLVHGWKHSURVSHFWRIDSHUPanently antagonized 
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pessimistic, almost defeatist collective psychology amongst British 
decision makers in the face of multiple crises in 1938-1939. This 
defeatist mentality was most prevalent amongst the services, whom 
Pratt fingers as the most ardent supporters of appeasement.11 Pratt 
helped to shift scholarship of British foreign policy away from central 
(XURSHZKHQ LW KDGSUHYLRXVO\ EHHQ FKDUDFWHUL]HGE\&KDPEHUODLQ¶V
ultimately fruitless attempts to broker a lasting European peace at the 
Munich Conference during the Sudeten crisis in 1938. Instead, by 
putting the spotlight on events in the Mediterranean, Pratt succeeded in 
drawing attention to events in a region hitherto not been given much 
attention by scholars of the appeasement policy.    
 
      Reynolds M. Salerno goes one step further in Vital 
Crossroads: Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935-
1940(2002), arguing that Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean were 
just as important as those of Germany in central Europe in influencing 
British and French decisions prior to the Second World War. Salerno 
criticizes both Chamberlain and the Admiralty for persisting with the 
appeasement of Italy even when it became evident by 1938 that such a 
policy had little prospect of success.12 Relying heavily on French and 
Italian archival material, Salerno makes a strong case that for the 
French government, control of the Mediterranean was as important as 
resisting German expansion in central Europe. Salerno argues that 




its system of priorities and thus have far-reaching consequences in the 
)DU(DVWDQGQHDUHUKRPH´6HH/DZUHQFH53UDWWEast of Malta, 
West of Suez (Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 30. 
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p. 104. 
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to eschew an attack on Italy in late 1939, had a decisive effect not only 
on how the Second World War broke out but also the course of the war 
itself. By surrendering the initiative to the Axis, the British effectively set 
the stage for the disastrous events of 1940 when the defeat of France 
by Nazi Germany effectively led to a brief period when Axis armies 
were virtually unchallenged on the European continent. 13  While 
Salerno might perhaps be accused of over-emphasizing the 
importance of the Mediterranean, he does offer a refreshing 
perspective to traditional narratives about the origins of the Second 
World War.  
 
      The last few years of peace before the outbreak of the most 
destructive war in human history constitute a highly dynamic and 
fascinating period in the scholarship of British grand strategy. The 
cautionary tale against appeasement that casts Chamberlain as the 
villain of the piece has become all too familiar to students of late 
interwar European foreign policy. While such a narrative cannot really 
be considered misleading, it omits the full picture. This thesis 
addresses a crucial gap in currently existing studies of revisionist 
scholarship by further exploring the connections between the 















CHAPTER ONE: British Grand Strategy from 1932 to 1935 - How 
did the Mediterranean fit in? 
    
      The fundamental importance of the Mediterranean sea to 
British imperial defence policy during the 20th century lay primarily in 
the fact that the inland sea sat astride the shortest route between the 
BrLWLVK +RPH ,VODQGV DQG WKH )DU (DVW IROORZLQJ WKH 6XH] &DQDO¶V
FRQVWUXFWLRQ LQ7KHEDVLQ¶V UROHDV WKHNH\KLJKZD\RI LPSHUial 
defence constituted the prism through which British defence planners 
saw its defence and relevance to larger schemes of defending the 
Empire. Following the final abolishment of the Ten-Year Rule in 1932, 
the British government embarked upon a thorough re-examination of 
British defence policy in an attempt to correct the deficiencies in 
Britain¶V GHIHQFH FDSDELOLWLHV WKDW KDG PDQLIHVWHG IURP WHQ \HDUV RI
drastically reduced defence spending.14 Corollary to this review was an 
attempt to establish defence priorities for various British colonial 
territories and imperial lines of communications which was necessary 
for deciding the allocation of scarce defence resources. During the 
HDUO\VWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VGHFLVLRQWRFRPPLWLWVHOIWRWKH³Singapore 
6WUDWHJ\´ D GHFLVLRQ influenced and underscored by increasing 
Japanese military capabilities, meant that the Far Eastern theatre had 
become, by default, the chief priority in British imperial defence, second 
only to the defence of the Home Islands. This chapter shall discuss 
how the British Admiralty attempted to fit the defence of British                                                         
14
 On 15th August 1919, the British War Cabinet set out the principles 
which, it said, should govern the plans of the Service Departments 
during the coming years.  Some of these applied to the work of the 
individual Services. But one general principle was to apply to them all. 
µ,WVKRXOGEHDVVXPHGIRUIUDPLQJUHYLVHG(VWLPDWHVWKDWWKH%ULWLVK
Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years, 
DQGWKDWQR([SHGLWLRQDU\)RUFHLVUHTXLUHGIRUWKLVSXUSRVH¶,Q
the Ten-Year Rule was officially formalized as part of British policy and 
the ten-year period for which war was not to be expected was renewed 
on a daily basis.  The Ten-Year Rule was to act as the guiding principle 
RI%ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQFHSROLF\XQWLO$QGHYHQZKHQLWZDVUHVFLQGHG
in that year, it left behind a legacy of uncertainty and unpreparedness 
which was hardly dissipated when the Second World War began. Cited 
from Gibbs, Grand Strategy, p. 3.  
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interests in the Mediterranean Basin in the years between 1932 and 
1935 into a coherent grand strategy of imperial defence that saw the 
Far East as the highest priority theatre. 
 
      The year 1932 was highly significant as it marked a 
watershed in British defence policy. The trigger for a fundamental 
UHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH%ULWLVK(PSLUH¶VGHIHQFHSODQVFDPHIURPHYHQWV
in the Far East, where conflict between an increasingly aggressive 
Imperial Japan and China was becoming a matter of significant 
concern due to the presence of considerable British interests in the Far 
East. More ominously, it pointed out the paucity of British defence 
capabilities in a region that was becoming dominated by Imperial 
-DSDQ¶VULVH7KHILQGLQJVRIWKLVUHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHHQWLUHVFKHPHRI
imperial defence were first enunciated in the Annual Review of Imperial 
Defence Policy by the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee in 1932. 
In this review, the COS listed GHILFLHQFLHVLQ%ULWDLQ¶VDUPHGIRUFHVWKDW
had manifested due to the Ten-Year Rule. In particular, the COS 
VLQJOHGRXW%ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQFHZHDNQHVVHVLQWKH)DU(DVWDVDQDUHDRI
major concern, which they believed presented an open invitation to the 
Japanese to act with impunity.15  
 
      Such weaknesses, the COS Committee pointed out, were not 
restricted to just one of the British armed services or any single 
geographical theatre. The Royal Navy was found to be at all points 
deficient in the means that were necessary for it to carry out its task.16 
This was evident not only in the obsolescence of many of its warships 
and lack of warships to carry out the task of global imperial policing, but 
also in the lack of proper defences for many overseas ports.17 As for 
the British Army, it was found to be hardly sufficient for the defence of 
India or %ULWDLQ¶VRWKHU(DVWAsian possessions, let alone carry out any 
responsibilities that might arise under the aegis of the League of                                                         
15
 Gibbs, p. 78. 
16
 Ibid., p. 78. 
17
 Ibid., p. 79. 
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Nations Covenant or the Treaty of Locarno.18 Britain, the strongest 
power within the League, was seen as the ultimate guarantor of 
European stability. Hence, any attempt to enforce a collective League 
decision would be heavily reliant on British military muscle, the COS 
findings were unnerving, to say the least.  
 
    The reassessment of British grand strategy by the COS was 
intimately linked with the overall direction of British foreign policy. 
Italian rearmament, which included an ambitious naval construction 
programme aimed at achieving eventual naval parity with France, 
suggested that Italy would, in time to come, become the power with the 
greatest capability to threaten British dominance of the Mediterranean. 
Nevertheless, the present political circumstances in the Mediterranean 
were interpreted by the COS to suggest that Italian intentions towards 
Britain were of a generally benign nature. This view was supported by 
the Admiralty, which was inclined to interpret Italian naval rearmament 
as being primarily motivated by Italo-French rivalry instead of as 
evidence that Italy intended a naval challenge against Britain in the 
Mediterranean.19  7KHGLUHFWLPSOLFDWLRQRIWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VDQDO\VLVZDV
that no major threats against Britain were perceived to exist in the 
Mediterranean, which pushed the theatre down on the list of British 
defence priorities.  
 
      The findings of the COS manifested themselves in the first 
report of the Defence Policy Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC), 
released in November 1933. 20  The DRC was set up as a sub-
committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), with its main 
purpose WRDFWDVDFRRUGLQDWLQJERG\ IRU%ULWDLQ¶V rearmament effort. 
This report set out the general strategic principles which were to guide 
                                                        
18
 Ibid., p. 79. 
19
 Stephen Morewood, The British Defence of Egypt, 1935-1940: 
conflict and crisis in the Mediterranean (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 
183. 
20
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WKH HIIRUWV WR UHSDLU WKH GHILFLHQFLHV LQ %ULWDLQ¶V DUPHG IRUFHV, as  
highlighted by the COS.  
 
      The DRC¶VUHSRUWEegan with a broad overview of the threats 
the British Empire was IDFLQJ0HUHO\D\HDUKDGODSVHGVLQFH%ULWDLQ¶V
final renunciation of the Ten-Year Rule in 1932, yet within this period, 
the strategic picture faced by British defence planners had grown 
incUHDVLQJO\ EOHDNHU +LWOHU¶V DVFHQVLRQ WR SRZHU DV &KDQFHOORU RI
Germany in early 1933 was accompanied by his decision to withdraw 
Germany from both the League of Nations and the Disarmament 
Conference. This forced the British government and its military 
advisers to consider, for the first time, the possibility that Britain might 
in future be forced to fight a simultaneous war against Germany in 
Europe and Japan in the Far East. More importantly, the DRC pointed 
out that Germany, due to its latent economic and military strength, its 
geographical position in the centre of Europe and proximity to the 
British Isles, had to be seen as the most dangerous, and possibly, the 
ultimate long-term enemy, that Britain would have to face.21 The global 
QDWXUHRI%ULWDLQ¶VGefence commitments made competing demands for 
scarce resources inevitable. Hence, the DRC hoped to establish a set 
of priorities that would govern the direction for the rectification of British 
defence deficiencies. Consequently, the DRC designated France, Italy 
and the United States as friendly powers against whom, for the 
present, no defence preparations were necessary.22  
 
      The DRC¶VUHSRUWWKHUHIRUHSURYLGHVDQLPSRUWDQWLQVLJKWLQWR
the mindset of the British Admiralty in its attempt to formulate a 
coherent grand strategy for empire defence in light of changes in the 
international situation.  The DRC¶V UHSRUW XQGHUOLQHd WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V
existing belief that Italy, despite its rapidly increasing military 
capabilities, should not be credited with any hostile intent towards 
Britain. Such a fundamentally benign interpretation of Italian intentions                                                         
21
 Ibid., p. 94.  
22
 Ibid., p. 93. 
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played a key role in shaping WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V DSSURDFK WRZDUGV WKH
Mediterranean sea in the years from 1932 to 1934.  
 
      7KH ³6LQJDSRUH 6WUDWHJ\´ HYROYHG DV D UHVXOW RI WKH
transformation of the global geo-strategic situation that followed the 
end of the First World War. This provided the Admiralty with both the 
reason and opportunity for a reassessment of its plans. The prostration 
RI*HUPDQ\%ULWDLQ¶VJUHDWHVWDQGPRVWGDQJHURXVQDYDO ULYDO IRU WKH
past few decades, meant that the British Empire, for the near future at 
least, did not have to contend with any major European power with 
either the willingness or the motivation to challenge British security in 
home waters. The situation in the Far East, however, demanded some 
concern. During the First World War, the Royal Navy entrusted the 
protection of British Far Eastern colonies and trade routes to Imperial 
Japan, which was then allied to the British under the terms of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance.23 What appeared though to be a militarily 
sound strategy, on the surface, aroused considerable concern amongst 
the British Dominions, particularly Australia.24 As early as 1919, the 
$GPLUDOW\ ZDV IRUFHG WR GUDZ DWWHQWLRQ WRZDUGV ³WKH UXPRXU RI WKH
passing of [British] sea VXSUHPDF\´ ± a rumour which ³FDOOHG IRUWK
emphatic protests from otheU SDUWV RI WKH (PSLUH´ DQG ZKLFK FRXOG
KDYH ³LPSRUWDQW HIIHFWV´ RQ %ULWLVK SUHVWLJH DQG ³GLSORPDWLF DQG
FRPPHUFLDO LQWHUHVWV´25 These concerns were echoed by the British 
Foreign Office, which urged on the Admiralty three times, during 1919 
and 1920, the need to base a powerful naval squadron at Singapore to 
LOOXVWUDWH WR ERWK WKH -DSDQHVH DQG WKH QDWLYHV WKDW %ULWDLQ¶V )DU
                                                        
23
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24
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(DVWHUQ SRVLWLRQ UHPDLQHG ³XQDVVDLODEOH´ DQG WR VWUHQJWKHQ %ULWDLQ¶V
diplomatic hand in dealings with the Japanese government.26  
 
     In March 1921, the Admiralty decided to accept in principle 
the recommendations of the Penang Conference and proceed with the 
construction of a new naval base in Singapore that would serve as, in 
WKHZRUGVRIWKHQ)LUVW6HD/RUG$GPLUDO-HOOLFRH³WKHNH\ to the British 
naval position in the Pacific.´27 From then onWKH³6LQJDSRUH6WUDWHJ\´
EHFDPH LPSOLFLWO\ IRUPDOLVHG DV%ULWDLQ¶V GHIDXOW EDWWOHSODQ DJDLQVW LWV
most likely enemy in the Pacific, Imperial Japan. Essentially, the key 
SUHPLVH RI WKH ³6LQJDSRUH 6WUDWHJ\´ ZDV WKDW LQ WKH HYHQW RI WKH
outbreak of war between Britain and Japan, the bulk of the Royal 
1DY\¶VPDLQIOHHWZRXOGVHWVDLODVVRRQDVSRVVLEOHWRWKH6LQJDSRUH
naval base, from which it would commence operations against the 
Japanese navy. While the actual construction of the base itself 
proceeded in a stop-start manner over the course of the next two 
decades, the British government and the naval staff continued to 
reaffirm that the main fleet of the Royal Navy would be sent out to the 
Far EDVW LQ WKH HYHQW RI -DSDQHVH DJJUHVVLRQ 7KH ³6LQJDSRUH
6WUDWHJ\´ GHYHORSHG DV D EDWWOHSODQ WR VDIHJXDUG %ULWLVK LQWHUHVWV LQ
the Far East, therefore gradually evolved into a fundamental 
component of global British grand strategy for imperial defence during 
the 1930s.  
 
      The growing emphasis upon the Singapore Strategy, 
together with the first DRC White Paper, appear to suggest that the Far 
Eastern theatre had been given the role of primus inter pares when it 
came to devising a scheme of overall empire defence by the British 
Admiralty. The prioritisation of the Far East seemed reasonable in the 
1920s when Britain faced no prospective enemies apart from Japan. 
Changes in the geopolitical situation, with the emergence of Germany 
and later Italy as potential British enemies, meant that the comfortable                                                         
26
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27
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DVVXPSWLRQVWKDWZHUHYLWDOWRWKH1DY\¶VDELOLW\WRVHQGWKH³PDLn fleet 
WR6LQJDSRUH´GHPDQGHGserious re-examination by the mid 1930s. The 
Admiralty responded to these changes in the plans from 1932 onwards, 
when the prospect of Britain fighting a multi-front war in the near future 
became much more likely than it had been for the last fourteen years. 
To consider how the Mediterranean basin was seen by the Admiralty 
vis-à-vis the entire scheme of British grand strategy, we must first 
examine in closer detail the link between the Mediterranean basin and 
the Singapore Strategy. 
 
      The Mediterranean basin was vital in the context of the 
6LQJDSRUH6WUDWHJ\ DV LW DOORZHG IRU VZLIW WUDQVLW RI WKH5R\DO1DY\¶V
main fleet from the British Isles to the Far East.  The need for the 
1DY\¶V PDLQ IOHHW WR EH DEOH WR PRYH TXLFNO\ IURP RQH WKHDWUe to 
another in light of the fact that Britain now faced, for the first time, a first 
class power situated thousands of miles from the Home Islands was 
underlined in an Overseas Defence Committee(ODC) memorandum 
which declared, 
Our naval strategy...is based on the principle that a fleet of 
adequate strength, suitably disposed geographically and 
FRQFHQWUDWHG DJDLQVW WKH HQHP\¶V IOHHW SURYLGHV WKH ³FRYHU´
under which security is given to widely dispersed territories and 
trade routes.28 
The same memorandum also stressed the importance of fleet mobility 
DQG WKH QHHG IRU µGHIHQGHG EDVHV DW VWUDWHJLF SRLQWV WKURXJKRXW WKH
(PSLUH¶2QHRIWKHNH\VWUDWHJLFSRLQWVWKDWWKH2'&KDGLQPLQGZDV
the Mediterranean basin, which, through the Suez Canal as its eastern 
exitZDVWKHSULPDU\URXWHWKURXJKZKLFKWKH1DY\¶VPDLQIOHHWKDGWR
WUDYHO LQ RUGHU WR SURYLGH WKH QHFHVVDU\ ³FRYHU´ IRU %ULWDLQ¶V ZLGHO\
dispersed territories in the Far East. The Suez Canal, which connected 
the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, was 
considered absolutely essential to British imperial communications. 
The degree of mobility that the Mediterranean route offered to the                                                         
28
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Royal Navy can be considered by comparing the sailing distance 
between the southernmost British port at Plymouth and Singapore via 
the Suez Canal with that between Plymouth and Singapore via the 
Cape of Good Hope. The route via Suez totals 8,100 nautical miles. In 
comparison, a journey via the traditional Cape route would total 11,400 
nautical miles.29 The additional distance via the traditional Cape route 
would have added two weeks to the travelling time for the journey.30 
The emphasis that the COS placed on the ability of the Main Fleet to 
be able to travel from home waters to the Far East within the shortest 
SRVVLEOHWLPHZDVXQGHUOLQHGLQWKHLUHVWLPDWLRQVRIWKH³SHULRGEHIRUH
UHOLHI´ which referred to the time it would take for the fleet to arrive in 
6LQJDSRUHIROORZLQJWKHGHFLVLRQWRVHQGLW,QWKH³SHULRGEHIRUH
UHOLHI´ ZDV GHVLJQDWHG DV  GD\V.31 While this figure was altered as 
the decade progressed due to changes in the geopolitical environment, 
the initially optimistic estimate suggests that Admiralty planners 
expected that the fleet could use the Suez route, and that nothing was 
expected to interfere with the passage of the fleet through the 
Mediterranean. Within this context, the importance of the 
Mediterranean to overall British grand strategy becomes fully 
highlighted. It therefore needs to be asked ± what were the most 
specific and pressing concerns of the British Admiralty with regard to 
the Mediterranean theatre from 1932 onwards?  
     
      7KHVWUHQJWKRI%ULWDLQ¶VQDYDOSRVLWLRQ LQWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ
basin effectively rested upon British control of strategic bastions at both 
exits and in the centre of the inland sea. In the west, British possession 
of a fortified naval base at Gibraltar allowed the Royal Navy to control 
passage between the Mediterranean basin and the Atlantic Ocean 
through the narrow Straits of Gibraltar. In the east, British overlordship 
over the Kingdom of Egypt, in conjunction with the British naval base at 
the port of Alexandria, allowed for effective control over passage                                                         
29
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through the Suez Canal. British presence at both ends of the 
Mediterranean was further consolidated with her possession of Malta, 
which sits almost at the geographic centre of the basin. 
  
      7KH %ULWLVK $GPLUDOW\¶V FRQFHUQV ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH
Mediterranean theatre during the first half of the 1930s were centered 
around two main issues. The first and biggest issue of concern was 
WKDWWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VDELOLW\WRHQMR\XQFRQWHVWHGSDVVDJHWKURXJKWKH
Suez Canal be made as secure as possible. Secondary to the Suez 
Canal was the problem of the defences of Malta, which, according to 
Admiral Sir William Fisher, Commander-in-Chief of the British 
Mediterranean Fleet, were grossly inadequate and required a 
significant amount of remedial work, especially with regard to the 
LVODQG¶VDQWL-aircraft defences.32 %\H[DPLQLQJ LQGHWDLO WKH$GPLUDOW\¶V
approach towards these two problems, it is possible to trace out a 
EURDGRXWOLQHRIWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VSROLF\WRZDUGVWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQEDVLQ
as a whole, and how the defence of the Mediterranean was meant to 
connect with the overall scheme of British imperial defence.  
 
      The British naval position in the Mediterranean had also been 
further complicated by the emergence of a naval arms race between 
France and Italy, which not only threatened to upset the naval balance 
of power in the Mediterranean but also increased the prospect of 
armed conflict. At this point it should be pointed out that, while the 
British Admiralty appeared to have accepted the DRC¶V
recommendation that Italy be considered a friendly power, British naval 
planners were already acknowledging that the growth of Italian military 
VWUHQJWK DQG ,WDO\¶V RFFXSDWLRQ RI D FHQWUDO SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH
Mediterranean demanded some attention regarding a possible war 
against Italy in future.  This is evidenced in a report sent by the 
Admiralty to the CID in mid-1932 regarding the measures that might be 
taken to apply economic pressure to Italy, which was accompanied by                                                         
32
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an assessment of Italian strengths and vulnerabilities should it become 
LQYROYHGLQDZDUDJDLQVW%ULWDLQ7KH$GPLUDOW\¶VPDLQILQGLQJZDVWKDW
given Ital\¶V VKRUWDJHRI LPSRUWDQW UDZPDWHULDOV VXVWDLQHGHFRQRPLF
pressure in the form of a naval blockade of Italian ports would severely 
damage its ability to continue in a war.33 This report was crucial, as it 
SURYLGHGWKHEDVLVIRUWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VZDUSODQQLQg against Italy later on 
ZKHQ WKH WKUHDW IURP%HQLWR0XVVROLQL¶VH[SDQVLRQLVWDPELWLRQV LQ WKH
Mediterranean became clear.  
 
      %ULWDLQ¶V ULJKW WR OHJDOO\ FORVH WKH 6XH] &DQDO LI LW EHFDPH
involved in a war had been awarded as part of the final settlement 
treaties following the end of the First World War. The importance of the 
Suez Canal as a vital link of the British Empire had been reaffirmed 
IURPDVHDUO\DVE\$GPLUDO%HDWW\%ULWDLQ¶VWKHQ)LUVW6HD/RUG
when he declared that the Suez route had acquired an even greater 
degree of importance considering that Britain faced two major naval 
rivals in two separate theatres in the form of Japan and the United 
States. 34  $GPLUDO %HDWW\¶V YLHZV ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH &DQDO ZHUH
reiterated in an Admiralty memorandum released in February 1921, 
which also revealed a keen awareness of the vulnerability of passage 
through the canal that resurfaced again during the 1930s. This 
PHPRUDQGXPGHFODUHGWKDW³the vital importance of the Suez Canal to 
the sea communications of WKH%ULWLVK(PSLUH LV DQD[LRP´ DQGDOVR
KLJKOLJKWHG WKDW ³its peculiar danger lies in the fact that it is the 
narrowest and most easily-blocked portion of our only short route to the 
East.´35 $GPLUDO %HDWW\¶V YLHZV RQ WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI 6XH] ZHUH QRW
merely restricted to the Admiralty itself, but were shared by leaders of 
the British dominions of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. 
William Massey, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, had previously                                                         
33
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even declared that he considered Egypt the most important country in 
the British Empire after Britain itself. This declaration showcased the 
insecurities of the far-flung dominions towards being cut-off from the 
British Isles and provided the vulnerability of Suez with an added 
political dimension.36 
 
                           Consequently, in 1934, the COS began to develop a 
tri-service plan to defend the Suez Canal. A decision was made to 
issue a formal directive to the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) to draw 
up the plan. 37  The impetus behind this came from the increased 
difficulties in defending the Canal due to new technological 
developments in aviation which now placed Suez within easy range of 
French and Italian bomber aircraft. This led to the gradual creation of a 
fully comprehensive Suez Canal Defence Plan, which was revised 
continuously in response to the evolving strategic environment. A close 
examination of the Plan in its formative years from 1934 to 1935 can 
SURYLGHLQVLJKWLQWRWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VRXWORRNUHJDUGLQJWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ
at this point, and threats which it most expected to face.  
 
      7KH-3&¶VPHHWLQJRQWKHth of February 1934 was crucial 
in setting out the initial parameters of the Plan. During this meeting, the 
JPC singled out four points regarding the defence of the canal which it 
believed required special attention. These four points were not of equal 
importance, but played significant roles in setting the tone for the 
evolution of the Plan. The first and most important point mentioned by 
the JPC was with regard to what the Committee believed, constituted 
the greatest threat to the safety of the Canal. In its opinion, the greatest 
threat came not from aLUDWWDFNEXWIURP³DWWHPSWVWRVFXWWOHDYHVVHO
SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ RQH RI WKH URFN\ QDUURZV´ RI WKH &DQDO LWVHOI 38  The                                                         
36
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second point that JPC highlighted was the need for countermeasures 
to be undertaken to prevent the Canal from being blocked by the 
scuttling of a ship. The JPC emphasized that these countermeasures 
VKRXOG EH H[HFXWHG EHIRUH RU GXULQJ WKH ³PRVW GDQJHURXV SHULRG´
which was the period just before war had been declared by or against 
Britain.39 7KH-3&¶VUDWLRQDOHZDVWKDWWKLVZDVWKHSHULRGGXUing which 
sabotage of the canal was most likely to be attempted. The third point 
was the threat of air attack to the Canal by an enemy power. While the 
JPC perceived the threat to be remote as long as France and Italy 
could be assumed as friendly powers, it acknowledged that the air 
situation needed to be reviewed regularly, and protective measures 
should be considered should the risk of air attack to the Canal increase 
with the establishment of significant enemy air forces within striking 
range.40 The fourth and final point was the role of the British military 
JDUULVRQ LQ (J\SW LQ FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK WKH &DQDO¶V VHFXULW\ 7KH -3&
recommended that, if circumstances required defensive measures to 
HQVXUH WKH &DQDO¶V VHFXULW\ WKHVH PHDVXUHV KDG WR EH JLYHQ
precedence over all other demands for resources to defend Egypt. The 
JPC also emphasised that the primary role of the Egyptian garrison 
was to defend the Canal. 41 
 
      These four points should be further examined with regard to 
the mindset and approach of British military planners towards the 
Canal. The fact that defence against attempted Japanese sabotage 
was given the highest priority reflects the broader direction of British 
grand strategy. The planners also considered the possibility, however 
remote then, of military invasion of Egypt. This is evident from the 
-3&¶VFDOORIDQDQQXDOUHYLHZRIWKHDLUWKUHDWWRWKH6XH]&DQDODQG
the emphasis for it to be given absolute priority over all other Egyptian 
defence commitments. This suggests that despite the focus on the 







war with other Mediterranean powers, this could threaten the security 
of the Canal as well.  
 
      It is pertinent to turn towards an analysis of the gradual 
evolution of the Suez Canal Defence Plan following the groundwork 
laid by the JPC in early 1934. In April 1934, two months after the 
UHOHDVH RI WKH -3&¶V UHSRUW $GPLUDO (UQOH &KDWILHOG VXEPLWWHG D
memorandum to the COS with a proposal for preventive measures to 
be undertaken to keep the Canal open during times of crisis. He 
suggested the declaration of martial law in the Canal Zone during an 
emergency to allow British authorities in Egypt to resolutely and 
effectively control passage through the Canal during times of crisis. 
&KDWILHOGDOVRSURSRVHGWKHFRQFHSWRI³FRXQWHU-EORFNLQJ´DVDPHDQV
to regulate the use of the Canal during this period. This plan involved 
the mooring of boomships with strong buoys at both Port Said and Port 
Tewfik, two ports situated at the respective northern and southern exits 
of the Canal. Movement of traffic through the Canal could be controlled 
by manoeuvring these ships to act as ad-hoc gantries.42 In December 
1934, Chatfield issued another memorandum which discussed in 
greater detail the proceedings which were to govern the defence of the 
Canal in times of crisis. He reiterated the need for his proposed 
countermeasures to be activated at least 24 hours before the 
Mediterranean Fleet was to set out from Malta in the event of the need 
WR FDUU\ RXW WKH ³6LQJDSRUH6WUDWHJ\´ DQG VHQG WKHEXON RI WKH5R\DO
Navy to the Far East. The rationale behind this was that it was the most 
dangerous period in which a Japanese attempt at sabotaging the Canal 
was expected.43 At the same time, clandestine security talks between 
the Admiralty and the Suez Canal Company were also initiated, and by 
May 1935, the boomships that the Admiralty needed to carry out its 
contingency plans were put in place. Following another JPC review 
shortly after, the final Plan was sent to and endorsed by the                                                         
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Commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral William Fisher, on 28 
June 1935, shortly before the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian Crisis.44  
 
      The amount of forethought and attention to detail displayed 
by the Admiralty towards the formulation of the Plan reveals the high 
degree of importance it attached to the Canal. It also suggests that the 
Admiralty was aware of the correlation between the Mediterranean 
theatre and the Far East, and that Mediterranean security constituted 
an important element in the successful execution of the Singapore 
Strategy and imperial defence as a whole. The development of the 
Suez Canal Defence Plan from 1934 to 1935 clearly suggests that the 
Admiralty was deeply concerned about the threat of a Japanese 
sabotage attempt. The threat of aerial bombardment or an attempt to 
seize the Canal through a ground invasion, while noted by the 
Admiralty, was not considered significant enough to warrant serious 
attention, at least for the PRPHQW &OHDUO\ WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V FKRLFH WR
devote the bulk of its attention and resources towards preventing the 
admittedly remote possibility of a Japanese attempt at blocking the 
Canal does seem to suggest that the Mediterranean basin was 
primarily seen as a means to an end ± the end being to keep the Suez 
route open for the Royal Navy.  
 
      The island of Malta occupies a central position in the 
Mediterranean basin that is almost equidistant between Gibraltar in the 
west and Suez in the east.  As the main base and command 
headquarters of the British Mediterranean Fleet, Malta was arguably 
indispensible to the British naval position in the basin. The importance 
of Malta had been given a further boost after the First World War, when 
it was designated as the base of the Main Fleet that was to serve as 
protection for all British overseas territories in the Far East. In the event 
of a threat towards British interests in the Far East, this fleet was to be 




6WUDWHJ\´ ,Q  WKLV ³0DLQ )OHHW´ FRQVLVWHG RI WKH HQWLUH
Mediterranean Fleet minus the older coal-burning battleships of the 
Iron Duke class.45  Douglas Austin argues that the designation of Malta 
as the base of the Main Fleet meant that the island should be seen in 
the 1920s as vital in the context of defending the entire Eastern Empire 
instead of just the Mediterranean basin.46 The geographic centrality of 
0DOWD¶VSRVLWLRQZDVDOVRLQVWUDWHJLFWHUPVDGRXEOHHGJHGVZRUGDV
the island is a mere 60 miles from the Italian island of Sicily.47  As a 
result, the threat of military attack by Italy featured constantly in 
GLVFXVVLRQVDERXW0DOWD¶VGHIHQFHGXULQJWKHHDUO\V 
 
      The Admiralty had been well aware of the threat posed by air 
attack to Malta from as early as 1924, when it expressed concern 
DERXW WKH LVODQG¶V DELOLW\ WR UHVLVW DHULDO ERPEDUGPHQW7KH$GPLUDOW\
GLVDJUHHGZLWK WKH$LU6WDII¶V YLHZ WKDW WKHDHULDO WKUHDW WR0DOWDZDV
³DOPRVW QHJOLJLEOH´ GXH WR WKH ³SUHVHQW LQHIILFLHQF\´ RI WKH ,WDOian Air 
Force.48 Subsequent discussions of the ODC produced a compromise 
report in which the views of the Air Staff were momentarily accepted, 
EXWZLWKWKHFDYHDWWKDW³GHWDLOHGSODQVIRUWKHDHULDOGHIHQFHRI0DOWD
would have to be drawn up DWWKHHDUOLHVWSRVVLEOHVWDJH´49 
 
      +RZHYHUYHU\OLWWOHZDVGRQHWRLPSURYH0DOWD¶VGHIHQFHVLQ
the years 1926-1930. This was primarily due to financial constraints 
imposed upon defence expenditure as part of the Ten-Year Rule, the 
decision of the Baldwin government to concentrate government 
spending on social reform, and the absence of any forseeable threat to 
the British Empire in the near future, evidenced by the signing of the 
Locarno Treaty in 1925 and the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928.                                                         
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      The iVVXH RI 0DOWD¶V GHIHQFHV ZDV EURXJKW EDFN RQWR WKH
GLVFXVVLRQ WDEOH ZKHQ WKH &26 SURGXFHG WKHLU DQQXDO ³5HYLHZ RI
,PSHULDO 'HIHQFH´ LQ  ,Q WKHLU UHSRUW WKH &26 FULWLFL]HG WKH
LVODQG¶VFRDVWDODUWLOOHU\DVEHLQJLQD³SUH-ZDUVWDWH´DQGLWVDQWL-aircraft 
GHIHQFHVDV³DOPRVWQRQ-existent and unable to meet even the weakest 
of attacks.´50  By this point, British military planners were under no 
LOOXVLRQV DERXW WKH IDFW WKDW PRVW RI WKH LVODQG¶V GHIHQFHV were 
REVROHWH 1HYHUWKHOHVV DXVWHULW\ PHDVXUHV LPSRVHG E\ %ULWDLQ¶V
worsening financial position as a result of the Great Depression, and 
the fact that the COS believed that there were more pressing demands 
elsewhere, meant no resources could be spared tR XSJUDGH 0DOWD¶V
defences.51 
 
      Yet, despite being well aware of the sheer vulnerability of the 
island to air attack, the Admiralty was determined that the island should 
remain as the main base of the British Mediterranean Fleet.  In 
addition, Malta was also to serve as a forward operating base from 
which to attack Italy should the British Empire find itself at war with it. 
7KH $GPLUDOW\¶V VWURQJ YLHZV DERXW 0DOWD FDQ EH JOHDQHG IURP
&KDWILHOG¶VUHVSRQVHWRZDUGVD&KLHIRI$LU6WDII&$6SDSHUWKDt 
recommended the Mediterranean Fleet find a new base in view of the 
JUHDWO\ LQFUHDVHG WKUHDW RI DLU DWWDFN IURP ,WDO\ ZKLFK KDG ³DW OHDVW
 DLUFUDIW RI WKH ODWHVW GHVLJQ´ E\ , according to RAF 
intelligence.52 Chatfield declared that the Mediterranean Fleet could not 
abandon Malta for it would have meant the British losing control of the 
entire central Mediterranean. He also questioned the CAS views about 
the strength and scale of Italian air attack on Malta in the event of war, 
and concluded that the CAS appreciation was unduly pessimistic.  
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      While the Admiralty was adamant that the fleet must not 
abandon Malta, the amount of financial spending on the improvement 
RI0DOWD¶VGHIHQFHVEHFDPHDPDWWHURIVHULRXVFRQWHQWLRQ7KLVZDV
reflected in a debate between Chatfield, the First Sea Lord, and 
Admiral William Fisher, Commander in Chief of the British 
0HGLWHUUDQHDQ)OHHWRYHUWKHLVVXHRIVWUHQJWKHQLQJ0DOWD¶VGHIHQFHV
During the early 1930s, Fisher insisted WKDW0DOWD¶VGHIHQFHVFRXOGEH
made up-to-date at a relatively reasonable cost. In 1933, Fisher sent 
WZROHWWHUVDUJXLQJ0DOWD¶VFDVHWRWKH$GPLUDOW\53 In his second letter, 
KHXUJHG&KDWILHOGWRWDNHFRQFUHWHPHDVXUHVLQVWUHQJWKHQLQJ0DOWD¶V
anti-aircraft defences. Fisher felt that the British Admiralty was taking 
DQ³XQMXVWLILDEOHULVNDERXW0DOWD´DQGWKDWWKHLVODQG¶VGHIHQFHVFRXOG
be put in order during two or three years at a cost of only some 
£150,000.54 )LVKHU¶VYLHZVZHUHQRWIDYRXUHGE\&KDWILHOGZKRHFKRHG
WKH &26¶V YLHZ LQ KLV UHSO\ WKDW ³HYHQ PRUH VHULRXV GHIHQFH
FRPPLWPHQWV HOVHZKHUH´ SUHFOXGHG DQ\ IRUP RI H[SHQGLWXUH LQ WKLV
direction.55  
 
      Disagreements between Fisher and Chatfield point toward 
creative tension within the Admiralty with regard to overall grand 
strategy. More crucially, it suggests both men might have been looking 
DW WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ EDVLQ WKURXJK GLIIHUHQW SHUVSHFWLYHV )LVKHU¶V
SHUVLVWHQFHLQDWWHPSWLQJWRSHUVXDGHWKH$GPLUDOW\WREXIIXS0DOWD¶V
defences came from the fact that, as Commander in Chief of the 
Mediterranean Fleet, he was well aware of the strategic value the 
island could offer in any war against a Mediterranean adversary. 
&KDWILHOG DV )LUVW 6HD /RUG ZDV QRW XQDZDUH RI WKH LVODQG¶V
importance but perceived the Mediterranean as merely a piece in the 
jigsaw of overall British imperial defence. The basin was vital, but with 
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Japanese aggression being increasingly evident, the most immediate 
threat that had to be first dealt with was in the Far East.  
 
      7KH$GPLUDOW\¶VUHIXVDOWRILQDQFH WKHLPSURYHPHQWRI0DOWD¶V
defences should therefore not be construed as evidence it was 
unaware of the threat posed to the island by a fully modernized, first 
class Italian air force, or considered Malta or the Mediterranean basin 
as unimportant and expendable within the context of grand strategy. 
The greatest threat to Malta was clearly Italy, which had not by any 
PHDQV EHHQ LJQRUHG DV&KDWILHOG¶V FULWLFLVP WRZDUGV WKH&$6 SDSHU
which recommended that the Mediterranean Fleet look for a new base 
clearly suggests. Nevertheless, there were other more urgent priorities, 
and Italy, despite its rapidly improving capabilities, at least on paper, to 
pose a threat to the British position in Malta, was not considered, for 
the moment, to harbour hostile intentions. This prevailing view was 
given official sanction by the DRC Report in November 1933, which, by 
placing France and Italy in the list of powers that were to be considered 
as friendly, effectively pushed the Mediterranean basin downwards in 
the list of British defence priorities.  
 
      British naval planning for the Mediterranean basin during the 
early 1930s was inextricably interlinked with grand strategy. The focus 
upon the Far East and the emergence of the Japanese threat did 
heighten the importance of the basin as an imperial connection and 
means of transit between Europe and the Far East, as the sheer 
amount of attention devoted towards planning against a Japanese 
sabotage attempt of the Suez Canal clearly demonstrates. The 
prioritisation of the Far Eastern theatre as part of official policy however 
meant that certain difficult choices in terms of resource allocation had 
to be made. This meant, in the words of Admiral Fisher, the taking of 
ZKDW KH FRQVLGHUHG WR EH ³XQMXVWLILDEOH ULVNV´ LQ WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ
This did not mean that the Mediterranean basin was no longer 
considered vital. On the contrary, the Admiralty recognised the 
LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH EDVLQ WR WKH VXFFHVV RI WKH ³6LQJDSRUH 6WUDWHJ\´
 31 
The decision to exclude Italy, which the Admiralty had previously 
UHFRJQL]HG DV%ULWDLQ¶V JUHDWHVW WKUHDW LQ WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ IURP WKH
list of potential British enemies as part of official policy, nevertheless 
served to divert attention and resources away from the basin and 
towards what were considered, for the present moment, as more 
pressing and immediate threats.  



























CHAPTER TWO: 1935-1936 - The Italo-Abyssinian Crisis and the 
$GPLUDOW\¶VUROHLQformulating a coherent British Response towards 
Italian Aggression 
 
      The British government, prior to the outbreak of the 
Abyssinian crisis, did not seriously consider the possibility that Britain 
PLJKW ILQG LWVHOI DW ZDU LQ WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ %ULWDLQ¶V UHVSRQVH
throughout the crisis was influenced by the advice of the COS, which 
was tasked with providing the British government with advice about the 
military implications of possible courses of actions against Italy. With 
the Royal Navy expected to take the leading role in the event of a 
possible war between Britain and Italy, the Admiralty naturally acquired 
a significant voice in shaping British policy towards Italy during the 
crisis. The Abyssinian crisis shifted the Mediterranean basin into the 
central focus of contingency planning for the first time, by forcing the 
Admiralty to develop plans for war against Italy on short notice. It also 
VHW WKHWRQHIRU%ULWDLQ¶VVWUDWHJLFSRVWXUH LQWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQGXULQJ
the tumultuous next five years. 
 
         7KH$GPLUDOW\¶V DSSURDFK WKURXJKRXW WKH HQWLUH FRXUVH RI
the Abyssinian crisis was defined by a strong reluctance to impose 
sanctions on Italy. Its argument was that imposing sanctions would 
lead to a war against Italy that it was determined to avoid. The 
Admiralty saw a Mediterranean conflict, to paraphrase the words of 
GeneraO2PDU%UDGOH\GXULQJ WKH.RUHDQ:DUDV WKH ³ZURQJZDU LQ
the wrong place, at the wrong WLPHDJDLQVW WKHZURQJHQHP\´56 The 
Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral 
:LOOLDP )LVKHU VWURQJO\ FKDOOHQJHG WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V UHOXFWDQFH WR
countenance war against Italy under any circumstances. He argued for 
a reinforcement of Malta to enable the Mediterranean Fleet to pursue a 
vigorous offensive against Italy, should hostilities occur. This chapter                                                         
56
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VKDOO FORVHO\H[DPLQH WKH UDWLRQDOHEHKLQG WKH$GPLUDOW\¶VGHFLVLRQ WR
persuade the British government to pursue a strategy during the 
Abyssinian crisis that is best characterized by extreme caution. The 
$GPLUDOW\¶V SUHGLVSRVLWLRQ DJDLQVW ILJKWLQJ D 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ ZDU
remained constant throughout the crisis. This was despite the fact that, 
by December 1935, the overall British strategic position in the 
Mediterranean had improved to the extent that mRVWRIWKH$GPLUDOW\¶V
initial tactical concerns with regard to a war against Italy had been 
HIIHFWLYHO\DGGUHVVHG7KH$GPLUDOW\¶V UHOXFWDQFH WRHQGRUVHDVWURQJ
British policy against Italy was largely due to concerns that war against 
Italy would result in ship losses even if the Royal Navy emerged 
victorious. The risk of losing any capital ships was considered 
unacceptable by the Admiralty, which feared that such losses would 
MHRSDUGL]H WKH 5R\DO 1DY\¶V DELOLW\ WR IXOILOO LWV )DU (DVWHUQ GHIHQFH
responsiELOLWLHV7KH$GPLUDOW\VDZ WKH5R\DO1DY\¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU
defending the Far East as a consideration of paramount importance. 
This fixation with the Far East compelled the Admiralty to advise the 
British government against taking any form of action that might have 
led to war against Italy.  
 
      To the British government, allowing an Italian conquest of 
Abyssinia would have considerable implications that were both political 
and strategic. A war between Italy and Abyssinia, both of which were 
members of the League of Nations, would significantly undermine the 
credibility of the League. Britain had a strong vested interest in 
ensuring the continued success of the system of collective security 
created in the aftermath of the First World War that the League was 
supposed to protect.  
  
      From a strategic viewpoint, a successful Italian conquest of 
Abyssinia would shift the balance of power in East Africa with 
significant ramifications. Abyssinia was bordered to the north by Eritrea 
and to the south by Italian Somaliland. To its east were the colonies of 
British and French Somaliland, which provided both Britain and France 
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with a window on the Red Sea. The annexation of the vast territory of 
Abyssinia into the Italian Empire would have therefore meant the 
encirclement of British and French Somaliland by Italian territory on all 
VLGHV$SDUW IURPVLJQLILFDQWO\HQKDQFLQJ ,WDO\¶VVWUDWHJLFSRVLWLRQQHDU
the southern end of the Red Sea on which lay the main route to the Far 
East, it would have created an additional strategic problem for Britain in 
the Horn of Africa. 
  
                  More crucially, the addition of Abyssinia to the Italian 
Empire would undermine British ability to defend Egypt in the event the 
UK went to war with Italy. At this point in early 1935, the primary 
concern for the British defence position in Egypt was a possible 
eastward advance from the Italian colony of Libya. Should the Italians 
VXFFHVVIXOO\ HVWDEOLVK WKHPVHOYHV LQ $E\VVLQLD %ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ
Egypt would have to contend with the additional threat of a possible 
Italian offensive from Abyssinia, which lay to the southeastern frontier 
of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. This would have meant the British needing to 
defend Egypt on two fronts in the event of war with Italy. Given the 
importance of Egypt to the British Empire, this was something the COS 
could not afford to take lightly. 
 
      By July 1935, the British Cabinet felt the Abyssinian crisis 
had reached such a point whereby it needed to consider possible 
actions that could be taken by the League of Nations should Italy 
choose to defy the League and attack Abyssinia. These questions were 
referred to the Advisory Committee of Trade Questions in Time of War 
of the CID. This Committee was tasked to consider the political, 
diplomatic and economic effects of a decision to invoke Article 16 of 
WKH/HDJXH¶VFRYHQDQWDJDLQVW ,WDO\57 By invoking this article, League                                                         
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member states would be expected to take part in collective action 
against the member state found to have broken this covenant, which 
would be decided by the League. The main finding of the Committee 
was that, while France could be expected to act in support of such a 
decision, the attitude of other states could not be effectively 
ascertained.58 
 
      On the other hand, the CommittHH FRPPHQWHG WKDW ,WDO\¶V
sheer dependence on imports for its survival made it acutely vulnerable 
to a sustained blockade. The Committee also pointed out that, with a 
large proportion of the Italian Expeditionary Force having been 
committed to Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, the British government 
FRXOGVHYHUHO\GDPDJH,WDO\¶VDELOLW\WRZDJHZDUVLPSO\E\EORFNDGLQJ
the Suez Canal and cutting off the Italian Army in East Africa from the 
homeland.59 
 
      The Committee ended its report by concluding that, for 
economic action against Italy to have any effect should the British fail 
to obtain the support of the other Mediterranean states, they needed to 
impose a tight naval blockade of the Italian mainland.60 This entailed 
the exercise of belligerent rights by Britain against Italy, and the 
stopping and searching of all Italian maritime traffic by Royal Navy 
warships. Not only would such action significantly increase the 
possibility of war breaking out between Britain and Italy, it would earn 
Britain the permanent hostility of the Italian Fascist government. From                                                                                                                                                  
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this point onwards, the British government faced the question of how to 
impose sanctions against Italy that would be credible and effective and 
yet not lead to war. 
   
      The first deliberations by the COS about the possible 
implications of British policy during the Abyssinian crisis took place in 
July 1935. This followed the failure of British Foreign Secretary 
$QWKRQ\(GHQ¶VSHUVRQDO WULS WR ,WDO\DPRQWKHDUOLHU LQDQDWWHPSW WR
dissuade Mussolini from going to war to achieve his aims.61 This was 
also the point at which punitive measures, such as the imposition of 
arms sanctions on Italy, were first discussed. Prior to this, due to the 
%ULWLVK JRYHUQPHQW¶V GHVLUH WR UHWDLQ ,WDOLDQ IULHQGVKLS DV SDUW Rf its 
overall policy of containing Germany, it adopted a relatively hands-off 
approach towards the crisis by working through the League of Nations. 
The delicate nature of sanctions, which might have to be enforced by 
the Royal Navy, and the unpredictable nDWXUH RI 0XVVROLQL¶V DFWLRQV
were the concerns uppermost in the minds of the COS. With regard to 
the latter, the concern that Mussolini might launch a surprise attack 
against British forces as retaliation against sanctions was a constant 
theme throughout these discussions. During the very first meeting of 
the COS to discuss possible British actions against Italy, Chatfield, who 
was by this point the chairman of the COS Committee, made it a point 
WRVWUHVVWKDWLWZRXOGEH³DEVROXWHO\QHFHVVDU\IRUVHUYLFHSreparations 
to be completed EHIRUHVDQFWLRQVZHUHLPSRVHG´ This meant, in effect, 
WKHFDOOLQJXSRIWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VUHVHUYHV62 
 
      In subsequent COS meetings over the course of July, 
Chatfield reiterated his worry that imposing sanctions on Italy or 
attempting to close the Suez Canal would provoke war.63 In addition to 
the necessity of full military preparations for such an eventuality,                                                         
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Chatfield now added the condition that the full cooperation of the 
French should be secured before imposing sanctions against Italy.64 
&KDWILHOG¶V LQVLVWHQFH RQ VHFXULQJ )UHQFK FRRSHUDWLRQ VXJJHVWV WKH
Admiralty was unwilling to contemplate, at this point, the prospect of a 
single-handed war against Italy.  
 
      7KH $GPLUDOW\¶V XQZLOOLQJQHVV WR FRQVLGHU ZDU DJDLQVW ,WDO\ 
was significantly influenced by concerns about the Far East. Admiral 
Frederic Charles Dreyer, Commander-in-&KLHI RI WKH 5R\DO 1DY\¶V
China Station, expressed his worries in an exchange of letters with 
Chatfield. In his first letter, written in December 1933, Dreyer 
FRPPHQWHG³,EHOLHYHWKDWZLOOEHDYHU\FULWLFDO\HDURXWKHUH6R
many of the Japanese preparations seem to point that, including the 
fact that their military and naval people cannot expect their country to 
go on spending such enormous sums on armaments without some 
JRRG UHDVRQ IRU LWEHLQJVKRZQ´65 +HSUHGLFWHG WKDW ³WURXEOHZKHQ LW
comes, wilO FRPHEHWZHHQ0D\DQG2FWREHU´ GXULQJZKLFK ³DVWURQJ
monsoon in the Indian Ocean will add considerable risk to air 
squadrons flying in from India to Singapore.´66 While Chatfield initially 
appeared to be relatively unconcerned about the Far Eastern situation, 
KHUHSOLHGWR'UH\HURQ$XJXVWWKDWKH³GLGQRWIHHOZDV
likely to be a year of such anxiety as the following year of 1936.´67 In 
&KDWILHOGIHOWWKDW³WKH-DSDQHVH)OHHWZLOOEHLQDJUHDWHUVWDWHRI
readiness, while if the 1935 (London Naval) Conference breaks down it 
is always possible that it may break down with ill-feeling, which is apt to 
lead to dangerous political deYHORSPHQWV´68 This posed a problem for 
WKH%ULWLVKDV³ LVQRWDJRRG\HDUIURPRXUSRLQWRIYLHZVKRXOG
Britain find itself in conflict with Japan) because the Singapore 
defences will still be incomplete, whereas we shall still have a number 
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of our cDSLWDOVKLSV ODLGXSIRUH[WHQVLYHPRGHUQL]DWLRQ´69 In a further 
DWWHPSW WR UHDVVXUH 'UH\HU &KDWILHOG ZURWH WKDW ³ZKDW , ZDQW \RX WR
know is, however, that the unreadiness of this country for trouble in the 
Far East is not only fully appreciated by me and my colleagues, but 
also by others, and while we remain unready we have to do everything 
SRVVLEOH WR DYRLG FRQIOLFW ZLWK -DSDQ´ 70  This exchange of letters 
between Dreyer and Chatfield was clear evidence that, from as early 
as 1933, the Admiralty was becomiQJUDWKHUFRQFHUQHGDERXW%ULWDLQ¶V
Far Eastern position in the face of increasing Japanese naval strength. 
It also appears evident that Chatfield expected the Japanese menace 
to increase considerably in 1936, especially if the London Naval 
Conference failed to end amicably. These concerns were to be 
uppermost on the minds of the Admiralty as they faced a potential 
conflict with Italy in late 1935.  
 
      The Admiralty had, in 1932, drawn up an assessment of the 
strategic options available to Britain in the event that it became 
involved in a war against Italy with no allies on either side.71 This paper 
IRUPHG WKH EDVLV IRU WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V ZDU SODQV QRW RQO\ GXULQJ WKH
Abyssinian crisis but also during the later part of the decade when the 
H[WHQW RI ,WDO\¶V Hxpansionist ambitions in the Mediterranean became 
clearer. 
 
       The Admiralty advocated applying economic pressure 
against Italy through a restriction of Italian maritime trade as a means 
of forcing Italy to come to terms without the need to defeat Italian naval 
forces in battle. Such a strategy of distant blockade, the Admiralty 
argued, had already proven its effectiveness in the First World War, 
when the imposition of a naval blockade against Germany led to the 
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collapse of the German home front by November 1918. The Admiralty 
SUHVVHG LWV FDVH IXUWKHU E\ DUJXLQJ WKDW ,WDO\¶V GHSHQGHQFH XSRQ
maritime imports for vital raw materials for its industries, in addition to 
its weak domestic economic base, made it uniquely suitable for the 
application of a strategy of economic warfare. 72  The Admiralty 
proposed that such a strategy be carried out by leveraging British 
command of both exits of the Mediterranean at Gibraltar and Suez, 
which were to be used as chokepoints to prevent Italy from importing 
goods from outside the Mediterranean Sea. This was considered to be 
VXIILFLHQWWRFULSSOHWKH,WDOLDQHFRQRP\JLYHQ,WDO\¶VGHSHQGHQFHXSRQ
imports from outside the Mediterranean, which the Admiralty noted, 
consisted of six-sevenths of Italian maritime commerce.73  
 
      Despite emphasizing a strategy of naval blockade, the 
Admiralty did not ignore the possibilities for direct offensive action in a 
war against Italy. With regard to this, the Admiralty drew up a list of 
military measures that, if undertaken at the commencement of 
hostilities, could decisively disrupt Italian economic life and undermine 
Italian powers of resistance. These included recommendations for a 
concentrated offensive against the Italian electrical power system in 
northern Italy, and attacks against the main Italian industrial centres of 
Genoa, Turin, Milan, Trieste and Venice.74 Added to these proposals 
was also an option for a close blockade of the Italian ports of Genoa, 
Savena, and Leghorn, through which over half of the imports for the 
northern Italian industrial heartland were derived. The Admiralty 
considered that, while a close blockade of the Italian mainland would 
be an operation fraught with risk, the potential results of such an 
operation in a war against Italy were so far-reaching that it should be 
closely investigated.75 










      Several conclusions can be drawn from a cursory analysis of 
WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V ZDU SODQ )LUVW LW DSSHDUV WKDW WKH $GPLUDOW\ GLG QRW
intend to engage the Italian navy directly in a Trafalgar-style clash of 
both fleets. Instead, the Admiralty believed it could strangle Italy 
economically and force it to terms simply by denying Italy access to the 
bulk of its external trade. This can be seen in how the idea of a naval 
blockade, in its varying options, was a constant feature of the 
$GPLUDOW\¶V LQLWLDO ZDU SODQV DJDLQVW ,WDO\ ,W DOVR DSSHDUV WKDW WKH
$GPLUDOW\¶V UHOXFWDQFH WR GLUHFWO\ FRQIURQW WKH ,WDOLDQ IOHHW ZDV QRW
entirely due to fear of defeat or of sustaining crippling losses. The 
$GPLUDOW\¶V FKRLFH RI D QDYDO EORFNDGH DV WKHPRVW H[SHGLHQW RSWLRQ
ZDVDOVRERUQHRXWRILWVDQDO\VLVWKDWJLYHQ,WDO\¶VKHDY\GHSHQGHQFH
upon maritime imports to sustain its domestic economy and its war 
effort, it would be able to achieve the goal of defeating Italy without 
VXEMHFWLQJWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VFDSLWDOVKLSVWRXQQHFHVVDU\ULVN 
 
      Clearly, the Admiralty also recognized the potential gains of 
adopting a more aggressive approach in a war against Italy. The plan 
for an immediate attack against the Italian power grid and the northern 
Italian industrial heartland appears to share some resemblance with 
ZKDW LQ PRGHUQ SDUODQFH ZRXOG EH WHUPHG DV D ³VKRFN DQG DZH´
offensive, aimed to produce swift and decisive victory. This can be 
VHHQIURPWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VDQDO\VLVWKDWVXFKPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVZRXOG
KDYH WKH HIIHFW RI ³SDUDO\]LQJ WKUHH TXDUWHUV RI DOO ,WDOLDQ LQGXVWULDO
DFWLYLW\´DVZHOODVWR³SURGXFHDYDOXDEOHHIIHFWRQWKHPRUDOHRI WKH
people by directly affecting their daily domestic life.´767KH$GPLUDOW\¶V
deliberations about the possibility of imposing a close blockade of vital 
Italian ports also showed a willingness to consider operations that 
involved a significant element of risk, provided the game was worth the 
candle. This is evident from the fact that imposing a close naval 
blockade of Italian ports would have involved exposing the Royal Navy 




mainland. The threat posed by the Regia Aeronautica featured 
prominently in Admiralty discussions about confronting Italy during the 
$E\VVLQLDQ FULVLV DV DLU SRZHU ZDV VHHQ DV RQH RI ,WDO\¶V PDLQ
strengths.  
 
      The threat of Italian air power represented the greatest 
unknown factor that had significant iQIOXHQFH RYHU WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V
plans. This threat was also, to a large extent, questionable, as no naval 
engagements that involved the use of air power against ships had, as 
of yet, occurred. Expressing his views over the credibility of air power 
as a threat to the Navy in an open letter to The Times in August 1935, 
&KDWILHOG FRPPHQWHG WKDW ³XQGHU FHUWDLQ FLUFXPVWDQFHV DWWDFNV IURP
the air will be a serious menace to warships, but it is at present pure 
conjecture as to what those circumstances will be, and what the degree 
of vulnerability of the ships will be.´77 &KDWILHOG¶VFRPPHQWUHIOHFWHGWKH
uncertainty within the Admiralty itself as to whether this should be seen 
as a serious concern± using air power against ships was a novel and 
untested idea, but surel\ ,WDO\¶V DLU IRUFH ZLWK DW OHDVW  PRGHUQ
aircraft based within striking distance of the Mediterranean, demanded 
some attention?78 Nevertheless, it appears that the Admiralty did not 
intend to take the threat of the Regia Aeronautica lightly. The decision 
to move the Mediterranean Fleet from its main base at Malta to 
Alexandria was partly motivated by concerns that the Regia 
Aeronautica, with bases a mere 60 miles away, might attempt a knock-
out blow against British warships in harbour.79 
 
      Concerns over the menace posed by the Regia Aeronautica 
were further heightened when it was revealed that the Mediterranean                                                         
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Fleet was in dire need of anti-aircraft ammunition reserves. The lack of 
anti-aircraft ammunition transformed the threat of Italian air power from 
a mere nuisance into a potentially significant threat. A report written by 
Chatfield for the DRC shed some light on the parlous state of the Royal 
1DY\¶V DQWL-aircraft ammunition reserves in September 1935. This 
UHSRUW VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH )OHHW¶V ODFN of anti-aircraft ammunition 
UHVHUYHV UHQGHUHG LW XQDEOH WR  ³PHHW D VXVWDLQHG DWWDFN E\ WKH
Metropolitan Air Force of a Mediterranean power for even so short a 
SHULRG DV RQH ZHHN´ 80  It should not be forgotten, however, that 
&KDWILHOG¶VVHHPLQJO\EOHDNSLFWXUHRIWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\WR
Italian air power did not appear to take into account the defensive 
cover that could be provided to the Mediterranean Fleet from ground 
EDVHG %ULWLVK DLUFUDIW LQ 0DOWD DQG (J\SW &KDWILHOG¶V UHSRUW DOVR
overlooked WKH IDFW WKDWZLWK WKHEXONRI ,WDO\¶VDLU IRUFHKDYLQJEHHQ
deployed in East Africa, it was more likely that the Italians were 
intending to use their air force primarily in support of ground offensive 
operations against Abyssinian forces instead of deploying them against 
the Mediterranean Fleet.  During a DRC meeting on 9 October 1935, it 
was noted that the Regia Aeronautica¶V DLU IOHHW FRQVLVWHGPDLQO\ RI
bombers with a maximum of 250 miles. The main threat of the Regia 
Aeronautica would come from the 24 Savoia S55x bombers with a 
maximum operational radius of 600-700 miles, the 9 Savoia S62 bis 
and the 9 Savoia S78 bombers both with a maximum radius of 400 
miles.81 The limited range of most Italian aircraft meant redeploying 
them from their attack positions in East Africa to Italy would be a 
lengthy and laborious process. While the Admiralty could not simply 
dismiss the threat of the Regia Aeronautica, they could count upon 
having sufficient warning time should Italian military chiefs choose to 
redeploy their air force from East Africa to the Mediterranean.  
 
      7KH $GPLUDOW\¶V FRQFHUQ RYHU WKH DLU WKUHDW GLG QRW FDVW
VHULRXVGRXEWRYHULWVFRQILGHQFHWKDWWKH5R\DO1DY\¶ZRXOGSUHYDLOLILW                                                        
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was forced to fight.  Chatfield stated early in the crisis that he had no 
doubt over the final outcome of a conflict with Italy.82 Any worries on 
the part of the Admiralty over Italian air power should therefore be seen 
in the context of how this increased the risks of the Royal Navy 
sustaining losses or damage to its ships that would impede its ability to 
respond to crises elsewhere in the near future. In effect, the threat of 
air power was perceived by the Admiralty as a relatively unknown 
element that might cause some degree of concern. It was nevertheless 
not regarded as a game changer that would reverse the unfavourable 
strategic balance faced by the Italians in the Mediterranean. 
Consequently, concerns about the Regia Aeronautica played a 
significant role in influencing the development of British naval plans 
against Italy.  
 
      British naval preparations during this period proceeded in two 
GLUHFWLRQV)LUVWWKH$GPLUDOW\VWHDGLO\LQFUHDVHG%ULWDLQ¶VFRQFHQWUDWLRQ
of naval force in the Mediterranean. Second, the Admiralty began to 
search for a forward operating base in the Eastern Mediterranean to 
compensate for the possible abandonment of Malta by the 
Mediterranean Fleet. The main options considered for such a base 
were the Greek ports of either Navarino or Suda Bay.83 7KH$GPLUDOW\¶V
initial intention was to concentrate the Royal Navy into two main fleets, 
one based at Gibraltar, and the other at Alexandria. By August 29, the 
British Cabinet authorized the Admiralty to arrange for the Home Fleet 
to be concentrated and sent south to the Mediterranean.84 Chatfield 
decided to detach the aircraft carrier HMS Courageous, the 5th and 
part of the 2nd Destroyer Flotillas, and a submarine flotilla to Gibraltar 
while the rest of the Home Fleet remained at Portland, ready to sail at 
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short notice. 85  The remaining ships of the Home Fleet would be 
dispatched to the Mediterranean if a decision to impose sanctions 
against Italy led to a more dangerous situation necessitating further 
reinforcement of the Mediterranean Fleet. For this to take place, 
Chatfield placed great emphasis on attaining not only the full military 
support of the French, but also the agreement of the Greek 
government for the use of its ports. It is clear that Chatfield expected 
the imposition of sanctions against Italy to run a very high risk of 
WULJJHULQJ DQ DGYHUVH ,WDOLDQ UHDFWLRQ DJDLQVW %ULWDLQ 7KH $GPLUDOW\¶V
fundamental principle was that no punitive measures against Italy 
should be imposed before the support of other powers that would be 
important in a war against Italy, namely France and Greece, was first 
obtained.  
 
      In contrast, Fisher pushed for the sending of all available 
reinforcements from the Home Fleet to Malta to form what he expected 
to be the western pincer of an attack against the Italian fleet, should 
Italy choose to initiate hostilities. To Fisher, time was of the essence, 
DQGDQ\³KRVWLOHDFWE\,WDO\´RXJKWWREH³PHWE\WKHVWURQJHVWSRVVLEOH
counter offensives within 24 hours If possible.´ 86  In this respect, 
)LVKHU¶VYLHZVHFKRHGWKHVFKRRORIWKRXJKWWKDWFDOOHG for a swift and 
aggressive offensive against Italy at the outset, aimed at striking a 
HDUO\ DQG GHFLVLYH EORZ DJDLQVW ,WDO\¶V DELOLW\ WR FRQWLQXH LQ D ZDU
Chatfield replied that an aggressive posture should not be taken 
against Italy until full French support was assured. 
  
       By early September, Chatfield had changed his stance in 
support of a more comprehensive deployment of British forces in the 
Mediterranean Sea. He authorized the despatch of a Home Fleet 
detachment consisting of the two battlecruisers HMS Hood and                                                         
85
 Committee of Imperial Defence, Sub-Committee of Defence Policy 
and Requirements, Italo-Abyssinian Dispute, The Naval Strategical 
Position in the Mediterranean, AIR 9/11. 
86
 Marder, p. 1331. 
 45 
Renown, three six inch cruisers and six destroyers. 87  These ships 
arrived at Gibraltar on September 17. In addition, the Fourth Cruiser 
Squadron was commanded to seal off the southern entrance of the 
Red Sea. Various reinforcements from the China, Pacific, American 
and West Indies Stations were also sent to reinforce the Mediterranean 
Fleet. 88  While the Admiralty took pains to ensure that these 
deployments appeared as unobtrusive as possible, these forces 
nevertheless represented a formidable concentration of British naval 
force in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition to these naval forces, three 
British army battalions were despatched to Malta, and an additional 30 
aircraft were sent to British air squadrons in the Middle East. These 
measures were intended to guard against a possible Italian military 
backlash against imposing League sanctions, due to be discussed in 
Geneva later that month. 
  
      The plan for an early offensive against Italy at the very outset 
suffered from one significant defect. The Royal Navy did not possess a 
base in the Eastern Mediterranean that was sufficiently close to Italy.  
The Admiralty decided to shift the Mediterranean Fleet from Malta to 
Alexandria due to its worry about Italian air attack. The Egyptian port of 
Alexandria was perfect for a strategy of blockade as it controlled the 
Suez Canal, lay astride the Italian line of communications to Ethiopia, 
and possessed an easily defended harbor. 89  These advantages 
however, had to be balanced against the fact that Alexandria was 
situated almost a thousand miles from the Italian mainland, making it 
XQVXLWDEOHWRFDUU\RXW)LVKHU¶VSODQIRUDVZLIWRIIHQVLYH 
 
      To mitigate the distance disadvantage of Alexandria, the 
Admiralty considered establishing a forward operating base in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. The Admiralty had, in 1934, begun to explore 
the possibility of setting up the Mobile Naval Base Defence                                                         
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Organization(MNBDO). The MNBDO was initially conceived as a 
means of providing the Royal Navy with a greater degree of operational 
flexibility for fighting a war in the Far East.90 This was meant to enable 
the Royal Navy to set up, at short notice, ad-hoc defended naval bases 
whenever and wherever it wished. It was expected to negate the need 
for constructing expensive permanent fleet facilities and provide the 
Navy with more options for fighting a war against a distant enemy. At 
the time of the Abyssinian crisis, exercises with the MNBDO provided 
the option of setting up rudimentary defences within 48 hours of the 
fleet arriving at a harbour chosen by the Admiralty for such a purpose.  
:LWKLQDZHHN WKLVEDVHFRXOGEHPDGH µPRGHUDWHO\VDIHIURPDWWDFN
by submariQHVGHVWUR\HUVRUIURPWKHDLU¶91  
 
      In August 1935, ships containing equipment necessary for 
VHWWLQJXSWKH01%'2ZHUHPRELOL]HGDVSDUWRIWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VLQLWLDO
mobilization measures and sent in batches from England to the 
Mediterranean. This equipment consisted of anti-torpedo baffles, anti-
submarine nets, controlled mines, AA guns, coastal defence guns, 
searchlights, moorings for large and small ships, a communications 
section, and even a headquarters staff to command the base. By the 
end of September, these consignments of equipment and men had 
reached Alexandria and were effectively operationally ready to be 
deployed within 2 days anywhere in the Eastern Mediterranean, had 
such an order been given.92 
 
      The swiftness with which the MNBDO was dispatched to 
Alexandria suggests that it would have formed an integral part of the 
$GPLUDOW\¶VEDWWOHSODQDJDLQVW,WDO\KDGZDUEURNHQRXW$VHDUO\DV
September, Admiral Fisher sent a telegraph to the Admiralty about his 
outline plan of operations against Italy. He planned to set up the                                                         
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MNBDO at Navarino, with a view to conduct an immediate offensive 
against Taranto and other naval bases in southern Italy.93  
 
      Two main issues remained at this point which gave the 
Admiralty cause to hesitate regarding the plan for the deploy the 
MNBDO. The first was a diplomatic question that had to be addressed 
by the British government itself. With the port of Navarino being 
situated upon Greek sovereign territory, the permission of the Greek 
government would have to be obtained before it could be used as a 
base for the Royal Navy.  
 
      The second crucial issue was the likely threat posed by 
Italian air power against such a base.  The increased proximity to Italy 
that Navarino would have provided the Royal Navy with was effectively 
a double-edged sword, as the base was well within range of aircraft 
based on the Italian mainland. That being said, the efficacy of the air 
threat was still very much an uncertain factor, and the MNBDO 
establishment sent out to Alexandria included 22 anti-aircraft guns, 
which provided a reasonable degree of protection against air attack. 
Furthermore, with the bulk of Italian aircraft having been sent to East 
Africa, which put them effectively out of range of Greece, the main 
aerial threat that Navarino faced would be the hundred or so aircraft 
based in Italy. Seen in this light, the AGPLUDOW\¶V IHDU WKDWDQDGYDQFH 
base at Navarino would have provided a tempting target for Italian 
aircraft does appear to have been somewhat overblown, considering 
that the operation of the MNBDO was planned with the threat of air 
attack in mind.  
 
      Clearly, the MNBDO did constitute a viable tactical option the 
$GPLUDOW\ FRXOGKDYHHPSOR\HG &KDWILHOG¶VGHFLVLRQ WR VHQGRXW WKH
necessary manpower and equipment for the MNBDO at the very 
beginning of the crisis indicated the important role it was to play in the                                                         
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$GPLUDOW\¶V EDWWOH SODQ IRU ZDU DJDLQVW ,WDO\  )XUWKHUPRUH WKH PDLQ
diplomatic obstacle for the deployment of the MNBDO at Navarino was 
effectively removed in October, following the decision of the Greek 
government to allow the Royal Navy the use of its military facilities. The 
LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH01%'2 WR WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V EDWWOHSODQ DOVR SRLQWHG
towards a willingness to adopt an offensive strategy if Italy left Britain 
with no choice but to go to war. In this respect, the decisions taken by 
the Admiralty with regard to the possibility of harsher measures against 
Italy should be seen as evidence of its unwillingness to fight the Italians 
despite its readiness, by October 1935, to do so at short notice, and its 
near-absolute confidence of victory in such a war.  
 
      The Admiralty had since the beginning of the crisis argued 
VWURQJO\DJDLQVWWDNLQJDQ\SXQLWLYHPHDVXUHVDJDLQVW,WDO\0XVVROLQL¶V
decision to proceed with his attack on Abyssinia meant that punitive 
League measures against Italy were now necessary. The question 
before the British government now was to calibrate a response towards 
Italy that would preserve the integrity of the League, yet not be harsh 
enough to provoke an aggressive Italian response. On 11 October, the 
/HDJXH¶V$VVHPEO\HQGRUVHG WKHGHFLVLRQ WRDSSO\$UWLFOHDJDLQVW
,WDO\ IROORZLQJ ,WDO\¶VEUHDFKRI$UWLFOHRI WKH/HDJXH&RYHQDQWE\
waging war against a fellow member state. This mandated the 
application of sanctions by all members of the League against Italy. On 
1RYHPEHUWKH/HDJXH¶V&RRUGLQDWLRQ&RPPLWWHHDJUHHGWRLPSRVH
oil sanctions against Italy, subject to further enquiries about the attitude 
of the United States.94 
 
      The proposed imposition of oil sanctions by the League 
represented a significant escalation of the crisis. With Italy having to 
import most of its oil from overseas sources, cutting Italy off from 
foreign oil would eventually cripple its war effort in Abyssinia. This 
would present Mussolini with the unpleasant choice of having to end                                                         
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his war in Abyssinia, or attempt to break the sanctions cordon by force. 
The concern that imposing oil sanctions on Italy might lead to an 
Anglo-Italian war was underlined in a Cabinet meeting on December 2. 
During this meeting, secret information of Italian military preparations to 
retaliate if oil sanctions were imposed was revealed. The likelihood that 
Italy might go to war against Britain if she faced crippling oil sanctions 
was also given further emphasis by the Admiralty.95 It was therefore 
clear to all that oil sanctions, or an attempt to blockade the Suez Canal, 
constituted a red line that, if crossed, was likely to lead to war against 
Italy. 
 
      The Admiralty considered it vital to secure the full co-
operation of key Mediterranean allies before oil sanctions could be 
imposed against Italy. During a DRC meeting on September 5, 1935, a 
precondition before sanctions against Italy could take place was 
HVWDEOLVKHG 7KLV SUHFRQGLWLRQ VWLSXODWHG WKDW WKHUH PXVW EH ³D FOHDU
understanding that if Italy, as a consequence(of sanctions) should 
attack any of the nations concerned, all the participating nations would 
GHFODUH ZDU RQ ,WDO\´ 7KH VXSSRUW RI *UHHFH Yugoslavia, and 
France(in particular) was singled out as particularly vital.96 The main 
reason for this was the fact that, with the Mediterranean Fleet having 
evacuated from Malta, the Royal Navy no longer possessed any bases 
in the central and eastern Mediterranean area. With neither Gibraltar 
nor Alexandria having adequate facilities for the servicing of damaged 
capital ships, it would be necessary for ships requiring repair to sail all 
the way back to England. This would result in a significant reduction in 
fighting efficiency, in addition to surrendering control of the central 
Mediterranean to Italian air and naval forces during the early stages of 
a war. The support of France and Greece was considered as especially 
vital not only because it would avail the Admiralty with forward 
operating bases that would compensate for the loss of Malta, but also 
because it would provide opportunities for an early air offensive against                                                         
95
 Marder, p. 1335.  
96
 Ibid., p. 1346. 
 50 
Italy. Chatfield suggested during COS meetings on 6 and 13th 
September 1935 that, at the beginning of an Anglo-Italian war, the RAF 
should take the lead in attacking the Italian mainland.97 He explained 
that, provided the French and Yugoslav Air Forces gave full 
cooperation, and that Greece agreed to turn Navarino into a naval 
base, the RAF could launch attacks on the main Italian airbases 
concentrated in Sicily and the neighboring islands, and on the main 
harbours of southern Italy. Additional air action against the northern 
Italian war factories, in his opinion, should be left to the French to 
undertake.98 Chatfield saw Navarino as essential as it was the only 
PHDQVE\ZKLFK WKH5R\DO1DY\FRXOGH[HUW LQKLVZRUGV ³DGHTXDWH
control over the central Mediterranean.´99 He expected British use of 
Navarino to draw off part of the Regia Aeronautica in attacks against it, 
which would prevent Italian bombers from being concentrated in an 
attack against Malta or the Mediterranean fleet.100  
 
      The Admiralty perceived French support in a war against Italy 
as vital in other aspects. The French fleet, in concert with the British 
IOHHWDW*LEUDOWDUZDVH[SHFWHGWRDFWDVDWKUHDWWR,WDO\¶VZHVWFRDVW
DQGSUHYHQWWKH,WDOLDQIOHHWIURPFRQFHQWUDWLQJLQIRUFHDJDLQVW)LVKHU¶V
Mediterranean fleet at Alexandria.101 Crucially, French air attacks in 
northern Italy were also expected to divert the Regia Aeronautica away 
IURP 0DOWD DQG WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ )OHHW %\ DWWDFNLQJ ,WDO\¶V DLUFUDIW
production facilities and bases in the north, they were expected to 
reduce the strength of the Italian air threat against the Royal Navy.102 
French military forces were therefore expected to play an active role in 
exerting offensive pressure on Italy.  
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      The degree of support France was prepared to give therefore 
EHFRPHV LPSRUWDQW LQ DVVHVVLQJ WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V ZLOOLQJQHVV WR risk a 
Mediterranean war. From a very early stage, the French government 
expressed its willingness to allow the Admiralty the use of French 
ports. Furthermore, replies by the French Naval Staff toward the 
questionnaires sent in November 1935 by the Admiralty regarding the 
status and capabilities of the French ports of Bizerta and Toulon were 
comprehensive and forthcoming. 103  This appeared to indicate 
willingness, at least on the part of the French Naval Staff, to cooperate 
with the British in the event of war with Italy. 
 
      On October 18, Pierre Laval, then Prime Minister of France, 
gave a verbal assurance of military support to the British, which was 
followed up a few days later with the authorization of talks between the 
British and French naval staffs. 104  These talks were, from the 
$GPLUDOW\¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ ODUJHO\ XQVDWLVIDFWRU\ GXH WR )UHQFK
insistence on secrecy and the unwillingness of the French Air Force to 
carry out attacks on northern Italy as the Admiralty hoped it would do. 
Nevertheless, Laval made it clear that France would consider itself at 
war against Italy if it attacked British interests in response to a League 
decision to impose oil sanctions.105 As such, it can be concluded that in 
a war against Italy during the Abyssinian crisis, the Royal Navy would 
have been able to utilize French naval bases. The French Navy would 
also have been able to tie down significant Italian naval forces simply 
E\DFWLQJDVDIOHHWLQEHLQJRQ,WDO\¶VZHVWHUQIODQN%\-DQXDU\
an agreement had been reached between the British and French naval 
staffs to divide the Mediterranean Sea into a western and eastern 
zone, with the French navy being responsible for the former and the 
Royal Navy for the latter.106 
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      The Admiralty was also successful in obtaining the support of 
the other Mediterranean powers. The governments of Greece, Turkey 
and Yugoslavia all agreed to support Britain in the event of Italian 
attack. The Greek government also gave its unqualified assurance that 
all Greek ports and repair facilities would be available for use by the 
Royal Navy in the event of war. It even went as far as to promise the 
support of Greek forces.107 
 
      It is evident that the Royal Navy would have enjoyed a 
considerable degree of support from key allies had Italy chose to go to 
war with Britain in response to a strong sanctions policy. The Admiralty 
succeeded in obtaining almost all of what it had wanted from the two 
most important allies for any war against Italy, France and Greece. It 
managed to secure the use of forward bases to operate from on both 
,WDO\¶V ZHVWHUQ DQG HDVWHUQ IODQNV DQG UHSDLU IDFLOLWLHV IRU LWV FDSLWDO
ships. The mobilization and eventual involvement of French and Greek 
forces would also have served to further disperse Italian forces and 
create an even more favourable tactical situation in the Mediterranean. 
  
      Even without taking into account the addition of French and 
Greek naval forces, the Royal Navy by mid-December had managed to 
assemble a comfortable margin of superiority in the Mediterranean 
Sea. The Royal Navy deployed 5 battleships, the HMS Queen 
Elizabeth, Valiant, Barham, Ramillies and Revenge XQGHU )LVKHU¶V
command at Alexandria. This was in addition to the two battlecruisers, 
the HMS Hood and Renown, which were detached from the Home 
Fleet and were now based at Gibraltar. 108  The Royal Navy in the 
Mediterranean also had two aircraft carriers, the HMS Glorious under 
the Mediterranean Fleet and the HMS Courageous, sent as part of the 
Home Fleet detachment, to counter the threat posed by Italian air                                                         
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power. Against such a formidable concentration of naval force, the 
Italians could muster only 2 ageing battleships, the Doria and Duilio, 
and a single aircraft carrier.109 7KH5R\DO 1DY\¶V RYHUZKHOPLQJ IRUFH
advantage was such that Chatfield had little doubt about its ability to 
defeat Italy even in a single-handed war with no support from France 
and Greece.110 
 
      Taking into account the sizeable advantages enjoyed by the 
Royal Navy, together with the fact that it succeeded in securing, for the 
most SDUW WKH FRRSHUDWLRQ RI )UDQFH DQG *UHHFH WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V
unwillingness to endorse any form of strong action against Italy 
certainly demands explanation. In this sense, a clarification of the 
$GPLUDOW\¶V RXWORRN FDQ EH IRXQG E\ ORRNLQJ DW WKH JOREDO VWUategic 
VLWXDWLRQ WKH %ULWLVK IDFHG &KDWILHOG¶V UHOXFWDQFH WR ULVN D
Mediterranean war can be attributed to the fact that he believed peace 
with Italy WREHHVVHQWLDOJLYHQ,WDO\¶VSRVLWLRQDVWULGH%ULWDLQ¶VPDLQOLQH
of communications to the Far East. On 25 August 1935 in a letter to 
Fisher, Chatfield underlined his concern about the potential 
LPSOLFDWLRQV RQ WKH 5R\DO 1DY\¶V DELOLW\ WR GHIHQG WKH )DU (DVW WKDW
PLJKW UHVXOW IURP D ZDU DJDLQVW ,WDO\ ³:H KDYH UHOLHG RQ SUDFWLFDOO\
abandoning the Mediterranean if we send the fleet east. For that 
reason I do not want to go to extreme measures and hope the Geneva 
Pacifists(who were pushing for harsh measures against Italy) will fail to 
JHW XQDQLPLW\ DQG WKH /HDJXH ZLOO EUHDN RXW´ 111  It is clear from 
&KDWILHOG¶V statement that, despite the Abyssinian crisis, the Admiralty 
continued to prioritize the defence of the Far East over the 
Mediterranean. The need to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet as a 
result of the Abyssinian Crisis had also forced the Admiralty to denude 
the Home Fleet of the two battlecruisers it possessed, leaving Britain 
without any capital ships in home waters. This presented the Admiralty                                                         
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with a potentially dangerous situation, given that it had nothing to 
counter the threat posed by the new German Deutschland- class 
pocket battleships, which had come into service in 1933.  
 
        The consequence of the Abyssinian crisis was that, having 
been forced to concentrate its forces in the Mediterranean for an 
extended period, the Admiralty became even more aware of the 
dangers posed by a Mediterranean war, and the potential damage this 
FRXOGGRWR%ULWDLQ¶VRYHUDOOVWUDWHJLFSRVLWLRQ7KLVFDXVHGLW WR LJQRUH
the opportunity to exert significant pressure against Italy and even to 
force Mussolini to abandon his Abyssinian adventure in late 1935. This 
was a period when oil sanctions and a blockade of the Suez Canal 
would have rendered the Italian position in East Africa simply 
untenable. During a meeting on June 16, 1936, the COS outlined the 
future direction of British policy in the Mediterranean. Two of its general 
FRQFOXVLRQVZHUHQRWDEOH7KHFKLHIVFRQFOXGHGWKDW³2XULQWHUHVWVOLH
in a peaceful Mediterranean, and this can only be achieved by 
returning to a state of friendly relations with Italy. This should be our 
aim even in the earliest steps we take to liquidate the Mediterranean 
VLWXDWLRQ´112 The need to retain Italian friendship henceforth became 
an article of faith held by the Admiralty.   In a statement that stressed 
the prioritization of the defence of the Far East over the Mediterranean, 
WKHPHHWLQJDOVRFRQFOXGHG³2QHRIWKHREMHFWVRIUDLVLQJVDQFWLRQVLV
to enable us to withdraw our extra forces at present in the 
Mediterranean, and to return to a state of normal distribution which will 
permit us to be more ready to defend our interests at Home and in the 
)DU (DVW´113 It certainly appeared that the Admiralty was becoming 
increasingly unnerved by the need to concentrate a sizeable proportion 
of its ships in the Mediterranean due to the Abyssinian crisis, creating a 
situation that it clearly regarded as abnormal.     
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       The Abyssinian crisis constituted a critical turning point for 
the British Admiralty in many important respects. The crisis forced the 
Admiralty to abandon all its previous assumptions that no serious war 
planning in the Mediterranean need take place. The consequence was 
that the Admiralty was forced to create, almost from scratch, the 
practical basis of a war plan against Italy. Such a plan had to take into 
account the circumstances of the time, and the fact that the Royal Navy 
faced strategic pressure in other regions which the Admiralty believed, 
demanded more attention than the Mediterranean Sea. The Admiralty 
therefore searched for additional choices apart from passive blockade 
to add to its menu of options for war against Italy. The exploration of 
new tactical options, such as the one provided by the MNBDO, can 
therefore be seen as being motivated by the need to prevent a long, 
drawn out conflict should war against Italy become unavoidable. This 
was partly an acknowledgement of the doubtful value of a naval 
EORFNDGH LQHQVXULQJ ,WDO\¶VVZLIWGHIHDW7KH LPSHWXVIRU WDNLQJDZDU
to Italy also arose from the need to keep the war as short as possible, 
which would enable the Admiralty to restore its normal fleet 
dispositions both in home waters in the Far East. This would put it in a 
better position to face the double threat of Germany and Japan, which 
the Admiralty became increasingly fixated upon as the crisis 
progressed. During a meeting on 18 March 1936, the COS concluded 
WKDW³,I WKHUH LVWKHVPDOOHVWGDQJHURIEHLQJGUDZQLQWRFRPPLWPHQWV
that might lead to war against Germany, we ought at once to 
disengage ourselves from our commitments in the Mediterranean 
which we have exhausted practically the whole of our meager 
IRUFHV´ 114  In late April 1936, the Admiralty began to pressure the 
Foreign Office to allow for a redistribution of the fleet back to its normal 
dispositions by returning the Home Fleet to Gibraltar and the 
Mediterranean Fleet to the Far East.115  
 






      It was therefore the strategic pressure faced in other theatres 
ZKLFKOHGWRDJHQHUDOVHQVHRIZHDNQHVVDERXW%ULWDLQ¶VJOREDOQDYDO
position, and that GURYH WKH$GPLUDOW\¶V SROLF\-making process during 
the Abyssinian crisis. While the Admiralty had reasons not to be 
complacent about the air threat, this was a factor that had already been 
accounted for in its plans for war against Italy. This was evident in the 
IDFW WKDWWKH01%'2¶VHVWDEOLVKPHQWZDVEXLOWZLWKGXe consideration 
having already been given to the need for anti-aircraft protection before 
it was sent out to the Mediterranean. Even then, the plan to use 
Navarino was hastily scrapped due to the apparent spectre of the 
Italian air threat, even after approval from the Greek government was 
REWDLQHG7KH$GPLUDOW\¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQDVNLQJWKH)UHQFK$LU)RUFHWR
launch air attacks against targets in northern Italy also reflected its 
mentality that, absent a perfect tactical situation in the Mediterranean, 
war against Italy should not even be contemplated.  The 
understandable reluctance of the French Air Force to commit to such a 
step, which would almost certain result in retaliatory Italian air attacks 
on French cities, provided the Admiralty with the excuse it needed to 
endorse a policy of non-confrontation against Italy. This was despite 
the fact that, to all intents and purposes, France and other 
Mediterranean nations committed to providing the Admiralty with 
assistance that would have gone a long way to alleviate most of the 
obstacles it would have faced in a Mediterranean war.  
 
      Following the mobilization measures of September, the 
Admiralty acquired a crushing strategic superiority over Italian naval 
forces in the Mediterranean that even the unproven threat posed by 
Italian air power could not hope to neutralize. With the addition of the 
French Navy and Greek forces to the equation, the Admiralty would 
have faced an extremely advantageous correlation of forces against 
Italy in the Mediterranean, had it chose to support the imposition of oil 
VDQFWLRQV 7KH$GPLUDOW\¶VHYHQWXDOGHFLVLRQQRW WRHQGRUVHDVWURQJ
policy against Italy should therefore be attributed to its fear that ship 
losses as a result of a war would serve to further erode the Royal 
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1DY\¶V ability to meet its other responsibilities. The Admiralty 
considered Germany and Japan to be far more dangerous threats in 
the long term as compared to Italy. As such, even as the Admiralty set 
its chess pieces into position in the Mediterranean, it continued to have 
its eye upon bigger game. 
 
      7KH%ULWLVK$GPLUDOW\¶VPRELOL]DWLRQLQWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQDOVR
forced it to remove ships from other parts of the world, even if only on a 
temporary basis. This alarmed the Admiralty to the extent that it 
became a fervent advocate of the appeasement of Italy. This was seen 
as a solution to the otherwise unsolvable problem of a three front war 
against Germany, Italy and Japan, which the Admiralty believed was a 
strategic nightmare to be avoided at all costs. Consequently, the 




















CHAPTER THREE: 1936-1938, The Spanish Civil War and 
problems on three fronts - Strategic interactions between the 
Mediterranean and other theatres 
 
      As a consequence of the Abyssinian crisis, the Admiralty was 
well aware of the dangers faced by Britain's Mediterranean position, 
and the fact that these dangers had become even more acute after 
Italy established itself firmly in East Africa. However, it could not be 
certain as to whether Italian intentions towards Britain were 
fundamentally bellicose or peaceful. Consequently, due to the strategic 
pressures faced by the Royal Navy in other theatres and limitations 
that the British government imposed on the scale of naval rearmament, 
the Admiralty decided to continue with the course of policy that had 
been set during the Abyssinian crisis. This course of policy was the 
appeasement of Italy. The Admiralty believed that this option would 
allow it to redistribute British naval forces to meet more pressing 
concerns. By the middle of the 1930s, the Admiralty was forced to 
FRQIURQWWKHGLOHPPDRIKRZWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VOLPLWHGIRUFHVVKRXOGEH
GLYLGHG WR PHHW %ULWDLQ¶V WKUHH SRWHQWLDO HQHPLHV LQ WKH IRUP RI
Germany, Italy and Japan. This problem was further complicated by 
the fact that Germany, Italy and Japan had been aggressively rearming 
whilst the Royal Navy, as a result of financial constraints and the self-
imposed limitations of the Ten Year Rule, was significantly weakened 
relative to its rivals during the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s. 
 
      Such a situation simply demanded that the Admiralty make 
difficult strategic choices over the prioritization of British worldwide 
defence interests. These choices were necessary because Britain 
faced threats in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Far East, 
and the weakness of the Royal Navy meant the COS did not consider it 
possible for Britain to prevail against a combination of all three 
enemies. By the end of 1938, the Admiralty had become very aware 
about the threat posed by Italy in the Mediterranean. This chapter will 
argue that, from 1935 to 1938, the Admiralty decided to continue 
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prioritizing the defence of the Far East over the Mediterranean because 
it believed British interests in the Far East were much more 
strategically important than those in the Mediterranean. This 
necessitated a continuation of the Italian appeasement policy that 
began during the Abyssinian crisis. In effect, it reduced the options 
available to the Admiralty and the British government in the 
Mediterranean. This ultimately served to undermine Britain's position 
by 1938, allowing Italy to gain significant strategic advantages.                
 
      7KH OHVVRQV IURP %ULWDLQ¶V LQYROYHPent in the Abyssinian 
crisis were interpreted in different ways by the British Foreign 
Office(FO) and the Admiralty. The British FO, led by Foreign Minister 
Anthony Eden, saw the Abyssinian crisis as evidence that Benito 
Mussolini was bent upon a program of Mediterranean expansionism 
that would ultimately set Italy on a collision course with Britain. Instead 
of appeasement as the Admiralty advocated, Eden pushed for a policy 
of containment and argued that the British government should 
VWUHQJWKHQ %ULWDLQ¶V Sosition in the Mediterranean. Writing a strongly 
ZRUGHGPHPRUDQGXPWRWKH%ULWLVK&DELQHW(GHQDUJXHGWKDW%ULWDLQ¶V
LQDELOLW\ WRUHVSRQGVWURQJO\ WRZDUGV ,WDO\¶VFRQTXHVWRI$E\VVLQLDKDG
already caused other states in the Mediterranean to raise doubts about 
British power. This was especially worrying, considering that this was a 
UHJLRQ LQZKLFK ³%ULWLVK LQWHUHVWVDUHQRWRQO\YHU\ LPSRUWDQWEXWYHU\
vulnerable, and that the danger from Italy might become very acute 
with very little notice, and at any moPHQW´116 Eden suggested that the 
British government act to forestall the concerns of the lesser 
Mediterranean powers through the signing of a restricted naval 
defensive treaty with Greece and Turkey.117 This was to be followed up 
by a warning to Italy that any further change in the Mediterranean 
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status quo would concern Britain. 118  These moves were aimed to 
UHDVVXUHWKHVHFRXQWULHVDERXW%ULWDLQ¶VFRQWLQXHGDELOLW\WRSURWHFW LWV
interests in the Mediterranean. They would also serve to reverse 
impressions of declining British power and Italian ascendancy. Eden 
further argued that the Royal Navy would be able to derive from such a 
treaty the practical benefits of being able to access Turkish and Greek 
territorial waters, as well as their naval facilities. This was expected to 
EROVWHU%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKH(DVWHUQ0HGLWHUUDQHDQDQGWKH%DONDQV
and address the problem of the lack of British naval bases in this 
region.119  
 
      The COS argued strongly against signing any mutual 
defensive treaties. Its case was that the weak British army and air force 
strength in the eastern Mediterranean called for a defensive posture 
even in the event of Italian hostility, regardless of the number of British 
DOOLHV LQ WKH UHJLRQ )XUWKHUPRUH WKH &26 HPSKDVL]HG WKDW ³LW LV RI
paramount importance to British strategic interests that we should be 
free of commitments in the Mediterranean if our defence arrangements 
are to prove adequate to deal with the threat of hostilities either in the 
Far East and at Home, and to give us breathing space with which to 
UHFRQGLWLRQ WKH VHUYLFHV´ 120  Evidently, the COS at this point still 
considered that scarce defence resources should not be used to 
improve the British defensive position in the Mediterranean. Instead, 
these resources should be used towDUGVVWUHQJWKHQLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VDELOLW\
to defend its interests against the powers that the COS considered 
most dangerous, Germany and Japan. The British government should 
therefore not commit Britain to signing any treaty that might result in                                                         
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commitments that might necessitate further dilution of British military 
strength across the globe.  
 
      The COS acknowledged Eden¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW WKH 5R\DO
Navy would be able to gain access to Greek and Turkish military 
facilities through the signing of a defensive alliance with these 
countries. Nevertheless, they pointed out that the value of these gains 
would be strategically insignificant compared with the increased risks of 
involvement in a Mediterranean war, in which British forces would have 
to bear the main burden.121 The COS advised the British government to 
make greater efforts to return to a state of friendly relations with Italy. 
This would enable the additional British forces stationed in the 
Mediterranean as a result of the Abyssinian crisis to be withdrawn. 
Consequently, British military forces would then be able to return to a 
³VWDWHRIQRUPDOGLVWULEXWLRQ´ZKLFKZRXOG³SHUPLWXVWREHPRUHUHDG\
WRGHIHQGRXULQWHUHVWVDW+RPHRULQWKH)DU(DVW´122  The insistence 
that a bilateral agreement with Italy was the best solution for preserving 
British defence interests in the Mediterranean was a constant refrain 
over the next few years. This would persist even when international 
GHYHORSPHQWV VXJJHVWHG WKDW0XVVROLQL LQWHQGHG WR GLVSODFH%ULWDLQ¶V
dominant position in the Mediterranean and transform the basin into an 
Italian mare nostrum.  
 
      The British Cabinet eventually GHFLGHG WRDFFHSW WKH&26¶V
recommendation to normalize relations with Italy in September 1936, 
subsequently rescinding British assurances given to Greece and 
Turkey during the Abyssinian crisis. By January 1938, British Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain had decided to sign the Anglo-Italian 
*HQWOHPHQ¶V $JUHHPHQW LQ ZKLFK ERWK %ULWDLQ DQG ,WDO\ DJUHHG WR
respect the territorial status quo among Mediterranean states and 






reaffirm the compatibility of Anglo-Italian interests in the region. 123 
These actions indicated that Chamberlain had decided to follow the 
$GPLUDOW\¶VDGYLFHLQSXUVXLQJDSROLF\RIFRQFLOLDWLRQWRZDUGV,WDO\ 
   
      The $GPLUDOW\¶V H[WUHPH UHOXFWDQFH WR VDQFWLRQ IXUWKHU
binding commitments in the Mediterranean can be attributed to its 
perception of British naval weakness worldwide. In this respect it will be 
necessary to examine the British naval rebuilding program from 1936 
to 1938. This program had been drawn up by the DRC largely in 
response to the deteriorating international climate of the early 1930s, 
which had created the need for the Admiralty to possess sufficient 
resources to fight a two-ocean war.  With 1936 being the year in which 
WKH ILUVWRIVHYHQFDSLWDOVKLSVZDV WREHFRQVWUXFWHG WKH$GPLUDOW\¶V
reluctance to support British involvement in any defensive treaty was 
perhaps understandable.  
 
      As a result of the signing of the London Naval Treaty by the 
British government in 1930, the Royal Navy was prohibited from 
constructing any new capital ships from 1930 to 1936. Before 1933, the 
$GPLUDOW\¶VFDOFXODWLRQVRI%ULWLVKQDYDOVWUHQJWKKDGEHHQEDVHGXSRQ
WKH ³RQH-SRZHU VWDQGDUG´ 124  7KH ³RQH-SRZHU VWDQGDUG´(OPS) 
mandated that the Royal Navy possess at least the same number of 
capital ships as its closest naval rival. This standard was based upon 
the assumption that the Far East was the only area likely to be affected 
by any war, with no danger being anticipated in home waters. As of 
1935, the Royal Navy consisted of 12 capital ships, many of which 
were of WW1 vintage and therefore obsolete.125  
 
      The COS, from 1932 onwards, began to reassess the 
viability of the OPS as part of a general review of overall British                                                         
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defence capabilities following the decision to cancel the Ten-Year Rule.  
The general consensus amongst the British government and its 
defence planners, endorsed by the DRC, was that the OPS was no 
longer sufficient to meet the requirements of the changing international 
situation. Following DRC discussions, a new standard of British naval 
VWUHQJWK NQRZQ DV WKH ³'5& 6WDQGDUG´ HPHUJHG DV WKH PLQLPXP
necessary requirement considered adequate for the Royal Navy to 
meet its global responsibilities. This new standard was created to take 
into account the need for the Royal Navy to retain in European waters 
D ³GHWHUUHQW IRUFH´ WRSUHYHQW%ULWDLQ¶V YLWDOKRPH WHUPLQDODUHDV IURP
being interfered with by the strongest European naval power.126 This 
was while the Royal Navy took up a defensive position in the Far East 
and effected whatever redeployments were demanded by the 
circumstances of any particular crisis, which the COS expected to 
occur as a consequence of Japanese aggression. The DRC standard 
did not account for the prospect of a hostile Italy, relying on the French 
to guarantee the security of passage through the Mediterranean.  It 
called for the Royal Navy to maintain a peacetime fleet of a total of 15 
capital ships, 3 more than were required in the OPS. More important, 
the DRC recommended the construction of seven new capital ships 
from 1936 to 1938, at a rate of 2-3-2.127 This was necessary as, due to 
the capital ship construction holiday imposed by the London Naval 
Treaty, many British capital ships by this point were considered out-of-
date and therefore required replacement.  
 
      The British Cabinet accepted the basic principle of the DRC 
Standard fleet and its recommendations for new construction of capital 
ships early in 1936. By this point, the signing of the Anglo-German 
Naval Treaty effectively released the shackles on German naval 
rearmament. This forced the COS to consider that even a fleet rebuilt 
XSRQ WKH OLQHV RI WKH ³'5& 6WDQGDUG´ might be insufficient to meet 






accept a new and more ambitious standard of British naval strength, 
NQRZQDVWKH³7ZR-3RZHU6WDQGDUG´7KLVVWDQGDUGZDVGHVLJQHGWR 
³enable us to place a Fleet in the Far East fully adequate to act 
on the defensive and to act as a strong deterrent against any 
threat to our interests in that part of the globe, and to maintain in 
all circumstances in Home Waters a force able to meet the 
requirements of a war with Germany at the same time.´128  
 
Simply put, the DRC was asking the British government to authorize 
the construction of a fleet that would provide the Royal Navy with the 
capability to fight a two-ocean war against Germany and Japan. 
 
      This paper shall not dwell upon the question of whether the 
VL]H RI WKH ³'5&6WDQGDUG´ QDYDO UHEXLOGLQJ SURJUDPPHZRXOG KDYH
been sufficient to meet British needs. Instead, it will examine the 
strategic implications of the British goveUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQWRSXUVXHWKH
programme LQVWHDGRI WKH IXOO ³Two-3RZHU6WDQGDUG´SURJUDPPH WKDW
was later advocated by the DRC. 7KH³'5&6tandard´ programme was 
planned for completion by early 1939. This meant that British naval 
strength would be significantly weak compared to its main naval rivals 
for the next two \HDUV 7KH $GPLUDOW\ SURMHFWHG WKDW %ULWDLQ¶V QDYDO
weakness would be most acute in mid 1938 to early 1939, by which 
WLPH %ULWDLQ¶V PRVW OLNHO\ HQHPLHV *HUPDQ\ DQG -DSDQ ZRXOG KDYH
completed their current naval rearmament programmes. Should Britain 
find itself at war against both Germany and Japan during or before 
1939, the Royal Navy would have to fight from a highly 
GLVDGYDQWDJHRXVVWUDWHJLFSRVLWLRQ7KH$GPLUDOW\¶VYLHZZDV WKDW WKH
undesirability of war during this period necessitated a policy of 
conFLOLDWLRQ WRZDUGV %ULWDLQ¶V HQHPLHV DW OHDVW XQWLO HDUO\  7KLV
reinforced its prevailing belief that an agreement with Italy should be 
sought by the British government in order to reduce the number of 
potential enemies that Britain had to face.  
 




      7KH ³'5&6WDQGDUG´ QDYDO EXLOGLQJ SURJUDPPH DOORZHG IRU
the construction of a navy strong enough to fight Japan whilst the 
remaining of British naval forces took up a defensive posture in 
(XURSH 7KH %ULWLVK JRYHUQPHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR UHMHFW WKH $GPLUDOW\¶s 
suggestion of building up the fleet to a full two-power standard meant 
that, even after the completion of the naval construction programmes, 
the Royal Navy would barely be strong enough to fight a two-front war 
against a fully rearmed Germany and Japan. The corollary of this was 
that war on three fronts against Germany, Italy and Japan would be a 
task well beyond the means of a Royal Navy rebuilt upon the lines of 
the DRC standard. Yet, with Italy having to be considered as a 
potential enemy after the Abyssinian crisis, this was a possibility that 
could not be discounted. 
 
      7KH$GPLUDOW\¶VUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWILJKWLQJDWKUHHIURQWZDUZDV
DQ XQGHUWDNLQJ ZHOO EH\RQG %ULWDLQ¶V PHDQV ZDV UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH
development of British naval plans from 1936 onwards. Broad 
directives for the prioritization of British military liabilities were set out in 
the annual review of national and imperial defence held by the COS in 
February 1937. In this review, the security of British interests in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East was listed as having fourth priority 
behind the security of British imperial communications, the United 
Kingdom itself, and Empire interests in the Far East. However, they 
DGGHG WKHFDYHDW WKDW µWKHVWUHQJWKRI WKH)OHHW WKDWFRXOGEHVHQW WR
the Far East must be governed by consideration of Home 
5HTXLUHPHQWV¶129 These requirements, according to the COS, were 
that Britain must maintain naval forces that were at least equal in 
strength to that of Germany in the event that she needed to dispatch a 
fleet to the Far East.130  
 
      Due to the prioritization of the Far East over the 
0HGLWHUUDQHDQ WKH &26 EHOLHYHG WKDW %ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ PXVW EH                                                        
129




safeguarded through a diplomatic accommodation with Italy. The 
DOWHUQDWLYHQRWHGWKH&26ZDVWR³HVWDEOLVKRXUVHOves in such military 
strength in the Mediterranean as would permanently deter Italy from 
embarking on war against us.´131 In the event of war against Germany, 
Italy and Japan at the same time, the COS planned to rely upon the 
assistance of the French navy to maintain, at least to some extent, 
British command of the western Mediterranean. The COS believed 
that, so long as British forces managed to hold Egypt and the Suez 
Canal, their weakening position in the Mediterranean would be 
reversible. Even if Egypt coXOG QRW EH KHOG WKH ORVV RI %ULWDLQ¶V
0HGLWHUUDQHDQSRVLWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRWKH&26³ZRXOGQRWQHDUO\EHVR
serious as the surrender of our sea-power in the Far East.´132  
 
  ,WLVFOHDUIURPWKH&26¶VDVVHVVPHQWWKDWWKH\VDZ(J\SWDQG
the Suez Canal as BrLWDLQ¶V ³SRVLWLRQ RI ODVW UHVRUW´ LQ WKH
Mediterranean and the Middle East. This underlined the fact that 
%ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQFHSODQQHUVFRQWLQXHGWRVHHWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQSULPDULO\
as a means of providing the swiftest route to the Far East, instead of as 
a theatre that should be defended due to its inherent value to the 
British Empire.  By making it clear that even the loss of Egypt would be 
preferable to defeat in the Far East, the COS essentially reaffirmed the 
FRQWLQXHGSULPDF\RIWKH³6LQJDSRUH6WUDWHJ\´Ln British grand strategy 
for imperial defence. The COS decision to reassert the principle of 
prioritizing the Far East over the Mediterranean was made despite the 
need to take into account the prospect of a hostile Italy following 
%ULWDLQ¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ the Abyssinian crisis. The possibility that Italy 
PLJKWSRVHDWKUHDW WR%ULWDLQ¶VVKRUWHVW OLQHRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQVWRWKH
Far East was duly noted by the COS, but not considered serious 
enough to warrant a fundamental shift in the overall direction of British 
imperial defence strategy. 
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      The COS decided to prioritize the defence of the Far East 
over the Mediterranean primarily because it considered British interests 
in the Far East to hold far more strategic significance as compared to 
those in the Mediterranean.   Towards the end of the Abyssinian crisis, 
Chatfield now felt that the possibility of war between Britain and Italy 
was now remote, at best. Writing in a letter to Admiral Roger 
Backhouse, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, Chatfield 
commentHG³,IHHOWKDWWKHFKDQFHVRIWURXEOHLQWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQDUH
now greatly reduced, but the Italian-Abyssinian peace conference(of 
April 1936) is by no means certain to come off and if it does not then 
we may drift along in our present state for months. In that case I have 
little doubt that we should be able to take certain risks in the 
0HGLWHUUDQHDQ´133  Chatfield felt that the unlikelihood of war with Italy 
allowed the Admiralty to withdraw the bulk of British naval forces 
stationed in the Mediterranean in response to the Abyssinian crisis.134 
Crucially, Chatfield believed that British interests in the Mediterranean 
were of secondary strategic importance. He commented to Winston 
&KXUFKLOO LQ 0D\  WKDW ³7KH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ SUREOHP \RX ZLOO QR
doubt, immediately observe is not a true picture of what may happen 
because in the Mediterranean in the case of war with Italy we have not 
necessarily(sic) to consider anti-submarine attack on merchant ships,  
at any rate in that sea, because we can deflect our trade HOVHZKHUH´135 
This was an allusion to the fact that, should British merchant ships be 
unable to use the Suez Canal route, they could always be redirected 
through the traditional Cape of Good Hope route. The defeat of British 
power in the Mediterranean would therefore not constitute a fatal blow 
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to British trade, nor did Chatfield expect it to completely sever the 
connection between Britain and her Far Eastern empire.  
 
      7KH$GPLUDOW\DQGWKH&,'FRQVLGHUHG%ULWDLQ¶V)DU(DVWHUQ
territories as a vital, almost indispensable resource to the British 
Empire. Chatfield had little doubt that the Japanese would capitalize 
upon British involvement in a European war to attack lightly defended 
British possessions in the Far East. Following the ascension of Hitler to 
power in Nazi Germany in 1933, Chatfield had warned the DRC, 
³-DSDQZRXOG VXUHO\ VWULNH VRXWK EXW RQO\ LI WKH %ULWLVK navy became 
detained elsewhere.´136 Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the CID, also 
underlined the importance of the Far East to Britain when he made the 
case to the Treasury for funds to rebuild the Royal Navy in October 
1935: 
No risk could be taken in the Far East. If Japan could defeat us 
there she could overrun the East and we should be in an 
impossible position with Australia and New Zealand at the 
mercy of Japan and India cut off. The whole security of the 
Empire and the maintenance of our prestige in the world 
depended on the possession of a defence which without risk 
could leave us in a strong defensive position in the East in the 
event of trouble in the West.137   
 
Simply put, British defence planners saw British naval strength in the 
Far East as the lynchpin of the entire British defence position from the 
Indian Ocean to the Pacific. The defeat of British naval power in the 
Far East would not only sever the link between Britain and her Far 
Eastern Dominions of Australia and New Zealand, it was also expected 
to imperil British control over India, the crown jewel and garrison state 
of the British Empire which had provided the British Army with over 1.2 
million soldiers during the First World War.138 Defeat in the Far East 
with all its attendant consequences would therefore signal the end of                                                         
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%ULWDLQ¶V VWDWXV DV D JOREDO SRZHU DQG LWV UHOHJDWLRQ WR VHFRQG UDWH
status. This could possibly even result in the end of the British Empire 
itself. Given these potentially disastrous consequences, it is 
unsurprising that neither Chatfield nor Hankey seriously entertained 
WKRXJKWVRIVXUUHQGHULQJ%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKH)DU(DVW 
  
      The 1937 Defence Review marked the first time the COS 
seriously considered the prospect of a war against the combination of 
Germany, Italy and Japan at the same time. Fully cognizant that a two-
front war against Germany and Japan would already tax British 
resources to their very limits, the COS saw an appeasement policy 
towards Italy as the best solution towards the problem of how to meet 
%ULWDLQ¶V LPPHQVH LPSHULDO GHIHQFH FRPPLWPHQWV ZLWK WKH OLPLWHG
resources at hand. The decision of the British government to deny the 
Admiralty the luxury of constructing a full two-ocean fleet was therefore 
instrumental in forcing the Admiralty to choose whether to accept 
British naval weakness in the Mediterranean or in the Far East.  
      By mid-1936, it was becoming clear that Benito Mussolini 
LQWHQGHG WR VWHDGLO\ LQFUHDVH ,WDO\¶V PLOLWDU\ VWUHQJWK LQ WKH
Mediterranean even as the Italo-Abyssinian war was being brought to a 
conclusion. Evidence of Italian intentions in the Mediterranean first 
EHJDQ WR VXUIDFH IROORZLQJ 0XVVROLQL¶V GHFLVLRQ WR VXSSO\ *HQHUDO
Francisco Franco with massive amounts of military aid, following the 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. In August 1936, Italian 
fighters and anti-aircraft equipment began to arrive in Majorca, the 
largest island in the Balearics, a strategically important chain of islands 
that lay along the main line of communications between Gibraltar and 
Malta. 139  Following the gradual increase of Italian forces in the 
Balearics over the course of late 1936, the islands became an 
important base for illegal attacks on merchant ships bound for Spanish 
Republican ports. In spring 1937, signs began to emerge that the 
Italians were fortifying the island of Pantelleria, another strategically                                                         
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important island that straddled the Straits of Sicily. More ominously for 
the British, Italian troops were pouring into Libya, creating a significant 
WKUHDW WR%ULWLVK(J\SW¶VZHVWHUQ border at about the same time ,WDO\¶V
position in Abyssinia was being consolidated.  
 
      The British FO was very much alive to the possibility of 
Mussolini using the Spanish Civil War as a platform to increase Italian 
power in the Mediterranean. On August 19, 1936, a FO memorandum 
warned that Italy might use its involvement in the Spanish Civil War to 
ZHDNHQ %ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH ZHVWHUQ 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ 140  On 24 
August, a sub-committee of the COS met to ascertain British security 
interests in the Iberian peninsula, and how these interests had been 
affected by the outbreak of the war. This committee identified Gibraltar 
DV%ULWDLQ¶VNH\FRPPHUFLDODQGVWUDWHJLF LQWHUHVW0RUHRPLQRXVO\IRU
the future, it singled out Italy as the main threat to regional stability in 
the Mediterranean.141 The committee decided that the goals of British 
SROLF\ LQ WKH6SDQLVK&LYLO:DUZHUH WREH ILUVW ³WKHPDLQWHQDQFHRI
WKH7HUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\RI6SDLQDQGKHUSRVVHVVLRQ´DQGVHFRQG³WKH
maintenance of such relations with any Spanish government that will 
emerge from this conflict as will ensure benevolent neutrality in the 
HYHQWRIRXUEHLQJHQJDJHGLQ(XURSHDQZDU´142  
 
      Despite these indications of a concerted Italian bid for 
Mediterranean hegemony, the COS were unwilling to take any 
measures that might lead to worsening relations between Britain and 
Italy. The CID concluded in August 1936 that the establishment of 
Italian air bases in Majorca and other Balearic islands did not affect any 
vital British interests.143 This assessment remained unchanged over                                                         
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the next few months, even as Italian troops and military equipment 
continued to pour into Spain.  
 
      In response to the growing Italian presence in Spain and the 
western Mediterranean, Eden insisted in December 1936 that the COS 
reconsider its opinion regarding the strategic importance of Italian 
naval bases in the Balearics. On 8 January, Eden proposed to the 
British Cabinet to impose a naval blockade around the Spanish coast 
to stem the flow of Italian military equipment to the Nationalists. 
6DPXHO+RDUH%ULWDLQ¶V)LUVW/RUGRIWKH$GPLUDOW\VWDXQFKO\RSSRVHG
(GHQ¶VSODQRQ WKHJURXQGV WKDW LW ³FXW DFURVV WKH FRQFHUQV RI WKRVH
who were very anxious that the Soviets not win in Europe.´144 The 
&DELQHW¶V UHMHFWLRQ RI the blockade proposal indicated that Eden had 
become an increasingly marginalized voice in arguing that Britain adopt 
a strong policy towards Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War.  
 
      Throughout this period, the Admiralty was very much alive to 
the strategic implications that could result from the aggressive nature of 
,WDO\¶VDFWLRQV,QDOHWWHUWR$GPLUDO%DFNKRXVHLQ-XO\&KDWILHOG
expressed a sense of general unease about the deteriorating situation 
in the Mediterranean. He expressed FRQFHUQDERXWWKH³YHU\FRQIOLFWLQJ
reports about the state of affairs in Italy, and the mentality of Mussolini, 
particularly if the Non-Intervention Committee(of the Spanish Civil War) 
EUHDNV GRZQ´145 While he did not consider the prospect of a British-
ItDOLDQZDU WR EH OLNHO\ DW WKLV SRLQW KH IHOW LW QHFHVVDU\ WRPDNH ³IXOO
SUHSDUDWLRQV LQ FDVH VRPH XQWRZDUG HYHQW KDSSHQV LQ WKH IXWXUH´146 
The Admiralty subsequently recommended the dispatch of one 
destroyer flotilla and three cruisers to Gibraltar, to be followed up by 
the improvement of net and anti-air defences at Rosyth, Malta and 
Alexandria, immediately. 147  In July 1937, Captain Tom Phillips,                                                         
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planning director for the Admiralty, submitted a report that indicated 
Malta and Egypt would be in grave danger in the event of an isolated 
war with Italy.148 &DSWDLQ3KLOLSV¶UHSRUWDQGWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VVXEVHTXHQW
decision to reinforce the Mediterranean, even if only with minor forces, 
VXJJHVW D NHHQ DZDUHQHVV RI WKH SHULO QRZ IDFLQJ %ULWDLQ¶V
Mediterranean position. 
  
      British local commanders in the Mediterranean were also 
keenly aware about the vulnerability of the entire position. By 
November 1936, Sir Miles Lampson, British Ambassador to Egypt, was 
FRPSODLQLQJ WKDW (J\SW KDG ³LQVXIILFLHQW UHVRXUFHV´ WR GHIHQG itself 
against the huge Italian garrison in Libya.149 With the strength of Italian 
forces in Libya having been increased to a total of 60,000 troops 
DJDLQVW D PHUH  LQ (J\SW /DPSVRQ¶V UHIUDLQ UHSUHVHQWHG DQ
understatement about British military weakness in Egypt. 150  These 
concerns were further heightened in March 1937 when Italy announced 
the opening of a coastal road in Libya that pointed directly to the Suez 
Canal.151 *LYHQWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VGHSHQGHQFHXSRQWKH(J\SWLDQQDYDO
base at Alexandria, the Admiralty could not afford to ignore these 
GHYHORSPHQWV /DPSVRQ¶V DWWHPSWV WR REWDLQ PRUH UHLQIRUFHPHQWV
were rejected by the CID, on the premise that LW ZRXOG ³UHVXOW LQ D
diversion of our limited resources from our main objective, which is the 
security of thLVFRXQWU\DJDLQVW*HUPDQDJJUHVVLRQ´7KLVQHFHVVLWDWHG
LQ WKH YLHZ RI WKH &,' WKH WDNLQJ RI ³KRUULEOH ULVNV´ LQ (J\SW152 The 
&,'¶VUHVSRQVHWR/DPSVRQVXJJHVWVLWZDVQRWXQDZDUHRIWKHGDQJHU
posed to Egypt by Italian troops in both Libya and Abyssinia.  
 
      7KH&,'¶V)DU(DVWHUQ$SSUHFLDWLRQRI-XO\GHPDQGHG
WKDW³DOOPHDVXUHVQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKH6XH]&DQDODQG                                                        
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for the security of our defended ports and our air and other routes to 
WKH )DU (DVWPXVW EH SXW LQWR RSHUDWLRQ´ RQFH DJain underlining the 
indispensible role played by the Suez Canal in maintaining British 
communications with the Far East.153 Clearly, by this point, the Italian 
military threat was now seen as serious enough to demand significant 
attention. This was in contrast to the period before the Abyssinian 
crisis, when Italy was perceived by British defence planners as a weak 
VWDWHZLWKQHLWKHUWKHZLOOQRUWKHPHDQVWRWKUHDWHQ%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQ
the Mediterranean.  
      On 31 August 1937, an Italian submarine in Spanish waters 
unsuccessfully attacked the British destroyer HMS Havock, which was 
on patrol as part of British involvement in the Non-Intervention 
Committee for the Spanish Civil War.154 Two days later, the British 
tanker Woodford was torpedoed and sunk off the coast of Valencia.155 
The attack on the Havock and the sinking of the Woodford were 
dangerous incidents that could have easily led to war between Britain 
DQG,WDO\7KH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHLQFLGHQWHIIHFWLYHO\
summed up the lengths to which Britain was willing to go in order to 
avoid conflict with Italy. The AdmiraOW\¶V3ODQV'LYLVLRQSURSRVHG IRXU
possible courses of action the British government could undertake in 
response to the attack.156 The Royal Navy could impose a blockade of 
Spanish ports held by nationalist forces or attempt a raid on one of 
these ports as retaliation against the attack. British military forces could 
also seize Majorca, the island from which Italian air attacks against 
Republican shipping had originated. The last option proposed was the 
prosecution of anti-submarine warfare operations to protect British 
naval assets and merchant ships from further attacks.  
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      'HVSLWH (GHQ¶V YRFLIHURXV FDOOV IRU D VWURQJ UHDFWLRQ WKH
%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWDFFHSWHGWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VILQDOUHFRPPHQGDWLRQWKDW
the last option be adopted, for fear that too an aggressive a response 
might provoke war.157 This Admiralty insistence to adopt the mildest 
possible response against the Italian submarine campaign was further 
underlined by the standing orders issued by Admiral Dudley Pound, 
now Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. Pound directed 
that, unless a submerged submarine was discovered within a five-mile 
radius of a recently attacked British ship, no retaliatory action would be 
conducted against the vessel in question. Instead, the Royal Navy 
should restrict itself to identifying the origin of the submarine.  Pound 
added that no actions were to be taken against hostile surface ships or 
airplanes and that no attempt would be made to protect non-British 
merchant ships headed for Republican ports.158 It was clear that, by 
this point, the Admiralty was even more reluctant to countenance the 
prospect of a clash with Italy than during the Abyssinian crisis. With 
$GPLUDO3RXQGVKDULQJ WKH$GPLUDOW\¶VYLHZVDERXW WKHQHHG WRDYRLG
conflict in the Mediterranean, the AdmirDOW\¶V SUHYDLOLQJ LPSXOVH IRU
appeasing Italy became even more entrenched as part of overall grand 
strategy.  
 
    7KH $GPLUDOW\¶V UHIXVDO WR VDQFWLRQ DQ DJJUHVVLYH UHVSRQVH
towards the Italian submarine attack on HMS Havock was also 
motivated in part by tactical considerations. The commencement of the 
naval rebuilding programme in 1936 created a need for heavy training 
SURJUDPPHV IRU PDQ\ RI WKH 5R\DO 1DY\¶V FUHZV159 Any attempt at 
military retaliation would have necessitated the disruption and delay of 
these programmes, with possibly inconvenient implications for the 
HQWLUH%ULWLVKQDYDOUHDUPDPHQWVFKHPH7KH$GPLUDOW\¶VDQDO\VLVZDV
that a slowing down of British naval rearmament was unacceptable 
given the pace at which BriWDLQ¶VHQHPLHV*HUPDQ\DQG-DSDQZHUH                                                        
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rapidly rearming. This had to be taken into account, in addition to 
possible ship losses expected as a result of a clash with Italian naval 
forces. The Admiralty expected that, should strong retaliatory action 
against Italy be taken, the naval correlation of forces between the 
Royal Navy and the combined navies of Germany and Japan in 1938 
would become even more disadvantageous to Britain than what was 
currently being projected. Furthermore, unlike during the Abyssinian 
crisis, the Admiralty could no longer count upon the certain support of 
other Mediterranean states such as France and Greece.  
 
      :KLOHWKH$GPLUDOW\ZDVXQGRXEWHGO\FRQFHUQHGDERXW,WDO\¶V
increasing belligerence, it was events in the Far East that provided the 
catalyst for the situation in Egypt to become a matter that demanded 
immediate attention from British defence planners. The outbreak of full-
scale war between Japan and China in July 1937 had greatly increased 
the risk of accidental Japanese attacks on British interests in the Far 
East. Such an incident occurred on 12 December 1937 when Japanese 
aircraft attacked, without provocation, the US gunboat USS Panay and 
the British gunboat HMS Ladybird. The incident, which resulted in the 
sinking of the Panay and the Ladybird sustaining serious damage, 
created uproar in the British and American public. Intent on setting a 
strong precedent against future acts of Japanese aggression against 
British interests in the Far East, Eden, after discussions with Chatfield, 
drafted a telegram to Washington stating that Britain was considering 
to send a battlefleet to the Far East in response to the attack.160 In this 
telegram, Eden urged the American government to take similar 
action.161 On January 3 1938, Chatfield informed Captain Royal E. 
Ingersoll, the Head of War Plans in the US Navy, that a British fleet 
would be ready to move to the Far East by 15 January.162 
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   7KH$GPLUDOW\¶VGHFLVLRQWRVHQGDIOHHWRIHLJKWWRQLQHFDSLWDO
ships to the Far East was halted when it was recognized that this 
required invoking the Suez Canal Defence Plan. The Suez Canal 
Defence Plan had presupposed that a British fleet would not proceed 
until either hostilities ensued with Japan or were imminent.163 Invoking 
the Suez Canal Defence Plan would involve serious measures. These 
measures included declaring martial law in Egypt, securing the Canal 
&RPSDQ\¶V DJUHHPHQW IRU VXVSHQGLQJ &DQDO WUDIILF IRU IRXU WR VHYHQ
days to allow for the passage of the fleet, and imposing controls on 
both ends of the canal as a security measure against suspect vessels. 
Admiral Dudley Pound, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean 
Fleet, informed Chatfield that for the fleet to be able to traverse the 
canal, nothing less than the full Suez Canal Defence Plan, which 
involved strict inspection and the denial of passage to all suspect 
vessels, including Italian, would have to be invoked.164 Not only did 
these measures have to be undertaken by the Egyptian government, 
they increased the likelihood of an Italian attack against Egypt at a time 
when %ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQVLYHSRVLWLRQLQ(J\SWZDVDFXWHO\ZHDN/DPSVRQ
alarmed at the prospect of an Italian attack on Egypt should the 
Admiralty choose to invoke the Suez Canal Defence Plan, telegraphed 
Eden on 22 January WKDWWKH³WHPSWDWLRQWR,WDO\WRDWWDFN(J\SWZRXOG
be very strong and our consequential interference with neutral shipping 
and Italian communications could provide ample pretexts.´ 165 
Eventually, following profuse apologies from the Japanese 
government, the plan for an Anglo-American show of force in the Far 
East was dropped.  
 
      The Panay incident brought home to the Admiralty the reality 
of the triple threat facing the British Empire, and how British weakness 
in one theatre could have a decisive impact in another. By exposing the 




 NMM, CHT 4/10, Letter from Pound to Chatfield, 7 February 1938. 
165
 Morewood, p. 110. 
 77 
PDGH WKH VKRULQJ XS RI (J\SW¶V GHIHQFHV D PDWWHU RI WKH KLJKHVW
urgency to the COS. To the Admiralty, the position of Egypt was now a 
critical issue, considering how the inability to implement the Suez 
Canal Defence Plan had precluded a strong British response towards 
the attack on the Panay. On 17 February 1938, the CID met to discuss 
/DPSVRQ¶V UHTXHVW IRU IXUWKHU UHLQIRUFHPHQWV WR EH VHQW WR (J\SW166 
The CID aimed for Egyptian self-sufficiency in defence, which, in 
&KDWILHOG¶VYLHZZDV³WRPDNe it certain that the garrison of Egypt could 
hold out until reinforcements could reach them, even if they had to be 
URXWHGYLDWKH&DSH´167 ,WDSSHDUHGWKDW&KDWILHOG¶VPDLQFRQFHUQZDV
therefore not so much the maintenance of British naval strength in the 
Mediterranean per se, but instead the defence of British Egypt and 
ensuring that the Suez Canal would be open for the passage of the 
main fleet to the Far East should Italy strike against Egypt. The CID 
FRQFOXGHGWKDWZLWKWKH,WDOLDQWKUHDWQRZ³PRUHLPPLQHQW´WKDQLWZDV
LQWKHVXPPHURIWKH&26KDGEHHQDEOHWR³XQGHUWDNHDIXUWKHU
examination of the problem in the course of their preparation of a 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHUHYLHZRIWKHVLWXDWLRQLQWKH0LGGOH(DVW´$VDUHVXOW
WKH &26 QRZ IHOW ³WKDW WKH Uisks attending the dispatch of forces to 
(J\SWIURPWKLVFRXQWU\VKRXOGQRZEHDFFHSWHG´168 The CID reached 
agreement to bring up to their authorized establishment the units that 
at present formed part of the garrison strength at Egypt, and to 
dispatch one infantry brigade and ancillary troops to Palestine and one 
Field Company to Egypt. In addition, one squadron of British Gloster 
Gladiator fighters was to be immediately sent to Egypt, together with 
twelve Wellesley first-line medium bombers and two squadrons of Hind 
light bombers.169 7KH&,' DOVR GLUHFWHG WKDW ³DGHTXDWH WUDQVSRUW RI D
suitable type was to be provided at once to ensure the requisite degree 
of mobility for the squadrons in the Middle East, and to provide for the 
                                                        
166









supply and maintenance requiremeQWV RI VTXDGURQV LQ WKH ILHOG´170 
Taken as a whole, this constituted a small but significant reinforcement 
of the British garrison in Egypt.  
 
      $VDFROORUDU\WRWKHGHFLVLRQWREROVWHU(J\SW¶VGHIHQFHVWKH
COS also decided to undertake a general reviHZ RI %ULWDLQ¶V RYHUDOO
defence position in the Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa. 
The main purpose of this review was to draw up plans for British 
engagement in a single-handed war against Italy, though other 
combinations such as a war between Britain and France on one side 
against Germany, Italy and Japan were considered as well. For the first 
time since 1933, when Italy had been classified as one of the friendly 
powers against whom no defence preparations need be made, the 
COS began to consider Italy as a probable enemy. The plans drawn up 
by the COS were significantly more aggressive than those drawn up by 
the Admiralty in its 1931 Appreciation. Envisaging an offensive role for 
WKH5R\DO1DY\WKH&26DGYRFDWHGXVLQJ%ULWLVKQDYDOIRUFHVWR³EUing 
pressure to bear upon Italy by operations designed to (a) stop supplies 
reaching her by sea, (b), cut communications with her forces in Libya 
DQG(DVW$IULFDDQGFDWWDFNKHUFRDVWV´171 In order to achieve this, 
3RXQG¶V0HGLWHUUDQHDQ)OHHWEDVHGRQAlexandria was to be reinforced 
with one aircraft carrier, two 8-inch cruisers, three 6-inch cruisers, one 
cruiser minelayer and two destroyer flotillas shortly after the outbreak 
of hostilities with Italy. 172  While the threat of Italian air power was 
considered, the COS decided that in the absence of war experience, 
WKH\ ZHUH QRW ³SUHSDUHG WR DFFHSW WKLV (that Italian air power would 
make the Central and Eastern Mediterranean untenable for the Royal 
1DY\VLWXDWLRQDV WKHEDVLV IRURXUSODQV´DQG WKDW WKH\proposed to 
H[DPLQH RIIHQVLYH PHDVXUHV ³RQ WKH EDVLV WKDW %ULWLVK QDYDO IRUFHV
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ZRXOGEHDEOHWRRSHUDWHLQVSLWHRI,WDOLDQQDYDODWWDFN´173 These were 
undoubtedly ambitious proposals, and the COS ended by 
recommending the creation of a Naval Mediterranean War Plan, 
including plans for offensive operations.174 7KH$GPLUDOW\¶VGHFLVLRQ WR
DSSURYHWKH&26¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVVXJJHVWVWKDWLWIXOO\DSSUHFLDWHG
the offensive possibilities against Italy in a British-Italian war.   
 
      The offensive nature of the COS plans for war against Italy, 
however, should not serve to obscure the fact that the Admiralty 
continued to prioritize the defence of the Far East over the 
Mediterranean. The COS UHYLHZPDGHSODLQWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VLQWHQWLRQWR
abandon the Mediterranean should it be required to send the main fleet 
to the Far East. It also marked the first time that the COS officially 
considered the worst-case scenario of a three-front war against 
Germany, Italy and Japan. The report declared that in such a situation, 
BritisKQDYDO IRUFHV LQ WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ ³ZRXOGEH UHGXFHG WRD IHZ
VXEPDULQHV DQG OLJKW VXUIDFH IRUFHV´ DOORZLQJ ,WDO\ WR ³EH DEOH WR
control the sea communications in the eastern Mediterranean, subject 
always to any action which the French navy would be able WRWDNH´175 
The obvious implication of this report was that, should the British 
JRYHUQPHQW EH FRPSHOOHG WR FDUU\ RXW WKH ³6LQJDSRUH 6WUDWHJ\´ E\
VHQGLQJ WKH IOHHW WR WKH )DU (DVW %ULWDLQ¶V HQWLUH SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH
Mediterranean could be held hostage by Italy. 
 
      7KH &,'¶V GHFLVLRQ WR UHLQIRUFH (J\SW DQG WKH SODQV WKDW
were drawn up for a single-handed war against Italy, suggest that 
British defence planners were by this point fully aware of the threat 
posed by an increasingly aggressive Fascist Italy in the Mediterranean. 
The various plans and scenarios drawn up by the CID also point to an 
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war, and the need to consider what British plans would be in such an 
eventuality. Nevertheless, WKH &,'¶V GHFLVLRQ WR UHLQIRUFH (J\SW
however, did not represent a reversal, or even a reconsideration of the 
SULQFLSOH WKDW WKH GHIHQFH RI %ULWDLQ¶V )DU (DVWHUQ SRVLWLRQ ZRXOG EH
prioritized over the Mediterranean. Nor did it inspire any fundamental 
reassessment of the appeasement policy towards Italy. On the 
contrary, it served to convince the Admiralty and the British 
government that Italian appeasement should be pursued even more 
vigorously in order to avoid, at almost any cost, war against an enemy 
that could seriously endanger communications between London and 
the Far East. In February 1938, the Admiralty rejected an offer for 
Anglo-French naval staff talks, on the grounds that this might upset 
Italian sensitivities during a period when negotiations for an Anglo-
Italian agreement were at a very delicate phase.176 During the same 
month, the resignation of Anthony Eden from his post as British 
Foreign Minister signaled the end of opposition within the British 
&DELQHWWRWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VSROLF\RISXUVXLQJ the appeasement of Italy 
at almost any price. 
 
      Within two years following the termination of the Abyssinian 
crisis, the balance of raw military power faced by British forces in the 
Mediterranean changed considerably. During this period, Italy 
significantly increased its military forces in North and East Africa, and 
was in the process of building up a modern and capable navy strong 
enough to challenge the Royal Navy for control of the Mediterranean 
Basin. In addition, through the fortification of Pantelleria and the 
establishment of naval and air bases in the Balearic Islands, Italian 
military forces acquired important jumping off points from which British 
and French assets in the Mediterranean could be attacked. Throughout 
this period, the Admiralty was fully aware of the fact that these 
measures signaled potential Italian hostility towards Britain, as well as 




,WDO\¶V LQFUHDVLQJ PLOLWDU\ SUHVHQFH <HW WKH $GPLUDOW\ FKRVH WR
continue with its Italian appeasement policy. Given the relative 
weakness of British naval power vis-à-vis its enemies, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the Admiralty decided that a diplomatic 
accommodation with at least one of its potential adversaries was 
necessary.  
 
      The Admiralty chose to pursue appeasement in the 
Mediterranean partly because it believed that an Anglo-Italian 
settlement might ultimately be attainable When faced with increasing 
HYLGHQFH RI0XVVROLQL¶V KRVWLOH LQWHQWLRQV WKH $GPLUDOW\ DFted first to 
secure its position in Egypt in order to ensure that the Suez route 
would be open for the passage of the main fleet to the Far East under 
any circumstances. The Admiralty considered British defence interests 
in the Far East to be more important than those in the Mediterranean. 
This was due to the potentially catastrophic consequences that it 
expected to occur should Britain allow itself to be defeated in the Far 
(DVW7KHQHHGIRUWKH$GPLUDOW\WRVHWDVLGHWKHEXONRI%ULWDLQ¶VQDYDO
forces to serve as an expeditionary force to the Far East whilst 
retaining sufficient force in home waters to deter opportunistic forays 
from the German Kriegsmarine effectively meant there would be little 
scope for any attempt to wrest control of the Mediterranean from Italy, 
if the worst case scenario of a three-front war came to pass. Yet, with 
the Suez Canal being a vital conduit through which Royal Navy ships 
would have to pass through on their way to Singapore, it became 
impossible for the Admiralty to ignore the threat to the Mediterranean. 
The COS acknowledged this awkward fact during the Panay crisis. It 
responded by coming up with plans for a single-handed war with Italy. 
This, however, did not result in a fundamental reconsideration of British 








































CHAPTER FOUR: 1938-1939 ± Admiralty Preparations for War, and 
the Planning of a Mediterranean Offensive 
 
      British grand strategy changed profoundly during the final 
two years before the outbreak of the Second World War. By the end of 
1938, the British government and the COS recognized that Italian 
appeasement was failing. The Munich Crisis in October 1938 led the 
COS to conclude that a major war in Europe was imminent, and was 
expected to precede war in the Far East. Italy was now expected to join 
*HUPDQ\ DJDLQVW %ULWDLQ DW D WLPH ZKHQ WKH 5R\DO 1DY\¶V UHEXLOGLQJ
programs remained incomplete. This chapter examines how the 
Admiralty, forced to make plans for a general war in Europe that it 
expected at anytime, continued to be influenced by Far Eastern 
considerations. It argues that the shadow cast over British grand 
strategy by the need to take into account the Far Eastern situation was 
the decisive factor preventing the development of a viable plan for a 
Mediterranean offensive.      
      
       British-Italian relations immediately following the resignation 
of Anthony Eden were defined by a renewed attempt at Italian 
DSSHDVHPHQWE\WKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW&KDPEHUODLQ¶VSROLF\HQMR\HG
the wholehearted support of the Admiralty, which shared his views on 
two key issues. The first was that the Italian government, led by Benito 
Mussolini, was equally desirous of achieving a peaceful settlement with 
the British, thus, agreement with the Fascists in a similar vein as the 
Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904 was ultimately achievable. The 
second was that such an agreement provided the best solution for 
%ULWDLQ¶V VHHPLQJO\ LQWUDFWDEOH VWUDWHJLF GLOHPPD RI LPSHULDO
RYHUVWUHWFK ,Q WKLV UHVSHFW &KDPEHUODLQ¶V HDJHUQHVV to swiftly 
conclude an agreement could partly be attributed to pressure from 
%ULWDLQ¶V )DU (DVWHUQ 'RPLQLRQV XQGHUVWDQGDEO\ QHUYRXV DERXW
%ULWDLQ¶VDELOLW\WRGHIHQGWKHPLQOLJKWRIUHFHQW-DSDQHVHDGYDQFHVLQ
China, which pointed ominously southward. In March 1938, the 
Australian Cabinet recommended to London that it should make every 
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effort to come to terms with Rome, as a formal Anglo-Italian agreement 
ZRXOGEHWKH³PRVWYDOXDEOHFRQWULEXWLRQ´ to the general appeasement 
of Europe.177 The formulation of Mediterranean policy in London clearly 
had a Far Eastern dimension the British government could not afford to 
ignore. The Australian government, aware of the fact that British 
involvement in a Mediterranean war could jeopardize the timely 
dispatch of a British naval fleet to the Far East, watched events from 
the sidelines with great interest. 
 
      Consequently, following the conclusion of bilateral talks 
between the British and Italian governments, the Anglo-Italian Easter 
Accords were signed on the 16th of April, 1938. Both sides agreed to 
the peaceful resolution of all Anglo-Italian disputes in the 
0HGLWHUUDQHDQDQGWRUHVSHFWHDFKRWKHU¶VVSKHUHVRILQIOXHQFHLQWKH
Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The Italian government agreed to 
tone down its dissemination of anti-British propaganda in the Arab 
world, which it broadcast through the Bari radio station. Italy agreed to 
a phased withdrawal of its troops from Spain after the termination of 
hostilities in the ongoing Spanish Civil War, and an unspecified 
reduction of its military garrison in Libya.  In return, Britain promised to 
RIILFLDOO\UHFRJQL]H,WDO\¶VQHZFRORQ\LQ$E\VVLQLD178 
 
         )ROORZLQJWKH%ULWLVK&DELQHW¶VGHFLVLRQWRDSSURYHVWDIIWDONV
between the British and French militaries in February 1938, the 
Admiralty was tasked to conduct these talks in view of coordinating the 
military resources of both sides as preparation for a possible future 
conflict against the Axis powers. Even before the talks began, the 
Admiralty took pains to ensure that these talks would not affect British-
Italian relations. The COS concern that staff discussions with France 
could jeopardize the recently concluded Easter Accords was such that                                                         
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an addendum was added to the paper which they submitted to the CID 
regarding these talks. This addendum declared that Germany alone 
would be assumed as the aggressor of any proposed Anglo-French 
war plan.179  
 
        By the middle of 1938, however, the British government and 
the COS were becoming less sanguine over the long-term prospects of 
British-,WDOLDQ UHODWLRQV 0XVVROLQL¶V VXOOHQ DFTXLHVFHQFH WRAnschluss 
caused the Admiralty to consider the possibility that, while Italy had 
been fundamentally weakened, its foreign policy was now irrevocably 
tied to that of Nazi Germany.180 These worries were exacerbated by 
,WDO\¶VSRVWSRQHPHQWRI WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI WKH(DVWHUDFFRUGV WKH
breakdown of French-Italian talks, and continuing Italian involvement in 
the Spanish Civil War. The FO felt that British-Italian relations were in 
DQ ³intermediDWH DQG GDQJHURXV SKDVH´, and there was every 
possibility that a war in Europe would rapidly spread to the 
Mediterranean.181 
 
      When Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudeten German Party, 
issued a series of demands known as the Carlsbad Program to the 
Government of Czechoslovakia in April 1938, he set off a chain of 
events that led to the biggest political crisis in Europe since the First 
World War.182  +LWOHUZKRLQVWLJDWHG+HQOHLQ¶VGHPDQGVWKUHDWHQHGWR
invade Czechoslovakia if his demands were not met. With France 
legally obliged to defend Czechoslovakia under the Franco-Czech 
Defence Treaty of 1925, a German invasion of Czechoslovakia could 
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easily lead to a wider European conflagration, with the British forced to 
come in on the side of France.183  
 
      The Munich Crisis, which reached its most dangerous phase 
in September 1938, constituted a critical turning point in convincing the 
Admiralty that war between Britain and Italy might be unavoidable. On 
18 September 1938, during the height of the crisis, Mussolini made a 
VSHHFK DW 7ULHVWH GHFODULQJ ³LI DQ\RQH WRRN VLGHV IRU RU DJDLQVW
3UDJXH HYHU\RQH NQRZV WKDW ,WDO\¶V SRVLWLRQ LV DOUHDG\ FKRVHQ.´184 
0XVVROLQL¶VVSHHFKVHUYHGWRFRQILUPWKHIHDUVRIWKRVHLQWKH)RUHLJQ
Office that Italy fully supported GermaQ\¶V GHVLUH WR DQQH[ WKH
Sudetenland, and might be willing to go to war against both Britain and 
France if the crisis could not be resolved through peaceful means.185 
On the day Mussolini delivered his speech, Admiral Pound sent an 
urgent telegram to the Admiralty pointing out the need to move strong 
forces into positions in the eastern Mediterranean where they could be 
easily concentrated for collective action, due to his concern that the 
³0XQLFK FULVLV PLJKW DULVH DQ\ GD\ DIWHU 7XHVGD\ th 6HSWHPEHU´ 
Pound proposed that the Mediterranean Fleet be reinforced by the 
battlecruiser HMS Hood, aircraft carrier HMS Glorious, heavy cruiser 
HMS Sussex, light cruiser HMS Penelope, and a flotilla of destroyers 
moving to Alexandria, whilst battleships HMS Warspite and Barham 
and the light cruiser HMS Galatea, together with other ships of the 
)OHHW¶VHDVWHUQIRUFHPRYHGWRSRVLWLRQVLQ*UHHFHDQG&\SUXV186  
 
      3RXQG¶VSURSRVDO WRFRQFHQWUDWHVXFKDVWURQJ%ULWLVKQDYDO
force in the Mediterranean suggests he anticipated that, despite the 
%ULWLVK JRYHUQPHQW¶V EHVW HIIRUWV WR UHDFK D SROLWLFDO VHWWOHPHQW ZLWK
Mussolini, war could well break out between Britain and Italy over the 
QH[W IHZ GD\V 3RXQG¶V GHFLVLRQ WR FRQFHQWUDWH WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ                                                        
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Fleet at Alexandria, instead of Malta, indicated worries over an early 
Italian attempt to knockout the Mediterranean fleet, concerns that 
echoed those of Chatfield and Fisher during the height of the 
$E\VVLQLDQFULVLV7KH$GPLUDOW\DFNQRZOHGJHG3RXQG¶VFRQFHUQVDQG
approved his recommendations for a temporary evacuation of 
important fleet assets from Malta. It also approved almost all his 
requests for naval reinforcements, with the exception that HMS 
Repulse was to be returned from Gibraltar to the North Sea.187 The 
$GPLUDOW\¶VSRsitive response indicated a change in its attitude towards 
the probability of war against Italy, and that it understood the possible 
complications that could arise in the Mediterranean as a result of the 
Munich crisis. 
  
      ,W VKRXOG EH QRWHG WKDW DOPRVW DOO RI 3RXQG¶V UHTXHVWV IRU
reinforcements were approved despite this being a period when the 
weakness of the Royal Navy was acute. This starkly contrasted with 
the Abyssinian crisis, when Chatfield initially only approved a limited 
reinforcement of the Mediterranean Fleet. The British naval rebuilding 
programme was still progressing, scheduled for completion only in mid-
1939. Even having accounted for this, the naval situation in September 
1938 was such that an unusually large number of British capital ships 
were out of action, for various reasons. The Nelson-class battleship 
HMS Rodney, one of the few relatively modern capital ships in the 
Royal Navy, had urgent defects and could not be ready until early 
November. HMS Resolution was currently being used for training 
purposes, while HMS Ramilles was planned for refitting. 188  The 
combined effect of these limitations meant that while the Admiralty was 
DEOH WR DSSURYH3RXQG¶V SURSRVDOV DQ\ SRVVLELOLW\ RI WDNLQJ DQ HDUO\
offensive against Italy was effectively excluded.  
 
      That the most dangerous period of the Munich Crisis arrived 






from the fact that its stance during the crisis was largely decided well 
befRUH LW EHJDQ 7KH$GPLUDOW\¶V FRQVLVWHQW VXSSRUW RI &KDPEHUODLQ¶V
Mediterranean appeasement policy, and its refusal to sanction anything 
but the most basic form of military cooperation between the British and 
French navies, significantly hampered the prospect of a common front 
against Italy in the Mediterranean, should it choose to attack British or 
French interests in response to any Anglo-French declaration of war 
DJDLQVW *HUPDQ\ 8QWLO WKLV SRLQW PRUH WKDQ IRXU \HDUV DIWHU ,WDO\¶V
invasion of Abyssinia, WKH$GPLUDOW\¶VSROLF\ UHJDUGLQJ WKHGHIHQFHRI
British Mediterranean interests was largely unchanged. By appeasing 
Italy at almost any price, the Mediterranean would be kept peaceful so 
that the main striking power of the Royal Navy could proceed 
unhindered to the Far East within the shortest possible time frame, 
when called upon to do so. But this was challenged after Admiral 
Roger Backhouse replaced Chatfield as the new First Sea Lord in 
August 1938.  
 
      As First Sea Lord, Backhouse tried to radically overhaul 
H[LVWLQJ QDYDO SODQV %DFNKRXVH FRQVLGHUHG WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V SODQV WR
send the bulk of the British fleet to the Far East in the event of an 
Anglo-Japanese war for an indefinite period of time to be dangerously 
LPSUDFWLFDO HYHQ LI %ULWDLQ¶V RQO\ enemy was Japan.189 He reasoned 
that the strategic centre of gravity of British naval strategy should 
instead be shifted to the Mediterranean. Backhouse argued that, with 
,WDO\EHLQJ WKHZHDNHVWDPRQJVW%ULWDLQ¶VSRWHQWLDOHQHPLHVDWWDFNLQJ
Italy in conjunction with France might result in an early knockout blow 
against Italy that could be decisive for the course of the war. 
%DFNKRXVH¶VSODQWRDWWDFN,WDO\DWWKHRXWVHWRIZDUEHFDPHDVXEMHFW
of serious exploration at the Admiralty during the winter of 1938/39, as 
the British naval high command sought to come to terms with a war in 
Europe they expected at any time. 
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      Backhouse was well aware that scrapping the Singapore 
Strategy entirely would have potentially disastrous political implications 
with regards to British standing in the Far East, especially in the eyes 
of the Dominions. During a meeting with the Australian High 
Commissioner on 1 November 1938, Backhouse made a point of 
reassuring the Australian government that a fleet consisting of seven of 
%ULWDLQ¶V FDSLWDO VKLSV WZR RI WKH ODWHVWNelson class and five of the 
older Royal Sovereign class) would be dispatched to the Far East in 
the event of an Anglo-Japanese war.190 %DFNKRXVH¶V UHDVVXUDQFH WR
the Australian government during this meeting suggested that he 
realized the political importance placed by Dominion governments 
WRZDUGV %ULWDLQ¶V FRQWLQXHG DGKHUHQFH WR WKH 6LQJDSRUH 6WUDWHJ\
despite his plans for change. 
 
      6FKRODUVVXFKDV/DZUHQFH3UDWWKDYHGXEEHG%DFNKRXVH¶V
attempt to overturn the previously unchallenged primacy of the 
Singapore Strategy in favour of a Mediterranean First approach as a 
³VWUDWHJLF UHYROXWLRQ´.191 6HHQ LQ WKLV UHVSHFW %DFNKRXVH¶V SXVK IRU
change represented less of a complete revolution in grand strategy, but 
rather an attempt to acknowledge the strategic realities of the time, and 
to formulate the best possible plan for a three front war. Backhouse, 
unlike his predecessors, was under no illusions about the likelihood of 
Italian participation if it came to war against Germany. He believed that 
the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region, given the stocks of oil 
reserves that were crucial to the Royal Navy, was now an area of 
military and economic significance exceeding that of the Far East.192 
Backhouse, Pound and Lord Stanhope, First Lord of the Admiralty, 
agreed that in the event of a European war, the Mediterranean would 
have to be cleared of hostile forces, and vital stocks of oil reserves in 
the Middle East defended, as a necessary prerequisite to any Far 
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Eastern naval expedition.193 Nevertheless, the COS acknowledged that 
WKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI%DFNKRXVH¶VSURSRVHGFKDQJHVZHUHVXFKWKDWWKH
proposed ³SHULRG EHIRUH UHOLHI´ EHIRUH D %ULWLVK IOHHW FRXOG DUULYH DW
Singapore would have to be extended well beyond the previously 
stipulated period of seventy days.194 From this point, the key question 
asked by the Admiralty would be; could an offensive in the 
Mediterranean be swift and powerful enough so as to knock Italy out of 
the war fast enough to avoid compromising the Singapore Strategy? 
 
      As Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, Pound 
drew up plans for a Mediterranean offensive with the help of his Chief 
of Staff, Admiral Bruce Fraser. 195  Pound recommended that British 
armed forces concentrate first on securing Egypt and the Suez Canal, 
before conducting a ground invasion of Italian Libya from Egypt in a 
combined pincer movement with French forces from Tunisia. This 
would be done whilst the Royal Navy and the French Marine interdicted 
,WDOLDQ FRPPXQLFDWLRQV ZLWK /LE\D WR SUHYHQW ,WDO\¶V /LE\DQ JDUULVRQ
from being reinforced from the mainland.196 Fraser believed success 
could draw in the support of the other Mediterranean nations on 
%ULWDLQ¶V VLGH197 %XW WKH &26 DQG WKH $GPLUDOW\ FRQVLGHUHG 3RXQG¶V
suggestions to be unworkable, because British ground and air forces in 
Egypt were too small to carry out any offensive action in North 
Africa.198 
 
      Backhouse nevertheless pressed ahead, bringing back 
retired Admiral Reginald Drax, former CinC Plymouth, to help draw up 
DQHZQDYDOVWUDWHJ\'UD[VKDUHG%DFNKRXVH¶VJHQHUDOFRQFHSW WKDW
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the next war should be directed at the Mediterranean instead of the Far 
East. Drax considered that since the Admiralty intended to send at 
OHDVW QLQH FDSLWDO VKLSV WR WKH)DU(DVW WKLV IRUFH ³FRXOGEHXVHGHQ
route for a few weeks or even days in order to strike at Italy at least 
one heavy blow: a blow that might deter Japan from entering the 
ZDU´199 Drax understood that Japanese entry into the war would result 
in the British government having to send a strong British naval force to 
the Far East. However, KHIHOWWKDW³VKRXOGWKH$GPLUDOW\KDYHWRODWHU
send the fleet to the Far East, thus leaving our naval forces in Europe 
on the defensive, it would be of immense value for the Fleet to have 
VWUXFNRQHRUWZRKHDY\EORZVEHIRUHOHDYLQJ(XURSHDQZDWHUV´200 He 
recommended that strong British naval forces be concentrated for a 
sustained naval bombardment of military and industrial targets on the 
west coast of Italy, as well as targets on the coast of Sicily and 
Libya.201 To carry out these operations, the Mediterranean Fleet would 
operate from the French ports of Bizerta, Toulon and Algiers, and act in 
close cooperation with French naval forces.202 
 
      'UD[¶V LGHDV ZHUH QRW HQWLUHO\ QRYHO LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW WKH
Admiralty had already explored the prospect of a concentrated 
RIIHQVLYH DJDLQVW ,WDO\¶V QRUWKZHVWHUQ LQGXVWULDO KHDUWODQG LQ LWV
Appreciation of March 1931, and found the potential results of such 
action to be promising.203 However, this was not 1931, and Britain now 
faced three potential enemies. This meant that the COS would have to 
think long and hard before deciding to concentrate the bulk of British 
forces in a single theatre. Drax was aware that with the Home Fleet 
having to be retained in home waters to counter the German 
Kriegsmarine, the only ships available to conduct offensive operations                                                         
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against Italy at the beginning of war would have to come entirely from 
the Mediterranean Fleet.204 It was therefore essential for the Royal 
1DY\ WR VWULNH DW WKH YHU\ RXWVHW RI WKHZDU ³ZKHQ ZH KDYH D KXJH
superiority in Capital Ships over Germany and Italy, and Japan is still 
wobbling on the fence, and the Italians have only two capital ships 
UHDG\´ 205   Drax foresaw that, with the Regia Marina¶V FDSLWDO VKLS
strength expected to increase from two to six by the end of 1939, this 
³ZRXOGPDNHWKHVLWXDWLRQLQWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQPXFKPRUHGLIILFXOW´206  
 
     7KH FUX[ RI 'UD[¶V FRQFHSW ZDV WR WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI D
fleeting period of overwhelming British naval superiority vis-à-vis 
Germany and Italy during the opening phases of the war, to strike an 
early and decisive blow against an enemy considered especially 
vulnerable to naval bombardment. It appears that Drax did not 
envisage abandoning the Singapore Strategy. He did not challenge the 
$GPLUDOW\¶V SODQ WR VHQG WKH PDLQ IOHHW WR the Far East if Japan 
declared war, but planned to use this fleet to strike at Italy before it had 
to sail east. This, in his view, might even make it unnecessary for the 
IOHHW WR EH VHQW HDVW DIWHU DOO 'UD[¶V SODQQHG VWUDWHJ\ VXJJHVWV WKDW
even by this late stage, the Admiralty was considering Mediterranean 
strategy within the context of its implications elsewhere. Drax expected 
successful operations in the Mediterranean to have a salutary effect on 
%ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH )DU (DVW HLWKHU E\ GHWHUULQg Japanese 
intervention or allowing the Royal Navy to concentrate a strong 
battlefleet against Japan, unencumbered by commitments in the 
Mediterranean.  
    
      By early 1939, the COS appeared to have been convinced by 
%DFNKRXVH¶VDUJXPHQW WKDW WKHPDLQ LQLWLDOHIIRUW LQ WKHXSFRPLQJZDU
should be directed against Italy. In February 1939, the COS released 
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WKHILQDOGUDIWRIWKH³(XURSHDQ$SSUHFLDWLRQ-´207 Conceived in 
response to the Munich crisis, this document was written to reflect the 
COS belief that a European war was now inevitable and likely to 
breakout from as early as April 1939 onwards. The COS Appreciation 
assumed that Italy would join a German war effort at the very outset of 
war against Britain and France as per its obligations in the Pact of 
Steel, while the attitude of Japan was uncertain, and would depend on 
the course of the war in Europe.208 This was a crucial assumption, 
implying that the centre of gravity in the forthcoming war would be in 
Europe and not the Far East, and that Italy would be an active 
belligerent against Britain from the very start.  
 
      The COS recommended that Britain seize the initiative 
against the Axis powers at the start of the war through offensive 
operations in the Mediterranean. Planners called for British armed 
IRUFHVWR³EULQJLPPHGLDWHSUHVVXUHWREHDURQ,WDO\E\RIIHQVLYHDFWLRQ
whenever possible against her naval forces, coasts and bases, by 
interrupting her seaborne trade and isolating her overseas 
territories´209 Placing great importance on maintaining British control 
over both exits of the Mediterranean, the JPC recommended using 
Lisbon as an alternative port for Britain to control the western 
Mediterranean, and even seizing Ceuta in Spanish Morocco should 
6SDLQVLGHZLWKWKH$[LV WKHUHE\PDNLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQ LQ*LEUDOWDU
untenable.210 The reinforcement of British land and air forces in Egypt 
DQG WKH 0LGGOH (DVW ZDV DOVR FRQVLGHUHG DQ ³XUJHQW VHFXULW\
coPPLWPHQW´ As a broad directive for British strategy at the outset of 
war, the COS called for British armed forces to combine closely with 
)UDQFHVRDVWR³FRQFHQWUDWHRXUHIIRUWVRQWKHGHIHQFHRIWKRVHYLWDO
interests attacked. The security of our interests must have priority, but 












COS singled out Italy as a possible target. Italy, the COS remarked, 
ZDV ³PRUH HDVLO\attacked and is likely to be more sensitive to such 
RIIHQVLYH DFWLRQ´211 Taken as a whole, the European Appreciation 
indicated that the COS advocated a defensive strategic posture for 
Britain at the outset of war. That being said, they were also seriously 
considering the idea of an early offensive in the Mediterranean to try to 
knock Italy out of the war. 
 
      The recommendations of the COS were first considered in a 
subsequent meeting of the Strategical Appreciation 
Subcommittee(SAC) on 1 March 1939. SAC was a subcommittee of 
WKH&,'VHWXSWRVWXG\WKH³(XURSHDQ$SSUHFLDWLRQ´, organize a new 
set of strategic priorities, and recommend policy for the British 
delegation for the upcoming Anglo-French staff talks.212  Backhouse 
declared his intention to station a strong fleet at Alexandria to use for 
operations in the central Mediterranean, and to harass Italian 
communications with Libya and in the Aegean.213 He recommended 
that the Mediterranean Fleet bombard Italian coastal towns and oil 
storage facilities on the North African seaboard at the very beginning of 
war against Germany and Italy. 214  Backhouse argued that keeping 
%ULWLVK ZDUVKLSV LGOH LQ SRUW ZRXOG XQGHUPLQH WKH PRUDOH RI VKLSV¶
crews, and reiterated the need for a display of British naval strength in 
the Mediterranean, to maintain British prestige in the region. 215 
Chatfield, now Minister for Coordination of Defence, enquired if the 
Sub-Committee believed that the Cabinet would order offensive 
operations against Italy, given the attendant risk of losses to British 
FDSLWDO VKLSV ZLWK %ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH )DU (DVW VWLOO XQFHUWDLQ
Bringing up the warnings issued to the Dominion governments during 
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asked the Committee to carefully consider the detrimental effect yet 
another warning might have on Dominion opinion.216 This debate made 
it clear the potential impact of any British failure to fulfill the promise to 
the Dominion governments that the main fleet would eventually be sent 
to the Far East, under any circumstances, was a crucial factor in 
GHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHU WKH&,'ZRXOG DFFHSW%DFNKRXVH¶V SURSRVDO IRU
an all-out offensive against Italy at the outset of war. 
       
       The conclusions reached by the SAC were ambivalent. 
While the 6$& DSSHDUHG WR DFNQRZOHGJH WKHPHULWV RI %DFNKRXVH¶V
arguments, its eventual conclusions suggested that it intended to retain 
the option to send a strong British fleet to the Far East. These 
conclusions were used as the basis for a new round of staff talks with 
)UDQFH IROORZLQJ WKH -3&¶V FRQFOXVLRQ LQ )HEUXDU\  WKDW D
European war was now imminent. The SAC reiterated the British 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V LQWHQWLRQ WRVHQGD IOHHW WR WKH)DU(DVW LQ WKHHYHQWRI
Japanese entry to the war, yet declared that certain factors must now 
be taken into account before the size and composition of such a fleet, 
and the date of its departure, could be settled. 217  These factors 
included the excellent prospects for speedy results that an early 
offensive against Italy at the very outset of war would offer and the 
importance of affording moral and material support to key British allies 
in the Near and Middle East, namely Turkey, Greece and Egypt. Pre-
existing restrictions that hindered the success of earlier staff talks were 
also remoYHGDQGSODQQHUVZHUHGLUHFWHGWRDVVXPHWKDW³%ULWLVKQDYDO
dispositions were to be such as to enable the maximum pressure to be 
brought to bear on Italy, so that, in-cooperation with the French, the 
Italian Fleet could be driven from the sea and Italian sea 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQV ZLWK /LE\D VHYHUHG´ 218  Yet, the SAC ended the 
meeting with one important caveat: 








Under the worst possible circumstances, i.e, such that the 
alternative would present itself of practically abandoning either 
the Eastern Mediterranean or the Far East for the time being to 
the enemy, it would be for the government of the day, taking 
into account the factors enumerated above, to decide upon the 
distribution of naval forces required to meet the situation.219 
 
The consequence of this was to defer any definitive decision on 
whether to adopt a Mediterranean First approach, and leave the 
direction of Anglo-French war planning in the hands of the Admiralty 
delegation. 
 
      Despite gaining broad acceptance by the SAC, obstacles still 
remained before WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V FRQFHSW FRXOG EH WUDQVODWHG LQWR D
FRKHUHQW DQG HIIHFWLYH VWUDWHJ\ )RU %DFNKRXVH¶V SODQ WR EH FDUULHG
out, close cooperation between the British and French navies, to an 
even greater extent than existed during the First World War, would be 
necessary. Also, the very idea of a Mediterranean offensive at the 
outset of the war remained anathema to the Foreign Office, which still 
EHOLHYHG%ULWDLQ¶VFDSLWDOVKLSVVKRXOGEHFDUHIXOO\KXVEDQGHGVR they 
could be despatched to Singapore immediately following any Japanese 
attack on British interests in the Far East. Stanhope, well aware of this 
IDFWFRPPHQWHGGXULQJ WKH6$&PHHWLQJ WKDW ³WKHVLWXDWLRQZRXOGEH
greatly improved if the United States could be prevailed upon to send a 
fleet to Hawaii as soon as the Japanese took up a threatening attitude 
LQ WKH 3DFLILF´220 In effect, the Admiralty hoped that a show of naval 
force by the US would deter Japan from joining the war and negate the 
need for the Admiralty to divide its limited naval forces between two 
oceans. It appears that while Chamberlain realized the need to stand 
shoulder-to-shoulder with the French against the threat of Italy, he also 
saw the British promise to the Dominions to send a fleet to the Far East 
as an indispensable sine qua non of British grand strategy which could 
not be sacrificed under any circumstances. In late January 1939, 






with France on the hypothesis of war against Germany and Italy, he 
ordered joint Anglo-French plans to be formulated for the 
Mediterranean and Middle East in particular, even though it was 
UHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKLVZRXOGPHDQ³DIDUPRUHELQGLQJFRPPLWPHQWWKDQ
KDVKLWKHUWREHHQFRQWHPSODWHG´221 Yet less than two months later, on 
20 March 1939, Chamberlain assured the Australian Prime Minister 
that Britain would deter any major Japanese operations against 
Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and India, and more important, that 
³WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ ZRXOG QRW EHFRPH D VWUDWHJLF SUREOHP IRU WKH
%ULWLVK´222 
 
      The general principle of a Mediterranean offensive, should 
the war begin in Europe, had gained broad acceptance amongst the 
British high command; but nevertheless, the details of how Italy was to 
EH ³NQRFNHG RXW´ RI WKH ZDU VWLOO UHPDLQHG WR EH VRUWHG RXW $ QHZ
series of staff talks between the Royal Navy and its French 
counterparts began on 30 March 1939.223 But Backhouse fell ill with 
influenza, and Drax left the Admiralty after his tenure expired in 
March.224 This had an important effect on these talks. Even before they 
began, the Anglo-French Joint Planning Committee(JPC), which was 
created to help facilitate joint military planning, released a paper that 
expressed doubts over the prospect of knocking Italy out of the war.225 
The main thrust of the JPC argument was that while Italy was indeed 
the weakest of the three Axis powers, it was unrealistic to expect 
offensive action by Britain and France to force the Italian government 
to sue for peace within a short period of time. The COS also pointed 
out that weak British ground and air forces in Egypt meant only the 
Royal Navy could take the offensive against Italy at the beginning of                                                         
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war. In sum, the JPC concluded that British policy in the Mediterranean 
must first ensure the security of Egypt against Italian attack before any 
offensive action against either Italy or Libya could take place.226   
         
      The subsequent Anglo-French staff talks failed to produce 
consensus over how a combined Anglo-French offensive in the 
Mediterranean should be conducted. Both sides agreed that knocking 
Italy out of the war as soon as possible was a goal worth pursuing, but 
could not agree how to do this. The talks began well with a French 
proposal for a combined Anglo-French attack against Libya, along the 
OLQHVRI3RXQG¶VSODQ7KLVSODQKRZHYHUFDPHZLWK WKHFDYHDW WKDW
should Spain join the war on the side of the Axis, the bulk of French 
forces in North Africa would have to first be deployed in an attack 
against Spanish Morocco before any large-scale eastward offensive 
against Libya could be undertaken. The French predicted that a major 
offensive against Libya could only commence within 20 to 30 days of 
the Moroccan front being brought under control. 227  The British 
responded by promising to conduct minor harassing operations against 
the Italians on the Egyptian front aimed to prevent any considerable 
reinforcement towards Tunisia, if the main theatre of operations in 
North Africa was in the west.228 The British delegation made the point, 
however, that these operations could not be expected to penetrate 
deep into Libyan territory and could only, at best, reach Bardia, a 
Libyan town 30 kilometers from the Egyptian border.229 It was evident 
from this that the conquest of Italian Libya by British and French forces 
would require a significant period of time. 
 
      The second crucial stumbling block during the talks was 
British insistence on sending the main fleet to the Far East in the event 
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predicated upon a recent agreement with Britain in which the Admiralty 
agreed to stationing four battleships in the Mediterranean basin.230 This 
was meant to allow the cream of the French navy, including the two 
fastest and most modern battleships, the Dunkerque and the 
Strasbourg, to be deployed in the Atlantic, where they could be used to 
protect Atlantic shipping lanes from the threat of German commerce 
raiders. Should the Admiralty choose to evacuate the Mediterranean, 
the French Navy would have to face the entire Regia Marina with just 
two old 22,500 ton battleships, unless it decided to redeploy ships that 
were designated for the Atlantic.231 This would not only result in the 
Allies effectively surrendering control of the entire Mediterranean to 
Italy, but would also seriously imperil the movement of French colonial 
troops from North Africa back to the metropole should they be required 
to augment the French Army in the event of a German invasion of 
France. The British delegation refused to accede to the French 
request, but agreed that, while the issue could not be decided in 
advance and would depend upon many factors, the weakening of the 
British Mediterranean Fleet should not lightly be undertaken. The 
formula that both sides agreed with regard to this issue was that the 
final decision of whether or not to send any units of the Mediterranean 
Fleet to the Far East, and how many ships were to be sent, would be 
decided by the British government in consultation with the French 
government.232  
 
      7KH%ULWLVKGHOHJDWLRQ¶VUHSRUWRQWKHRXWFRPHRISUHOLPLQDU\
Anglo-French staff talks suggested that it had become discouraged 
RYHUWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHU,WDO\FRXOGEHVXFFHVVIXOO\³NQRFNHGRXW´
of the war at its very outset. The report recommended that Allied grand 
VWUDWHJ\EHLQLWLDOO\GLUHFWHGWRZDUGV³PDLQWaining as far as possible the 
territorial integrity of the two (British and French)Empires and                                                         
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GHIHQGLQJWKRVHRIWKHLUYLWDOLQWHUHVWVWKDWDUHDWWDFNHG´233 Only in the 
second phase of operations, which the British delegation agreed 
should be directed towards ³GHDOLQJ GHFLVLYHO\ ZLWK ,WDO\´, should the 
conduct of significant offensive operations be considered. 234  British 
SODQQHUVQHYHUWKHOHVVFRQFOXGHGWKDW%ULWDLQVKRXOGEH³EXLOGLQJXSRXU
PLOLWDU\VWUHQJWKXQWLOZHFDQDGRSWDQRIIHQVLYHPDMRUVWUDWHJ\´235 The 
obvious implication of this was that achieving a quick decision in a war 
with Italy would not be feasible. While the British delegation did admit 
WKDW %ULWDLQ VKRXOG EH UHDG\ WR ³VHL]H DQ\ RSSRUWXQLW\ RI REWDLQLQJ
without undue cost, successes against Italy which might reduce her will 
WRILJKW´WKH\ evidently envisaged an initial strategy of containment until 
which time Allied superiority in manpower and resources could be 
brought to bear against Germany and Italy.236 From this point onwards, 
doubts were raised as to whether decisive results against Italy could be 
achieved before it became necessary to send a British fleet to the Far 
East. 
 
      Events in late March and April 1939 complicated matters still 
more, because they provoked a near volte-face by Chamberlain and 
the Foreign Office regarding the Far East.  Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
agreed to a British request to shift powerful US Navy forces back to the 
Pacific. This, together with an agreement to resume Anglo-American 
naval talks, suggested that the US might help pull British chestnuts in 
the FaU (DVW RXW RI WKH ILUH $OPRVW DW WKH VDPH WLPH *HUPDQ\¶V
DQQH[DWLRQRI&]HFKRVORYDNLDDQG,WDO\¶VLQYDVLRQRI$OEDQLDUHIRFXVHG
British attention on the rapidly deteriorating situation in Europe. 
Concern over these latest acts of aggression by the Axis powers was 
most apparent in France. On 11 April 1939, the French government 
indicated that France would make terms with Germany if Britain sent its 











strongly reinforced their forces in the Mediterranean, Tunisia and 
French Somaliland, to underline their determination to defend the 
region. 237  These were developments no British government could 
afford to ignore, so in mid-April, it hurriedly guaranteed to defend 
Greece, Turkey and Romania against further aggression by the Axis 
powers. In early May, Chatfield submitted the final recommendations of 
WKH6$&WRWKH&,'7KH6$&¶VILQDOUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVPDLQWDLQHGWKDW
%ULWDLQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRVHQGDFDSLWDOVKLSIRUFHWRWKH)DU(DVWZDV 
not open to question, but whether this could be done to the 
exclusion of our interests in the Mediterranean would have to be 
decided at the time.  As regards the question of whether we 
could knock out Italy before the Japanese caused us irreparable 
damage, the stationing of the United States Navy in the Pacific 
was an important factor.238         
 
These recommendations were subsequently endorsed by the CID, 
Chamberlain and the Foreign Office. Forced to choose between 
defending the Mediterranean and the Far East, the British government 
clung to the hope that intervention by the US might make such a 
decision unnecessary after all. 
 
      Once again, the Admiralty was compelled to reassess its Far 
Eastern commitments as a result of the rapidly evolving European 
situation*HUPDQ\¶VODXQFKRIWKHWZRQHZBismarck-class battleships, 
IROORZHG VZLIWO\ E\ +LWOHU¶V GHQXQFLDWLRQ RI WKH $QJOR-German Naval 
Agreement on 28 April 1939, seriously alarmed the British naval high 
command.239  In May 1939, the Admiralty released a memorandum 
detailing British fleet dispositions at the beginning of a European war. 
At least seven out of ten operational British capital ships had to be left 
in home waters to counter the German threat. The Admiralty planned to 
station three capital ships in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a view 
towards possibly sending them eastwards if Japan declared war.  The 
Admiralty concluded that possible action to counter Japanese action in                                                         
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the Far East in the event of a three front war had to depend upon the 
strategic situation in Europe, and the attitude of the US government. 
However, it planned to eventually send a fleet of four battleships to the 
Far East, once ships returning from extended notice reinforced the 
Home Fleet.240 This clearly demonstrated that the Admiralty did not 
want to abandon its commitments in the Far East even at this late 
stage, when German naval rearmament threatened to significantly 
reduce British naval superiority in the vital waters around the North 
Sea.  
 
      The outbreak of the Tientsin incident on June 14, when 
Japanese military forces blockaded the entrances to the International 
concessions at Tientsin, created a somewhat unexpected contingency: 
Britain might find itself at war in the Far East before the expected 
showdown with Germany and Italy. Critically, this dispelled any 
remaining illusions held by the British government about the possibility 
of the US helping, in the last resort, to guarantee the security of British 
interests in the Far East. The COS response was blunt. Due to the 
unsettled European situation and the need to preserve the 
preponderance of the fleet in Home and Mediterranean waters, only a 
maximum of two capital ships could be sent to the Far East to face the 
entire Japanese navy.241 Following top-secret staff talks between the 
British and American naval staffs in June 1939, the Admiralty decided 
that planning in the Far East could not be based upon the expectation 
of American intervention.242 7KLVEHOLHIZDVFRQILUPHGDIWHU5RRVHYHOW¶V
attempt to obtain congressional approval fRU D UHQHZDO RI WKH ³&DVK-
and-CDUU\´ SURYLVLRQ WR WKH 1HXWUDOLW\ $FW IDLOHG 243  This Act had 
previously allowed for the legal sale of US arms to France and Britain.                                                         
240
 TNA, ADM 116/3863, Minute by Director of Plans, Captain V. H. 
'DQFNZHUWV µ1DYDO SROLF\ LQ WKH HYHQW RI )DU (DVWHUQ :DU¶  0D\
1939. 
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 TNA, CAB 16/183A, COS Memorandum 92µ7KH6LWXDWLRQLQWKH
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opinion remained strongly against any form of American assistance 
towards belligerent parties should war break out. This made it clear to 
the British that American intervention in an Anglo-Japanese war was 
unlikely. 
 
      Successful negotiations between Sir Robert Cragie, %ULWDLQ¶V
ambassador to Tokyo, and the Japanese government allowed the 
British government to resolve the crisis without suffering too much 
damage to its prestige. The Admiralty, however, was alive to the fact 
that war in the Far East could break out anytime, and more importantly, 
that American assistance could not be counted upon. This settled its 
planning regarding a Mediterranean offensive. Pound replaced 
Backhouse as First Sea Lord in July, when the latter succumbed to his 
illness. Straight away, Pound noted the vital considerations that 
influenced whether or not a Mediterranean offensive could be 
successful. While it might not be possible to achieve a knockout blow 
within a very short time, allied naval and air forces could significantly 
weaken Italian war-making capacity by concentrating attacks on oil 
stocks. 244  Should Britain secure an American guarantee of its Far 
Eastern interests, the Royal Navy could afford to risk losing two to 
three capital ships pressing an all out effort against Mussolini. 245 
However, if there was any doubt as to the attitude of Japan and the 
USA, the British could not afford to risk such a loss; this would both 
induce Japan to enter the war and leave the Royal Navy to weak to 
reinforce the Far East even it chose to abandon the Eastern 
Mediterranean.246  3RXQG¶VPHPRUDQGXPSURYLGHVFOHDUHYLGHQFHWKDW
the Admiralty was not going to risk launching any major operations in 
the Mediterranean while the situation in the Far East remained 









defend the Far East still ranked higher in priority than attacking in the 
Mediterranean. 
                    
      The COS faced one more crucial question when deciding 
upon the right approach to take against Italy ± what if Italy reneged on 
its alliance with Germany and remained neutral at the outset of a 
European war? This issue was discussed during one of the final 
peacetime CID meetings on 24 July 1939. The CID decided that, 
VKRXOG ,WDO\FKRRVHQHXWUDOLW\ ³QRDWWHPSWVKRXOGEHmade to compel 
her to declare her position by any measures which are likely to have 
WKHHIIHFW RIEULQJLQJKHU LQ DJDLQVWXV´2Q WKH FRQWUDU\ LWZRXOG EH
ZRUWKZKLOHIRU%ULWDLQ³WRSD\WKHKLJKSULFHZKLFKVKHZRXOGGRXEWOHVV
demand, in order to avoid this contingency (of Italy entering the war on 
WKHVLGHRI*HUPDQ\´247 7KH&,'¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRSD\D³KLJKSULFH´IRU
Italian neutrality clearly suggests that even with war in Europe 
considered imminent, it still saw the concentration of British forces in 
the Mediterranean as an unnecessary diversion from more important 
strategic objectives. These objectives were the defence of the British 
+RPH,VODQGVDQG%ULWDLQ¶VLQWHUHVWVLQWKH)DU(DVW7KLVZDVFOHDUO\
demonstrated by the way the CID framed the question of what British 
policy should be in the event Italy fulfilled its alliance obligations and 
HQWHUHG WKH ZDU DORQJVLGH *HUPDQ\ 7KH &,'¶V PDLQ FRQFHUQ ZLWK
regard to the possibility of an immediate offensive against Italy under 
such a situation was the impact that such action would have on 
%ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH )DU (DVW 248  Its verdict was that "offensive 
operations against Italy do not offer a prospect of such rapid success 
as would release air and naval forces for operations in the Far East in 
the early days of the war."249 )XUWKHUPRUHZKLOH³DVXFFHVVLQWKH5HG
Sea area would enhance our prestige and might act as a deterrent to 









KHDY\ FDVXDOWLHV ³-DSDQPLJKW EH WHPSWHG WR WXUQ WKHRSportunity to 
her own advantage and our ultimate ability to defend the Dominions 
DQGRXURZQLQWHUHVWVLQWKH)DU(DVWZRXOGEHSUHMXGLFHG´250  
 
      The die was cast. Britain would return to the old policy of 
trying not to provoke Italy, and take up a strictly defensive stance in the 
Mediterranean should Italy turn hostile. The COS supported this policy 
at a meeting during the Danzig crisis on 24 August. During this 
meeting, the COS decided Britain should seek Italian neutrality, and 
even seek to make further concessions towards Italy.251 This policy 
remained unchanged when Britain declared war on Germany on 3 
September, following the German invasion of Poland two days earlier. 
 
      British defence planners were beset by a concatenation of 
crises during the last year before the Second World War. As the COS 
predicted in early 1939, the war began in Europe. Japan intervened 
only two years later when it made the momentous decision to attack 
Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941. The British Admiralty, well aware 
of the need to avoid a three front war it believed was unwinnable, 
seriously considered, in 1939, making an all-out effort against Italy, to 
try to abort that dilemma. But the war went in a very different direction 
when they opted to stand on the defensive instead. As it happened, it 
took nearly four years after war began in Europe for the Allies to 
conquer Italian Libya and establish Allied naval supremacy in the 
Mediterranean. The Admiralty vision of an offensive against Italy was 
only realized from July 1943, when Allied forces invaded the Italian 
peninsula, aiming to knock it out of the war by attacking what Winston 
&KXUFKLOOWHUPHGWKH³VRIWXQGHUEHOO\´RIWKH$[LVSRZHUV252  
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       However, the fact remained that for a Mediterranean 
offensive to be successful in the terms defined by the Admiralty, 
significant military forces had to be committed to such an enterprise. 
The Admiralty considered that for a Mediterranean offensive to be a full 
success, it had to defeat Italy within the space of a few months at the 
very most. Only this would allow the rapid turnaround of British naval 
forces to the Far East, where Japanese intervention was considered 
probable. The odds that such an admittedly ambitious objective could 
be achieved were significantly reduced when France could not and 
would not commit the forces necessary to produce the overwhelming 
superiority over Italy required to score the essential rapid knockout 
blow. When the Americans declined to guarantee any support against 
Japan, this made it obvious that trying to land an unlikely knockout 
blow against Italy might very well utterly compromise the Far East.  The 
need to defeat Italy swiftly or not attack at all was always the key factor 
LQWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQVEHFDXVHRIWKLVXQDYRLGDEOHNQRFNRQ
HIIHFWLQWKH)DU(DVW7KLVLQWKHILQDODQDO\VLVGLFWDWHGWKH$GPLUDOW\¶V




















      The British Admiralty explored ways and means to dominate 
the Mediterranean under any scenario throughout the 1930s. Prior to 
1935, the importance of the Mediterranean was not reflected in British 
naval plans simply because the British did not expect to face any 
serious opponent in the region. When it became evident that Italian 
hostility might have to be reckoned with, British naval planners reacted 
flexibly and intelligently. Well aware of the unparalleled qualitative and 
quantitative superiority enjoyed by the Royal Navy over its opponents, 
the Admiralty seriously considered taking the war to Italy should 
Mussolini have chosen to start one. The effort that the Admiralty put 
into developing the MNBDO, which was sent to Alexandria during the 
height of the Abyssinian crisis, provide indications of a gradual shift in 
strategic thinking in the Mediterranean from defensive to offensive, 
beginning from the middle of the 1930s. This clearly suggests that 
British defence planners were far from pusillanimous when they 
considered the prospect of war against Italy, an opponent which they 
considered manifestly inferior.  
 
      'HVSLWHLWVFRQILGHQFHLQWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VDELOLW\WRPHHWDQ\
challenge in the Mediterranean, the Admiralty was constantly held back 
from undertaking action against Italy due to its fear that the Navy would 
end up sustaining crippling losses. These losses were expected to 
compromise the defence of British interests in other theatres. With the 
exception of Admiral Roger Backhouse, most British naval planners 
considered this to be an unacceptable price to pay even if Italy was 
decisively defeated and the threat to British communications through 
the Mediterranean permanently removed. Forced to defend an 
overstretched empire with limited forces that were barely sufficient for 
its tasks, it should not surprise anyone that men like Chatfield and 
Pound constantly chose to err on the side of caution. 
      When it came to deciding imperial defence priorities, the 
Admiralty consistently prioritized the demands of Far Eastern defence 
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over the Mediterranean. This had an important impact in shaping plans 
in the Mediterranean, to the extent that British responses against Italian 
expansionist ambitions became rather muted. Nevertheless, it would 
be unfair to claim that the Admiralty considered British Mediterranean 
interests to be unimportant. On the contrary, it became even more 
FRQFHUQHG DERXW %ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ ZKHQ WKH
situation in the Far East GHWHULRUDWHG IROORZLQJ -DSDQ¶V DWWDFN RQ WKH
Panay in late 1937. British naval policy in the Mediterranean might 
have changed according to who was in charge as First Sea Lord at that 
point, but all knew that the defence of the Far Eastern and 
Mediterranean theatres were intimately connected. In truth, neither 
theatre could be neglected ± abandoning the Mediterranean would 
have jeopardized British communications with the Far East, while 
abandoning the Far East would have grave political and military 
implications to the extent of imperiling the entire British Empire east of 
Suez. Even Backhouse could not afford to take the latter consequence 
lightly. Caught in a bind, the Admiralty persistently pushed for a 
diplomatic settlement with Italy, until it became clear by 1938 that such 
a settlement was increasingly unattainable.  
 
      7KH HOXVLYH ³NQRFNRXW EORZ´ DJDLQVW ,WDO\ WKDW %DFNKRXVH
pushed for from 1938 onwards was a solution that British defence 
planners hoped would greatly ease their strategic predicament. Once 
Italy was taken out of the equation, it was expected that the daunting 
prospect of a three front war would become a much more manageable 
two-front conflict. This was a plan with admittedly ambitious objectives 
that would have been difficult to achieve under even the best-case 
scenario. Nevertheless, it clearly demonstrated that the Mediterranean 
Sea was always an integral part of overall grand strategy in the eyes of 
the Admiralty, and had acquired an even greater degree of significance 
by the end of WKHGHFDGH7KH$GPLUDOW\¶VFRQVWDQWVHDUFKIRUDSODQWR
GHFLVLYHO\GHIHDW,WDO\DQGUHPRYHWKHWKUHDWWR%ULWDLQ¶V0HGLWHUUDQHDQ
communications was indicative of how British grand strategy was 
always predicated on effective control of the Mediterranean. The great 
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irony was that British naval planners were ultimately prevented from 
executing such a plan by the fear of severely weakening the very 
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